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Abstract.
Freedom is a fundamental concept for anarchism; but what does that mean, exactly? What sort of  
freedom do anarchists seek, and how do they hope to realise this freedom? Starting with the premise  
that such questions,  though vital  to the anarchist  project,  have mostly  been ignored,  this thesis  
argues that the basic libertarian impulse of anarchism is in need of a critical analysis. Such an  
analysis, however, highlights a number of problems with the anarchist demand for a world without  
domination, so anarchist understandings of ethics, and of power, are explored in search for answers.  
However, anarchist approaches to ethics and power prove to be equally problematic, and serious  
doubts are raised about the potential for anarchism to provide a world where freedom is absolute,  
and, conversely, where all forms of coercion are rejected. One possible response to this is to be  
found in the contemporary support for consensus-decision making, which many anarchists argue  
has the potential to resolve conflict; however, it is argued that far from offering a response to the  
concerns  raised in  previous  chapters,  the possibilities  of  consensus must  be seen to  be greatly  
reduced, once such concerns are properly taken into account. Unable to live up to its libertarian  
promises, anarchism may appear to have reached a dead-end. However, the thesis concludes by  
arguing  that  anarchism’s  prefigurative  approach to  politics,  as  well  as  its  sustained  critique  of  
hierarchy, offer both radical and realisable possibilities for creating a world of much greater equality  
and freedom – even if such freedom can never be absolute. In accepting the limits of anarchism, its 
possibilities can be seen more clearly.
Keywords:  freedom, ethics,  power,  equality,  conflict,  consensus,  prefiguration,  liberalism,  blue-
prints.
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The Bull.
On my farm, the bull is the king of the yard;
He's big and bad and fast, he's strong he's . . . hard.
All my other animals would readily concur
That he is the one you salute, he's the one you call "Sir".
But my hens, a noisy, flighty flock -
Led, of course by my unsubmissive cock -
Whenever His Majesty the bull importantly goes by
They dance along behind him and they cry:
"Beware of the bull!"
The bull, the bull, 
is the biggest of all.
He is the boss, he is, because he's big and we are small.
But the bigger the bull, bigger the bull, bigger the balls.
The bigger the bull, the bigger and quicker and thicker the bullshite falls.
Beware of the bull! The dancing cock is right:
Beware of whoever looks down upon you from a height.
Beware of His Honour, His Excellence, His Grace, His Worshipful,
Beware of His Highness, because of the bull.
For if the boss, the chief, the chap at the top
Should let a single lump of claptrap drop,
The greater the weight and the height he is, the harder it will go
With a grander splat on the bleeders below.
Beware of the bull!
Taken from “The Bull” by Jake Thackray
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Preface.
It’s hard to think of another time when there has been such a gulf between intellectuals and activists;  
between theorists of revolution and its practitioners. Writers who for years have been publishing  
essays that sound like position papers for vast social movements that do not in fact exist seem seized  
with confusion or worse, dismissive contempt, now that real ones are everywhere emerging. It’s  
particularly scandalous in the case of what’s still, for no particularly good reason, referred to as the  
‘anti-globalization’ movement (Graeber 2002, 3)
DESPITE the recent surge of interest in anarchism from within academia, the vast majority  
of anarchists remain oblivious to, or disdainful of, the work of academics, who are often viewed ‘as  
over-privileged  obscurantists  who  function  to  justify,  and  therefore  maintain,  existing  social  
divisions’ (Franks 2010, 1). This stems in part from anarchists’ distrust of claims to authoritative  
knowledge,  and  from  an  equally  strong  distrust  of  abstract  theory.  Although  in  some  ways  
understandable, such an out-right rejection of academic work is nonetheless regrettable; as we shall  
see in the following thesis, anarchism is in considerable need of critical engagement, and whilst this  
can and must come from outside of the academic world, it can also come from within it. Academics  
are in a privileged position, able to spend time and energy considering the state of anarchism, and  
however  problematic  the  institution  of  the  university  and  the  role  of  the  academic  may  be,  
anarchists would be foolish to dismiss entirely the valuable contributions that academics are able to  
make. But there is another reason why academic work is so frequently dismissed by those outside  
the university; a great deal of academic work is simply inaccessible to those who do not want to, or  
who are not lucky enough, to spend their time familiarising themselves with dense and complex  
works of theory. Although at times academic work is by necessity difficult, because it is dealing  
with complex problems that cannot simply be dumbed-down, there are also a number of what seem 
to me unjustifiable and undesirable academic habits which can and should be jettisoned, in order to  
make  such  works  more  readable,  enjoyable,  and  therefore  useful.  The  use  of  formal  and  dry  
language – the prohibition against using the first person pronoun, for example – turns at  times  
already difficult theory into a still  more uninviting world in which those unaccustomed to such  
language feel unwelcome, and belittled. 
Academics, and, we might say, especially radical academics who want to change the world, have a  
responsibility to make their work accessible to those existing outside of the ivory tower. This does  
not mean that academics should not engage in complex theory, because the world itself is complex;  
9
simplifying  academic  analyses  simply  to  make  them  readable  by  everyone  does  nobody  any  
favours. Content, in other words, is not the issue; but wherever possible, academics must consider  
the way they present their work. Obtuse writing styles form an instant barrier to many, who may  
well give up an article or book simply because they feel estranged by its tone. 
As such, the following thesis is written in a relatively informal manner, in the hope that, whilst  
many of  the  discussions  within  it  are  indeed complicated,  the  language used  does  not  add  an  
additional burden. As I explain in the Introduction, this thesis has grown from my own experiences  
as an anarchist involved in various forms of political activism, and whilst my fellow activists may  
well choose to ignore my often critical views, I would hope that they at least have the opportunity to  
engage  with  them,  should  they  so  wish.  As  the  anarchist  academic  David  Graeber  has  said,  
anarchist theory should be offered as ‘a gift’ (Graeber 2004, 12), available to those who might make  
good use of it.
However, my own work is a somewhat unusual, and possibly unwelcome gift; more an exercise-
bike for an over-weight relative than a box of chocolates. The reason for this is simple; despite my  
continuing  support  for,  and  engagement  with,  anarchist  politics,  I  find  myself  increasingly  
uncomfortable and frustrated with the unthinking and uncritical approach of so many anarchists to  
their own ideology. All too often, anarchists present their ideas as being quite obviously viable and  
desirable, and appear unconcerned with engaging with any reasonable concerns that they are not. Of  
course,  anarchism  has  never  been  short  of  detractors,  all  too  happy  to  dismiss  it  as  violent  
extremism or naïve utopianism; but such criticisms are for the most part entirely misinformed and  
simplistic; as such, they are easily dismissed, and do nothing to add to the necessary debates about  
what it means to argue for anarchism. What they do do, however, is help foster an embattled and  
defensive attitude amongst anarchists themselves, who understandably feel reluctant to add to this  
chorus of negative voices. But anarchism is in serious need of engaged and thoughtful criticism, and  
the following work attempts to provide just that. In doing so, my ‘gift’ comes in the form of a  
somewhat relentless critique, and some dedicated and passionate anarchists – some of whom I count  
amongst  my friends  – are subjected to  this  criticism.  This,  beyond all  the  other  difficulties of  
writing a thesis, has made this an emotionally challenging work, and whilst I have felt compelled to  
pursue such criticisms, I hope that my words are taken, not as an insult or a personal attack, but as a  
gift, even if it is a somewhat challenging one.
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Introduction
Stirling, Scotland - 6th July 2005: 2 a.m. [...] From the Hori-zone eco-village and protest camp [...] a mass  
exodus is in progress [... O]n the A9 hundreds of people are obstructing the road along a few miles [...]  
throwing the entire region into a gridlock [....] turn[ing] Perthshire into one big traffic jam. In it, hundreds  
of secretaries, translators, businessmen and spin doctors are beginning one very long morning [...] In case  
some one hasn’t noticed, anarchism is alive and kicking (Gordon 2008, 1-2).  
I’M sure  lots  of  people  did  indeed notice  the  anarchist  presence  in  Scotland:  one  man  
certainly did. My journey to the G8 summit began two weeks earlier when I left for Scotland from  
London, on a bike, with sixty other cyclists. The G8 Bikeride travelled up through the country,  
without motorised support, to join in the protests. Although the ride was never explicitly anarchist,  
it was organised along anarchist principles, and certainly most of the people who took part would  
have identified with, for example, the principles of anarchism outlined in Uri Gordon’s book from  
which the above quote is taken. Some time in the afternoon of the 6th, the ride arrived at a small  
village called Auchterarder, where large numbers of diverse groups were meeting, with the intention  
of marching to Gleneagles, where the summit was being held. When we arrived, the main road  
running through the village and an adjoining park were filled with protesters. As we were about to  
head  off  for  another  ride,  to  see  what  was  happening  nearby,  a  large  man  with  an  unhappy  
expression stood right in front of me and my bike, preventing me from moving. I didn’t know why  
he was doing what he was doing, but it was clearly intentional. I assumed, given the circumstances,  
he was a plain-clothes police officer. ‘Excuse me’ I said. Then, suddenly: ‘Bloody anarchists’ he  
yelled, ‘we’ve been sat in traffic jams all morning thanks to you lot. I thought you believed in  
freedom! What about my freedom’? I had been, momentarily, the victim of a one-man blockade.
I don’t know why he singled me out, and it doesn’t really matter; the fact is, he had a point. A few  
bystanders joined in,  supporting the man,  and by the end of  the day,  the feeling of  animosity  
towards (simply) ‘anarchists’ was plain to see. By blocking roads, not only world leaders, but also a  
great many protesters had been disrupted by a relatively small number of anarchists. Their tactics  
had, undeniably, prevented people exercising their freedom to protest. Yet freedom, as my one-man 
blockader correctly suggested, is usually understood as being a fundamental principle of anarchism:  
so how was the denial of this man’s freedom justified? In part, the following work is an attempt to  
answer this question, but it does so in the form of a wider enquiry into the fundamental principles of  
anarchism. I begin by asking, then, what conception(s) of freedom do anarchists have? And do  
other principles at times over-rule the value of liberty – therefore justifying, for example, the denial  
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of my blockader’s freedom? If so, what are these principles? So I turn to the question of ethics, to  
examine  which  other  values  might  sit  alongside,  and  inform,  anarchist  visions  of  freedom.  
Anarchist approaches to ethics, however, must be understood in relation to another core concept –  
that of power. Is power understood as necessarily bad, or can it be a positive, creative force? And  
does it reside simply in certain institutions, such as the state, or within all areas of life? These three  
concepts then – freedom, ethics, and power – form the basis of the following enquiry. However,  
exploring these themes has not been a matter of simply detailing what anarchists say they think  
about such matters;  rather, it  has been a  critical engagement, exposing numerous problems and  
unspoken assumptions within what I call an anarchist common sense. Indeed, whilst the concepts of 
freedom, ethics, and power form the narrative structure of the following work, my discussions of  
them are  propelled  by  the  overarching  claim that  anarchism is  a  deeply  problematic  ideology,  
which, if it is to be capable of offering a viable vision of an alternative world, is in very real need of  
a sustained and critical re-assessment. 
This view, however, might be dismissed at the out-set, as being simply untrue. Anarchism, it might  
be argued, is enjoying a considerable surge in interest that has not been seen for well over fifty  
years; social justice and environmental activists are increasingly embracing anarchist  ideas, and  
anarchism is receiving attention from academics across the globe. Of course anarchism faces certain  
challenges, but what ideology doesn’t? Surely the high levels of interest generated in recent years  
suggests that anarchism is in fine health, and any barriers to its becoming more popular still are not  
the  result  of  anarchism’s  own  failing,  but  are  purely  external,  emanating  from  the  state,  the  
corporate media, and so on. Anarchism is not considered respectable by the very elites it seeks to  
get rid of, but that is clearly to be expected; and it evidently does meet with the approval of a wide 
spectrum of people committed to some form of social change. However, I would challenge this  
view. As both an activist and an academic, I remain unconvinced that anarchism is in a position of  
strength.  Although there has indeed been a great  deal  of enthusiasm for  anarchist  ideas  within  
various protest movements, much of this translates into extremely limited tactical shifts. Protests are  
organised along non-hierarchical lines, more direct action takes the place of marching from a to b,  
and so on; this is all well and good, but I believe the legitimate celebration of these achievements  
now needs to give way to an assessment of how, and in what ways, anarchism can be taken still  
further. Although anarchism may well be at the heart of much radical political protest, it remains  
very much marginalised as an alternative political model. In fact, I believe that if sufficient changes  
do not take place within the movement, it is likely to slide once more into insignificance. Before  
continuing the discussion of the thesis itself, then, I want to say a few words on the recent interest in  
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anarchism; in doing so, I hope it will become clear that anarchism, for all that has been achieved in  
its name over the past decade or so, is still far from being a threat to the established order.
In the Margins, or on the Front-Line?
Despite the myriad human catastrophes endured under ‘actually existing socialism’, for much of the  
latter half of the twentieth century, Marxism was still considered, at least in the academic world, as  
the only viable contender to capitalism; anarchism simply did not appear in the minds – or works –  
of respectable, leftist academics. At the beginning of the twenty-first century however, this situation  
has changed dramatically, and anarchism is now reverberating not only through a thoroughly global  
social  movement,  but  also,  increasingly,  through the corridors of academic institutions as  well.  
Anarchism has not been so visible for decades. And yet, here in the UK, when discussions about the  
prospect of a hung parliament and the apparent crisis of democracy dominated the media after the  
general election in May 2010, not once did I see an anarchist perspective being given column space  
or air-time. This is just one example, but the point is this: anarchism, for all it has achieved in recent  
years,  remains  utterly  at  odds  with  most  people’s  understanding  of  politics;  perhaps  more  
importantly, it remains at odds with their understanding of possibility. Anarchism is simply not seen  
as  being  a  realistic  political  philosophy  by  the  vast  majority  of  people.  And  I  am  wholly  
unconcerned here with the Daily Mail reading public; what about the people involved in Transition  
Towns1 or the Green Party, and even the countless people who have dabbled with radical politics at  
Climate Camps2 or G8 summits, for example, but who tend to fall back on more conventional forms  
of social change sooner or later? For example, there has been a big debate within the Climate Camp  
movement,  which  began  as  an  explicitly  anarchic  network,  about  the  extent  to  which  more  
conventional  political  routes should be taken to tackle the issue of climate change,  with many  
arguing that anarchism simply does not have the capacity to respond to such an urgent and global  
problem3. 
With capitalism teetering on the brink of collapse for several years, a recession as bad as anyone  
can remember, the global threat of climate change, a looming energy crisis, and, in the UK (and  
elsewhere),  a  political  system  that  even  mainstream  commentators  are  suggesting  is  unfit  for  
1 The Transition Town movement focuses on re-localising basic infrastructure, such as food production, in response to  
a looming energy crisis, and although it attempts to remain apolitical as a movement, many people involved are also  
engaged in other forms of political activism, some of it anarchistic in nature. See http://www.transitiontowns.org  
2 Climate Camps are organised along anarchist principles, but not everyone involved is necessarily an anarchist. See  
http://climatecamp.org.uk/  for more info. I also discuss the Camps organisational methods in Chapter Six.
3 See http://dysophia.wordpress.com/2010/01/  for one such discussion (last accessed 31/12/2010).
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purpose,  with  calls  for  greater  democratic  accountability  on  all  levels,  it  became  increasingly  
possible to imagine that a radically different politics such as anarchism would be embraced by more  
and more people. Clearly, this hasn’t happened, and to find out why, I would suggest anarchists  
need to take a more critical look at their own ideology, to honestly assess its problems. This might  
seem like an all too obvious point to make, but woven throughout my critique is an additional claim  
that anarchists have tended to be far too uncritical of their own ideology; I discuss some significant  
reasons as to why this is the case in Chapter One.
Is Anarchism Respectable?
 
I am not alone in challenging anarchism in this way. Indeed, numerous critics over the years have  
made their own particular claims about anarchism’s shortcomings, refusing to accept key anarchist  
views as unquestioned orthodoxy 4. There is of course no clear cut line between these more critical  
thinkers and others who have tended to be less so, but I would certainly highlight the work of  
Gustav Landauer  (2010),  Errico Malatesta  (1965)  and Michael  Taylor  (1980).  Colin  Ward was  
another such critical friend of anarchism, and I share his concerns with the question of whether or  
not anarchism is ‘respectable’. ‘In asking this question’, notes Ward, ‘I am not concerned about the  
way we dress, or whether our private lives conform to a statistical norm, or how we earn our living,  
but with the quality of our anarchist ideas: are our ideas worthy of respect?’ (quoted in White 2007, 
11). 
However, perhaps the most sustained critique of anarchism that has emerged in recent years comes  
in the form of  postanarchism.  Drawing on the work of poststructural  theorists,  such as Michel  
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and François Lyotard, a growing number of thinkers, for example Todd  
May (1994),  Saul  Newman (2001),  and Jason Adams (2003),  challenge what  they argue  are a  
number of problematic metaphysical assumptions within anarchist thought. As Newman explains , 
‘the central contention of postanarchism is that classical anarchist philosophy must take account of  
new  theoretical  directions  and  cultural  phenomena,  in  particular,  postmodernity  and  
poststructuralism’ (2008, 101).  
Although  the  postanarchist  critique  has  been  cautiously  welcomed  by  many  anarchists,  one  
complaint  that  has been consistently  raised is  that  postanarchists  have been too quick to  lump  
together what is widely acknowledged to be a diverse ideological family, failing to take account not  
4 Of course, this is supposed to be true of all anarchists; the following work suggests otherwise.
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only of the different – and at times contradictory – philosophical claims of those theorists they do  
critique, but also of the broader changes that have taken place within anarchist thought over the last  
hundred or so years. Ruth Kinna, for example, talks of ‘the tendency of postanarchists to bundle  
together  a  disparate  set  of  writers  in  one artificial  grouping,  in  a  way that  obscures  important  
differences of thought, time, geography, culture and political argument’ (Kinna 2007, 81). Kinna  
undoubtedly has a point – as we shall below. Such valid concerns aside, however, the postanarchist  
critique  should  be  broadly  welcomed,  because  it  has  helped  promote  a  much  needed  critical  
assessment  of  anarchist  theory,  prompting  anarchists  to  ask  which  metaphysical  assumptions  
different anarchists do in fact hold – if any. In fact, as I argue below, what the postanarchist critique  
most  clearly  –  though  unintentionally  – demonstrates  is  that  most  anarchists  have  no  clear  
metaphysical position. Not surprisingly then, I believe the recent emergence of postanarchist theory  
is an encouraging sign, which has helped expand the anarchist horizon. 
In certain respects my own work echoes this line of questioning, and might therefore be considered  
as  part  of  this  emerging  critique  of  anarchism.  However,  although  I  draw  on  the  works  of  
poststructural theorists such as Iris Marion Young, as well as on the work of postanarchists, and  
adopt what might be broadly considered to be a poststructural as regards questions of rationality,  
human nature and the nature of morality, I do not start from the same assumptions about anarchism 
as the postanarchists. As a result of this, I have chosen to explore anarchism in a much broader  
fashion, examining both classical and contemporary positions. In the following section, I explain  
and defend this broad-based approach, and, in doing so, we begin to see that to talk of anarchism’s  
metaphysical underpinning is, in some senses, to put the cart before the horse 5. 
Which Anarchism?
I have so far argued that anarchism has suffered from a general lack of critical engagement, but I  
have yet  to  address the question of which anarchism, or anarchists,  I  am discussing.  As every  
anarchist  knows,  the  anarchist  spectrum is  broad,  encompassing  many  diverse  –  and  at  times  
mutually incompatible – views of what anarchism really is.  Anarchism has always been a broad 
church, with different thinkers in different times and places emphasising certain aspects over others,  
and, over time, coming to reject particular elements altogether. Can we coherently discuss anarcho-
5 In fact, as we shall see throughout the thesis, many of the conclusions  drawn by the postanarchists parallel my own;  
the fact that we start from different  premises does not, I would argue, suggest that one or the other is wrong, but  
simply highlights the point  that ideologies are complex phenomena which can be understood and explained in  
equally complex (and varied) ways.   
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syndicalists of the 1930s in the same breath as anarcha-feminists of the 1980s, for example? As the  
now  infamous  dispute  between  Murray  Bookchin  (1995)  and  Bob  Black  (1997)  so  clearly  
demonstrated, a shared ideological label does not necessarily entail much else (I discuss this debate  
briefly in Chapter Six; see also Martin 1998, 39-44 for a useful discussion on the Bookchin and  
Black debate). Making claims about simply  anarchism, or  anarchists, then, with no qualification 
about which anarchism or anarchists one is discussing, is to obscure these important differences and  
treat all anarchists as following one coherent and well-defined ideological position; for better or for  
worse, this is rarely the case. As Leonard Williams puts it: ‘sometimes it seems that the only thing 
that is constant about anarchism is its inconstancy’ (Williams 2007, 299). 
However, I believe it is both possible and useful to discuss anarchism as a whole. Although t his 
approach does pose certain problems (which I discuss in greater detail below), such concerns –  
especially when adequately acknowledged – do not negate the fact that to make a broad based  
critique of anarchism is in fact possible, and, indeed, also beneficial; although at times it is useful to  
explore a narrowly defined aspect of an ideology – a particular era, or thinker, or theory – it is also  
useful to stand back and take a broader view. Doing so allows us to see through the many important  
differences to uncover some shared problems; this is not to say these differences are ignored, but  
rather suggests that at times an over-emphasis on diversity may in fact mask and muddle some more  
fundamental challenges. It can therefore be worthwhile to put them to one side at times, to get down  
to the nuts and bolts – to discover what I call here an anarchist common sense, which, as we shall 
see, is often far less diverse and unchanging than is often claimed. My work does of course follow  
certain  discourses  more  than  others;  most  prominently,  I  engage  with  contemporary  activist  
discourses,  as  exemplified  by  the  works  of  Uri  Gordon (2008),  whose  work  we  have  already  
encountered, as well as other activist scholars, such as Marianne Maeckelbergh (2009) and David  
Graeber (2004; 2007; 2009). Recent postanarchist critiques also provide another more solid thread  
to the thesis. However, whilst my work may be said to be structured around these core discourses,  
this core is nourished by – and only understandable through – its connection with a wider network  
of  anarchist  thought,  and  so  the  wider  anarchist  tradition  forms  an  underlying  matrix  for  my  
discussion. In this way, then, my work explores the anarchist  project’s  broad spectrum, and, in  
particular, draws parallels between classical and contemporary work. 
The  scope  of  my  research  is  limited  in  certain  ways,  some  intentional,  others  less  so.  Most  
obviously, my work is regrettably western, and anglo-centric. This is partly due to limitations in my  
linguistic skills, but also reflects a simple failure on my own part to look beyond the western world  
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– something which increasingly gives me cause for concern. My one justification for this is that, as  
I am challenging an already broad subject, reaching out still further might well tip the scales and  
turn a broad-based discussion into an incoherent mess. Nonetheless, the exclusion of other anarchist  
traditions, such as those in Turkey and Japan, is to be regretted. 
I  have  also  deliberately  excluded  anarcho-capitalists  such  as  Murray  Rothbard.  It  is  broadly  
accepted in the wider anarchist movement that anarchism is more than a simple critique of the state;  
for the majority of anarchists,  all  forms of hierarchy, including economic ones,  are challenged.  
Right libertarians reject the state, but embrace the capitalist market and accept any hierarchies and  
inequalities that flow from this. This view is consistent with a particular understanding of freedom,  
which emphasises the autonomy of the rational individual, and it is not my intention here to dismiss  
anarcho-capitalism, per se (though this is not to offer any support for it either). However, anarcho-
capitalists do not share sufficiently core values to be considered relevant for my discussion; their  
views  are  not  indicative  of  my  understandings  of  an  anarchist  common  sense.  Beyond  these  
limitations, how do I define this anarchist common sense?
The Anarchist Common Sense.
The anthropologist and anarchist David Graeber notes that  
Anarchism is less about a body of theory than about an attitude, or perhaps a faith: a rejection of certain  
types of social relation, a confidence that certain others are a much better ones [sic] on which to build a  
decent or human society, a faith that it would be possible to do so (Graeber 2007, 303). 
Whilst academic philosophers may wish to, and be able to, dissect a particular line of thought and  
demonstrate to what extent it  rests  on this or that metaphysical understanding of,  for example,  
knowledge, or of human nature, the majority of anarchist thought has not been constructed on such  
methodical grounds. Indeed, an increasingly common complaint from within anarchism, and an  
ever present complaint from its detractors, has been this lack of philosophical rigour (McLaughlin  
2007). It may be argued, however, that whether or not people are aware of the foundations they rest  
their philosophy on is besides the point; the foundations are there, and are of no small importance  
(see Jun, 2010 for an informative discussion of anarchism’s philosophical underpinnings). This is  
no doubt on one level true, but it is worth considering to what extent anarchists’ philosophical (or  
scientific)  beliefs  come  after their  more  basic  ethical  and  political  leanings,  justifying  them  
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retrospectively,  rather  than  being  their  source.  Malatesta  makes  the  point  well  with  regards  to  
Kropotkin, whose ‘[...] anarchism and communism’, he argued, ‘were much more the consequence  
of his sensibility than of reason. In him the heart spoke first and then reason followed to justify and  
reinforce the impulses of the heart’ (Malatesta 1965, 264). Much the same could be said, I would  
argue,  for most anarchists.  This is especially relevant  when we look to contemporary  activists, 
many of whom ‘[...] overtly disdain abstract or academic theory’ (Williams 2007, 298). So what can 
be said about this anarchist common sense? Generalisations may at times be useful, but important  
differences  cannot  simply  be  ignored.  Firstly,  I  want  to  explore  the  distinction  between  
contemporary and classical anarchism; in doing so, we will see that although some differences are  
indeed  relevant  –  and  when  this  is  the  case  they  will  be  addressed  in  the  following  work  –  
fundamental anarchist assumptions about freedom, ethics and power, have, in important respects,  
remained more or less the same over the last century and a half.
Saul Newman argues that whilst poststructuralism has 
had a major impact on different areas of scholarship and thought, as well as politics, anarchism tends  
to  have  remained  largely  resistant  to  these  developments  and  continues  to  work  within  an  
Enlightenment humanist epistemological framework (Newman 2008, 101). 
Yet poststructural thought has had a considerable influence on anarchist theory for many years now  
– a point which has been widely acknowledged (Purkis & Bowen 1997, 2004; Amster et al 2009; 
Curran 2006). Indeed, in the last decade, anarchism, it has been argued, has experienced an internal  
rupture,  and  a  supposedly  ‘new’  anarchism  (Graeber  2002),  ‘revised’  (Williams  2007)  and  
‘reloaded’ (Gordon 2008) with discourses from feminist, poststructural and post-colonial thought, to  
name  a  few,  has  been  born.  And  it  had  already  been  ‘reinvented’ (Ehrlich  et.  al.  1979)  and  
‘reinvented, again’ (Ehrlich 1996) before that. The distinction between ‘capital A Anarchists’ and  
‘small a anarchists’ (with ‘capital A anarchists’ representing an older, more ideologically strict form  
of  primarily  class  focused  anarchism,  and  ‘small  a  anarchists’  representing  a  contemporary,  
ideologically fluid variety, much more in line with poststructuralist theories) presents still further  
evidence  of  this  philosophical  shift  (Neal  1997;  Graeber  2004;  Kuhn  2009,  19)..  As  Leonard 
Williams suggests: 
In recent decades [...] anarchist thought has moved beyond its central focus on the State or capital to  
embrace wide-ranging thinking about such matters as the environment, technology, work, and the status  
of women (Williams 2007, 300). 
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However, despite such shifts, he goes on to highlight the fact that ‘anarchism seems to retain its  
central character as a viewpoint opposed to the presence of coercion, hierarchy, and authority in  
human  affairs’ (ibid.).  Importantly,  this  continuity  is  not  necessarily  the  result  of  conscious  
reflection,  and  Williams  goes  on  to  note  that  ‘[o]ne  element  that  remains  unquestioned  is  
anarchism’s bedrock commitment to opposing authoritarianism in almost any form’ (ibid., 311). In  
other words, despite the many changes that anarchism has undergone, some of its core principles  
and concerns remain, not only unchanged, but also unquestioned. 
The point can be made well by looking at  two claims made by the same theorist,  Uri Gordon.  
Gordon,  one  of  the  most  prominent  theorists  to  be  actively  involved  in,  and  write  about,  the  
contemporary anarchist movement, argues that:
The anarchist movement as we see it today is not a direct genealogical descendant of the nineteenth- and early  
twentieth-century thread of libertarian socialist militancy […]. Rather, the mainspring of today’s anarchism can  
be found at the intersection of other social movements […]. The process of network and ideological convergence  
among these movements involved a rediscovery, reframing and re-articulation of anarchist values and concepts  
[...] (Gordon 2009, 261-2).
On this view, contemporary anarchism is little more than a distant cousin of the anarchism of a  
century ago; it is, to use Gordon’s words, only  ‘ephemerally related’ (Gordon 2008, 6).  It would 
appear therefore that  to discuss contemporary and classical strands together is  flawed from the  
beginning. And yet, when the question of anarchism’s respectability (to use Ward’s term) is raised,  
this  difference seems to disappear.  According to  Gordon,  his  book,  Anarchy Alive! is  ‘[...]  not 
intended to argue for anarchism or to convince anyone that anarchy is possible or desirable’ (ibid.).  
Why?  Because  ‘the  ‘case  for  anarchy’ has  already  been  made  exhaustively  and  to  [his]  own  
satisfaction in two centuries of anarchist literature’ (ibid.).  Yet if the break between classical and  
contemporary is really so definitive, how can the ‘case for anarchy’ be made now with reference to 
texts written a hundred years ago? Of course, Gordon could simply have failed to have noticed what  
could be taken as contradiction,  both denying and defending a link between contemporary and  
classical  anarchism.  But  I  would  suggest  that  what  this  demonstrates  is  the  importance  of  
underlying assumptions that are indeed shared by the vast majority of anarchists. Indeed, I would  
argue that rather than having made an error as such, Gordon’s claim unintentionally highlights both  
common  assumptions  and  common  problems  that  reach  throughout  anarchism’s  long  history.  
However, whilst anarchism may have, in these core respects, remained unchanged, the discursive  
shifts  Gordon  speaks  of  that  have  occurred  within  anarchism  are  by  no  means  irrelevant  to  
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answering  the  question  of  whether  anarchism is  indeed  ‘possible  or  desirable’,  a  point  which  
Gordon himself appears to recognise in a later article (Gordon 2009, 262-5). Furthermore, the wider  
world  certainly  has  changed;  as  well  as  philosophical  changes,  anarchists  must  respond to  all  
manner of questions which the likes of Kropotkin could never have envisaged. From environmental  
problems such as climate change and peak oil, to technological changes, such as the internet and  
systems  of  surveillance,  to  the  cultural  differences  of  an  increasingly  plural  world,  the  world  
anarchists  now face  poses,  certainly  different,  and,  one  might  argue,  greater,  challenges  when 
thinking about the possibilities of a more libertarian society. I would disagree with Gordon’s claim  
that the ‘case for anarchy’ has already been well made, but if ever it had, it clearly needs to be made  
again – whichever form of anarchism it is one wishes to defend.  
What I want to suggest then is this: the various claims that anarchism has changed so radically in  
the last half century tell, at most, only half the story; in fact, I hope to show in the following thesis  
that anarchists have for too long failed to critically explore and articulate their own philosophical  
underpinning,  their  own  metaphysical,  and  indeed  practical,  assumptions.  So  while  the  
postanarchists argue that anarchists have followed Enlightenment inspired approaches to questions  
of human nature, power, ethics, and so on, I would argue what has become evident (partly thanks to  
their  critique)  is  that  there are  no clear  metaphysical  foundations to anarchist  theory.  Rather,  I  
believe  that  anarchism is  best  understood  as  a  set  of  basic  moral  demands,  which,  through  a  
complex  network  of  criss-crossing  narratives,  are  often  articulated  within  certain  discursive  
parameters, including, but not limited to, particular conceptions of human nature, rationality, power,  
and so on. Rather than resting on these foundations, however, the anarchist project is effectively  
free-floating, with the primary aim being the achievement of a certain moral rupture from the status  
quo.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  anything  an  anarchist  might  say  is  mere  opportunism,  but  to  
highlight the possibility that what really lies at the core of anarchism is not a view of human nature,  
or of the state, but rather a basic libertarian impulse that, when articulated, necessarily becomes  
intertwined with various political, sociological, and epistemological ideas; and, perhaps above all,  
with often highly contextualised tactical beliefs. Like all ideologies, anarchism is best understood as  
incorporating a core set of values that exist in a fluctuating relationship with a larger collection of  
peripheral ideas (Freeden 1996), some of which may be used to retrospectively justify these values.
What unites the vast majority of anarchist thought, old and new, is ultimately a failure to really  
engage with these issues. Freedom, ethics, power – when we begin to explore these questions, there  
is no clear, absolute humanist, or anti-humanist, foundation to which we can point. Of course, it is  
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true that some of the earlier anarchists at times applied a profoundly rationalist, scientific approach  
to their work; my aim is not to deny this, but to stress that there is at least another narrative that can  
be equally informative. Indeed, throughout anarchist thought there is in fact a strong emphasis on  
praxis, on anarchy in action, which, however much this may rely implicitly on some metaphysical  
view or another, is rarely concerned with uncovering what these views might be. As Williams states  
Whether in the form of street demonstrations or an urban bookstore, many of today’s anarchists are more  
focused on getting things done and much less concerned with developing a political philosophy or taking  
sides in polemical disputes (Williams 2007, 309).
 
Making a similar point, Graeber suggests that anarchists are not interested in creating their own  
High  Theory;  rather,  they  see  themselves  ‘[...]  giving  a  name  and  voice  to  a  certain  kind  of  
insurgent  common sense’ (Graeber  2009,  213).  My feeling  is  that  this  common sense has  not 
changed dramatically in the last two centuries; it has been added to, stretched, pulled and tugged,  
and so has inevitably incorporated new concerns, and no doubt abandoned a few, along the way: but  
its most fundamental elements remain. But common sense usually takes the form of unchallenged  
assumptions.  In the following work,  I  want to get to the heart  of the anarchist  common sense,  
revealing it for what it is, and challenging it where appropriate. In order to understand how I come  
to define and access this common sense, I want now to explain my methodological approach. I then  
provide a brief overview of some of the more important terms and ideas to be discussed, before  
finally presenting a more detailed outline of the thesis’ chapters.
Methodology: a Philosophical Ethnography
The following work, then, focuses not on one particular thinker, or movement, but on a broader  
understanding of  anarchism; what  I  have called an anarchist  common sense.  The question still  
remains, however, as to how I hope to access this common sense; how can I hope to filter through  
literally thousands of books and pamphlets, not to mention the mostly unwritten thoughts of most  
anarchists who never express their views in writing? How can I know – and convince the reader –  
that I am giving an honest and accurate account, and not simply misrepresenting and distorting  
ideas to suit my own agenda? There are two responses to such questions.
Firstly, this is a primarily philosophical work, and my intention is not to provide a detailed history  
of  anarchist  thought  per  se,  but  rather  to  explore  and  discuss  a  number  of  key  themes,  
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philosophically. That the ideas I discuss are considered central to anarchist theory is hopefully not  
in dispute, and I do not make the claim – which would simply be untrue – that all anarchists think in  
exactly the same way about these matters. What matters is that these themes – primarily, freedom,  
power, and ethics – are key to the majority of anarchists.  Therefore, any discussion about them  
would appear to be intrinsically justifiable; but the question remains whether my arguments are  
necessary, or relevant, when considered alongside what others have already said. How can we know  
I am not merely repeating, or ignoring, what others have already said, discussing problems which  
have long since been resolved? 
So  my  second  approach  takes  the  form  of  what  I  have  called  a  philosophical  ethnography.  
Contemporary theorists such as Gordon, Graeber and Maeckelbergh use ethnography to explore the  
various themes that anarchists – especially activists – are currently concerned with. In explaining  
her approach to discussing the new forms of democratic engagement currently being experimented  
with by anarchist activists, Marianne Maeckelbergh states that she uses her 
ethnography  […] to  critically  examine  political  philosophy on  democracy  in  order  to  draw out  the  
theoretical  and  practical  implications  of  this  emerging  form  of  alternative  global  democracy  
(Maeckelbergh 2009, 35). 
As an activist herself, she uses her experience to inform her work, drawing from the discussions and  
practices of other movement actors; in such a way, she is able to get a strong sense of what matters  
to these people, which issues interest them, what responses they give to certain questions, and so  
on.  This  is  an  increasingly  common  approach  to  anarchist  academic  work  (see,  for  example,  
Fernandez 2009; see also Jeffrey S. Juris (2007) who calls this approach ‘militant ethnography’). I  
too use my experience of over a decade’s involvement with contemporary anarchist activism 6, as 
well as a broader engagement with other outlets for anarchist thought. As well as the numerous  
academic books and articles that have surfaced in recent years, I also follow numerous email lists 7, 
and attend conferences, gatherings and workshops 8, all of which helps me build up a more thorough  
picture of this anarchist common sense. 
6 I have been involved in anarchist activism in numerous ways, including, but not limited to, Earth First!, Bicycology,  
Climate Camps, the Dissent Network!, and the Lancaster Anarchist Group.  
7 In particular, the Anarchist Academic, Anarchist Studies Network, and KnowledgeLab email lists, which are used  
by anarchist activists and academics, primarily in Europe and North America. 
8 Numerous Anarchist Bookfairs now take place annually in the UK. The first Anarchist Studies Network conference  
took place in Loughborough 2009. Several other conferences now include specifically anarchist streams, such as the  
Political Theory Workshops which takes place in Manchester every year. In recent years there has also been a  
number of more grassroots conferences, such as the KnowledgeLabs which took place in Lancaster in 2006-7, and  
the Anarchist Movement Conference in London, 2009.   
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Such ethnographic work lays the foundation for engaging with the anarchist ideology, which is then  
explored in ways which follow the work of Michael Freeden, who asks 
what are the implications and insights of a particular set of political views, in terms of the conceptual  
connections it forms? Which universe of meaning – deliberate as well as unintentional – is constructed by  
its conceptual configurations? (Freeden 1996, 3). 
As such, as Freeden continues:
The analysis of political concepts is not, on this understanding, most usefully pursued by projecting their  
logical permutations and ethical possibilities in the abstract, often attached to universalizable models […]  
but through locating them within the parameters in which they actually appear (ibid.).
However, my approach differs slightly from that of Freeden, Maeckelbergh, Gordon and others; as  
we saw,  Maeckelbergh  uses  ‘ethnography […] to  critically  examine  political  philosophy’,  as  I  
intend to  do,  but  I  also reverse the process,  and use political  philosophy to  critically  examine  
ethnography. Of course, to some extent, contemporary ethnographers such as Maeckelbergh also do  
this – their work is never entirely a one-way street; but whereas most ethnographic work focuses on  
detailing  the core ideas of activists, I want to philosophically explore them, and, crucially, to go  
further, and at times actively challenge them.
In doing so, I also make considerable use of academic discussions relating to liberalism; as will  
become  increasingly  clear  throughout  the  thesis,  much  can  be  learnt  by  comparing  the  two  
ideologies, both of which share  a strong commitment to freedom. In particular, I will argue that  
many criticisms levelled against liberalism, by theorists such as Iris Marion Young (2000), also  
highlight the potential for similar problems within the anarchist project.  
So the primary focus of my work is the contemporary activist  anarchism that inspired a global  
movement against not only capitalism and the state, but also many related concerns, such as the war  
on  terror  and  climate  change.  But  as  my  argument  suggests  that  the  problems  contemporary  
anarchists now face are much the same as those faced by earlier anarchists, and as I believe that the  
threads which connect contemporary anarchism and its earlier incarnations are often stronger than  
many now claim, my work also draws from the long history of anarchist thought. As I have already  
acknowledged, there are problems in discussing Peter Kropotkin, Colin Ward, and David Graeber in  
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the same breath, yet I believe there is much to be learnt from revealing just how much common  
ground they share; and, with regret, showing just how problematic so much of this shared history is.  
So my work is philosophical in nature, discussing a number of key themes central to all anarchist  
thought;  but  it  is  a  work  of  engaged  philosophy,  dealing  with  these  themes  not  as  abstract  
philosophical problems, but as articulations of a contemporary political movement. However, in  
order  to  fully  understand  this  movement,  and  the  ideas  it  expresses,  my  discussions  are  
contextualised with reference to the broader anarchist movement. I also want to stress at this point 
that  the following arguments offer  only a partial  account;  indeed, much of  what  I  have to  say  
throughout  this  thesis  is  intended  not  as  overarching  claims  to  truth,  objectively  covering  all  
possible interpretations, but as a collection of critical interrogations, which, taken together, build up  
a more holistic picture of what is a complex and diverse ideology. I do not claim to be aware of and 
cover every position held by anarchists; such extensive knowledge is simply not possible. But I do  
hope  to  provide  a  meaningful  account  of  what  I  argue  to  be  the  standard  philosophical  
underpinnings  of  anarchism  –  the  anarchist  common  sense.  Once  again,  I  follow  Freeden  in 
believing  that  ideologies  are  helpfully  understood  as  clusters  of  core  concepts  which  must  be  
analysed in relation to one another, as well as in relation to the wider cultural and historical context  
within which they are expressed, in order to present ‘[...]  a plausible, generally applicable, and  
reasonably  comprehensive  framework  of  analysis  that  is  both  intellectually  and  culturally  
satisfying’ (Freeden 1996, 6). Furthermore, 
the views of this scholar cannot be absolved from the limitations of perception and comprehension that  
apply to all human thought-processes. The test of this study will have to be not in the objective truth of its  
analysis and methods but in whatever intellectual appeal and utility of perspective it may be deemed to  
have (ibid., 4).   
As such, there is no denial of a ‘multiplicity of available perspectives’ or of the ‘inevitable gaps in  
recreating so intricate a phenomenon’ (ibid., 6). I am not, in other words, presenting a complete  
picture,  but,  rather,  simply  one  important  argument  within  a  broader  ideological  framework.  
Additionally, as the anecdote with which I opened this work demonstrates, my approach perhaps  
goes one step further, and is not only philosophical and ethnographic, but also deeply personal. It is,  
in the final analysis, my own attempt to understand anarchism, and to answer my own troubling  
questions that, over the last decade, have come to dominate my thinking about it. In this respect, I  
differ from Freeden in explicitly hoping not only to understand anarchism, but, especially in the  
final chapter, to offer my own thoughts on how it may begin to deal with the problems I outline.  
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This does not  mean I have rejected all  standards of academic rigour,  but  that  I recognise that,  
ultimately, my analysis is but one story amongst many. And, perhaps more than the high standards  
of academia, it is subjected to the more worthy test of whether or not other anarchists will find it of  
use; all I can say on that matter is that I hope that they will. 
Brief Glossary of Terms
Before concluding with an outline of the chapters to follow, some explanations of certain terms will  
be helpful. I have already narrowed down as much as possible what I intend to cover with the term  
anarchism. At times, when a certain distinction is necessary, I refer to  classical or  contemporary 
anarchism. As I discussed above, such terms separate anarchism not only chronologically, but also  
in  relation  to  a  number  of  philosophical  assumptions,  with  contemporary  anarchism  being  
understood as more aligned to poststructural and feminist discourses, and classical anarchism being  
closer  to  a  more  rationalist,  Enlightenment  approach.  Distinguishing  anarchism’s  differing  
philosophical  positions  with  reference  to  its  chronological  poles  is  undeniably  clumsy  and  
problematic;  but  it  is  also  a  now  recognised  short-hand,  which,  when  taken  in  context,  will  
hopefully help rather than hinder understanding.
In order to reduce overly repetitive language, I occasionally employ words such as  radicals, and 
libertarians, as synonyms for anarchists. By the anarchist movement, and any related terms such as 
movement  of  movements,  or  simply  the movement,  I  refer to the well  established,  if  ultimately 
impossible to name, network of individuals and groups which is widely recognised to be broadly  
anarchistic in nature, if not always explicitly so (Epstein 2001). Similarly, when using the word  
activist I am referring specifically to those activists who are either anarchists or who are involved in  
the  anarchist  movement.  I  recognise  that  there  are  additional  problems  with  the  term activist,  
especially when juxtaposed with some other term - most commonly, academic. The idea that there  
are activists and non-activists,  and the implication that academics are thereby not activists  is,  I  
accept, troublesome. Once again, however, as a widely recognised term, it can and does offer a  
certain use value, with the proviso that I by no means intend to suggest that such a divide exists on  
any fundamental level. Activists are those active in a certain way, involved in a certain form of  
activism.
The term prefiguration relates to the anarchist principle of maintaining equity between means and  
ends; in other words, the means do not justify the ends. Rather, the means and ends must always be  
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in accord with one another.  It  also refers  to  the related concept  of  anarchy in  action;  because 
anarchistic means must be employed to achieve anarchistic ends,  a prefigurative politics  places  
considerable emphasis on creating anarchic spaces and relationships here and now, as opposed to  
waiting  for  the  revolution.  Consensus  decision  making refers  specifically  to  its  current 
manifestation  within  the  movement.  Consensus  has  a  long  and  varied  history,  and  its  
implementation has changed over time, but my discussion of it is limited to the aforementioned  
movement.
Like anarchism, the term liberalism is often difficult to pin down. As will become clear, I discuss  
liberalism in a reasonably broad sense, as my argument focuses on the fundamental support for  
individual  freedom,  which  is  shared  with  anarchism,  and  the  support  for  the  state,  which  is  
obviously not. More specifically, I look to theorists such as Iris Marion Young and Bikhu Parekh  
(2000), and discuss their critique of liberalism. 
Chapter Outline
The following work is broken down into six core chapters (excluding this Introduction and the  
Conclusion).  Before  turning  to  the  central  questions  of  the  thesis,  in  Chapter  One I  ask  why 
anarchists  appear to  be so unwilling to even ask them. I  will  argue that  it  is  the emphasis  on  
anarchism as practice – the idea of anarchy in action - which dominates much anarchist thinking,  
that can at least partly explain why some deeper, underlying problems have not been adequately  
engaged with. The view that anarchy in action can be witnessed all around us – in social centres and  
in tribal communities, for example – has all too often led to the belief that anarchism has proved  
itself to be a viable form of politics; why bother asking more troubling questions, when anarchists  
know as much as they need to by simply looking at these living examples of anarchism? As I shall  
argue, however, this view is flawed in a number of fundamental ways. Additionally, I will argue that  
the resistance to creating utopian blue-prints, whilst resting on a valid critique of authority and  
hierarchy, has gone too far, resulting in a problematic refusal to engage in thinking about the sorts  
of questions the following thesis addresses. These two core elements of anarchist theory combine to  
create a significant barrier to discussing the problems with which the rest of the thesis is concerned. 
In  Chapter Two, I return to the question of freedom with which I began this Introduction; what  
conceptions of freedom do anarchists have? Do they recognise the potential for conflict, and for  
some freedoms to be denied? If so, how do they justify and manage any restrictions on liberty that  
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may result from such conflicts? Ultimately, I conclude that the potential for conflict is too often  
over-looked, and that freedom is presented in too simplistic a fashion. One possible reason for this,  
I suggest, is that anarchists frame their notion of freedom in relation to a certain understanding of  
what is morally good or bad. An ethical code could be used to argue that certain acts and beliefs are  
inherently  wrong;  as  such,  their  denial  would  be  justified,  whilst  maintaining  an  otherwise  
libertarian perspective. But if this is the case, what moral code do anarchists follow? 
In Chapter Three, therefore, I turn to the question of ethics. Beginning with an overview of two of  
anarchism’s most well known thinkers, Peter Kropotkin and Murray Bookchin, I suggest that whilst  
many aspects of their work have been widely influential, their attempts to outline an anarchist ethic  
have not met with much enthusiasm. Kropotkin’s concept of  mutual aid, however, has long been 
extremely popular with anarchists, but it relies an a common understanding of what is beneficial, or  
good, for a community. Can anarchists reasonably expect such an agreement, especially now that  
we live in such a plural world? I argue that anarchists do appear to expect such agreements, but that  
they  should not.  In fact,  I  go on to show that  anarchism mirrors much liberal  thinking in  this  
respect, with the anarchist idea of diversity echoing liberal claims to neutrality. Both these concepts  
– diversity and neutrality – rest on the separation between the public and the private, where an  
individual’s morality need not affect those around her. Such a view, however, runs into difficulty  
when the issue of power is introduced.
So in  Chapter Four,  I turn to the question of power. How do anarchists understand power; is it  
always morally bad, or can it be a force for good? Can it be destroyed (along with the state) or will  
it  remain  even  within  anarchist  societies?  Discussing  briefly  the  postanarchist  critique,  which  
argues that anarchists have misunderstood power, I suggest that anarchists have in fact often had a  
more sophisticated theoretical understanding of it, but that the practical ramifications of this have 
not been adequately acknowledged. I therefore go on to discuss two examples of the way power is,  
and will continue to be, an issue with which anarchists need to engage more critically; I first discuss  
Jo  Freeman’s  widely  read  article,  The  Tyranny  of  Structurelessness  (1970)  before  going  on  to 
explore the issue of transport. Referring back to the conclusions of the previous chapters, I suggest  
that power relations will continue to pose significant problems for the anarchist ideal of freedom  
when communities are unable to come to agreement about what constitutes the common good.
Chapters Two, Three and Four, then, form the core critique of the following thesis. However, whilst  
I argue that such criticisms are insufficiently acknowledged, in Chapter Five I go on to explore the 
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contemporary anarchist movement, which has made some progress in seeing that the state is not the  
only potential source of coercion and authority. As such, the use of consensus decision making has  
been widely embraced by the movement, with the view that this radically democratic process can  
safeguard communities against  potentially  hierarchical  form of  politics.  Unfortunately,  whist  in  
some ways appearing to deal with the problems raised in the previous chapters, consensus in fact  
fails  to  adequately  respond  to  them.  Indeed,  the  widespread  and  mostly  uncritical  support  for  
consensus, I suggest, exists despite such problems, not as a reasoned response to them. When such 
problems are properly considered, the case for consensus, I conclude, is considerably weakened.   
At this stage, it may appear that there is little hope left for anarchism; certainly, anarchism’s dreams  
for a truly libertarian community where no coercion or authority exists appear to be little more than  
a naïve dream. But whilst anarchists’ demands for such absolute freedom can never be realised,  
their relentless critiques of hierarchy and authority, and their support for a prefigurative approach to  
politics can, and, I argue, must, be seen as being separable from such absolute ideals; and, crucially,  
these more nuanced and achievable goals of reducing hierarchy, and of beginning to create anarchic  
spaces within a hierarchical world, offer a genuinely viable and desirable form of politics that has  
the potential to radically change the world. In the final chapter, then, I discuss the anarchist idea of  
prefiguration, and argue that this must be more widely and actively embraced. Doing so will, I go  
on  to  suggest,  allow  the  anarchist  opposition  to  blue-prints  to  be  softened,  as  prefigurative  
experiments begin to suggest more concrete ways in which an anarchist  society might operate.  
Anarchists will begin to have a more realistic, and tangible proposal to offer to the vast majority of  
people who currently remain unconvinced by anarchism’s prospects, and who, with however much  
regret, find themselves agreeing with Margaret Thatcher’s view that there is no alternative, rather  
than the anarchist  belief that another world is possible.  If  another world really is  possible,  the  
struggle to create it  must be based,  not  on absolutist  and unachievable moral demands,  but  on  
reasonable expectations about what can achieved in a complex world. 
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Chapter One 
The Case for Anarchy: Unhelpful Assumptions & Unchallenged Ideas.
IN the following thesis, I want to ask some basic questions about anarchism as a political  
and moral philosophy. Is it exclusively concerned with freedom, or does it hope to reconcile liberty  
with other values? If so, which values are they? Is there a specifically anarchist approach to ethics,  
and if so, what is it? How do anarchists understand power? Ultimately, my questions add up to this:  
Is anarchism viable, and desirable, and if the answer to both these questions is yes, then what would  
this viable and desirable anarchism actually look like? 9 To some readers, it may appear strange, even  
arrogant, to pose such fundamental questions: surely they have been answered many times over? In  
fact, I start this thesis by suggesting that anarchism is still lacking in answers to such questions;  
however, it is not only important to recognise this, but also to understand  why.  In the following 
chapter, I want to argue that the majority of anarchist texts, and indeed the majority of anarchists  
themselves, appear strangely unconcerned with asking whether anarchism really is viable. Indeed, it 
is not unusual to see the question simply turned on its head. As Randall Amster puts it:
the question is often posed: How can a society achieve the production, distribution and maintenance of  
public goods absent a central authority? [...] The problem with such queries is that they are inverted; the  
real question is how a society premised on coercion and central authority can ever produce, distribute and  
maintain free individuals (Amster 2009, 296).
But this failure to defend anarchism sufficiently has not come about through arbitrary neglect: there  
are  reasons  why this  otherwise  surprising  situation  has  occurred  –  reasons  which,  in  part,  are  
directly related to anarchist values themselves. In the following chapter I will discuss how these  
values have inspired problematic responses, and that this has had a negative impact on anarchism. I  
begin with an overview of various examples of anarchy in action, and show how they are used by  
anarchists to defend their claims that anarchism is a feasible model of social  organisation.  The  
emphasis on anarchy as a practice has been central to anarchist thought, in two ways. Firstly, in the  
claim that anarchism already exists, in primitive societies, for example, and even in our everyday  
lives within the state; such claims implicitly, and at times explicitly, undermine the need to ‘prove’  
the viability of anarchism. Secondly, the emphasis on practice has helped push what are viewed  
9 One way of thinking about the question of anarchism’s viability it to ask whether an anarchist society could exist  
within a world where states continued to exist. Important though this question is, it goes beyond the scope of this  
work.
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suspiciously as mere academic or theoretical questions aside: a justifiable distrust of and disdain for  
ivory  tower  pontificating  has  led  many  anarchists  to  unjustifiably  reject  anything  approaching 
theoretical reflection. So I go on to argue that whilst the examples are useful and inspiring, they  
must be understood within the context which they occur,  and cannot  necessarily be transposed  
uncritically onto the world at large. They do not, in other words, prove on any profound level that  
anarchism presents a viable model for organising societies in the modern world. Furthermore, I go  
on to  note  that  even if  such  examples  do  show anarchism to  be  viable,  they often  present  an 
alternative  to  the  state  that  appears  less  than  desirable.  Finally,  I  ask  whether  the  view  that  
anarchism is being practised within non-anarchic spaces suggests that anarchism is seen more as an  
approach to life within the state, rather than as a full-scale alternative; once again, however, there is  
a lack of clarity on this matter, and the question of how anarchist ideas are to be realised – within  
the state, or as an alternative to it – remains an open question.
I then go on to discuss the anarchist resistance to blue-prints.  Anarchists denounce the idea of a  
vanguardist politics (most commonly associated with marxism) and, in doing so, have become wary  
of discussing any abstract problems that may or may not be encountered in a hypothetical anarchist  
society:  we’ll  cross  that  bridge  when we come to  it .  Whilst  there  is  much to  be  said  for  this 
resistance, it is all too easily used to side-step challenging questions, such as what anarchists would  
do  about  crime.  Whilst  anarchists  might  rightly  refuse  to  dictate  in  advance  how  libertarian  
communities would answer such questions, there is a fine line between taking such a principled  
stance, and a blind faith in the anarchist project without having any reasonable ideas about how  
social life would be organised without the state. Finally, I also suggest that it is unrealistic to expect  
people to have confidence in – and thus support – anarchism, when they are given little more than  
grandiose moral claims that people will be perfectly free and equal once we get rid of the state, and  
capitalism.  Accepting  the  need  for  some  tentative  out-line  of  an  anarchist  politics  might  help  
encourage more people to take anarchism more seriously. Let us move now to explore these issues  
in turn.
Anarchy in action
Anarchism is plagued by the charge that it  is simply not viable: while other ideologies may be  
critiqued for their moral failings, anarchism may well find itself applauded for what it argues for, 
but dismissed on the grounds that it is simply impractical (Leach 1996, 186); consider, for example,  
how the  state  in  liberal  theory  is  frequently  referred  to  as  a  necessary  evil,  which,  we  might 
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reasonably infer, suggests that anarchism is seen by liberals as normatively desirable, but practically  
unobtainable – or obtainable at too high a cost (Bobbio 2005, 83). We might imagine, therefore, that  
anarchists would have devoted a great deal of their time demonstrating that in fact anarchism is  
perfectly  possible;  and,  in  some  ways,  they  have  indeed  done  so.  But  a  great  deal  of  this  
argumentation  has  taken  the  form of  referring  to  existing  examples  of  anarchism,  rather  than  
defending anarchism theoretically. On the surface, this makes perfect sense: if asked for evidence  
that a design for a four wheeled carriage could move along the floor powered by a diesel engine, we  
would save ourselves a great deal of bother by simply pointing to a car. Why waste time embroiling  
ourselves in theory when the requested proof lies all around us? As Colin Ward famously put it: ‘An 
anarchist society, a society which organises itself without authority, is always in existence, like a  
seed  beneath  the  snow,  buried  under  the  weight  of  the  state’ (Ward  1973,  11).  The view that  
anarchism already exists, and has indeed always existed, is extremely important to the anarchist,  
and  has  helped  shape  anarchist  thought  in  a  very  particular  way.  However  much  people  may  
bemoan the lack of philosophical justifications and explanations for anarchist ideas, such critiques  
are likely to fall on deaf ears: go ahead and make your theoretical critiques, anarchists will respond,  
anarchism already exists all around us; we do not need to explain or define it, we just need to look  
for it. Viewed this way, anarchism is not so much a theory at all, but a practice which people have  
been engaged in throughout our history, and which, in increasingly rare circumstances, people still  
engage in. As we shall see, this view has been fundamental in shaping the continuing focus of  
anarchist thought, but it has done so as much by influencing what is not said, as what is.
Indeed, as fundamental as it is,  the concept of anarchy in action, to use Ward’s term, is highly  
problematic, for a number of reasons. Yet before we explore why, it is worth first taking a look at  
some examples of these existing anarchies, to get a better sense of what it is anarchists believe we  
are to look for. In later chapters, we shall return to these visions to ask more specific questions, and  
to see how, when the issues of freedom, ethics and power are critically explored, these examples  
become much more complex and problematic. In this chapter, however, a general overview should  
help establish a useful starting point. We can split these examples of anarchy in action into two  
main parts: anarchy that exists within non-anarchic systems, that we might call pockets of anarchy, 
and which are to be found in our daily lives, and in deliberately created autonomous spaces; and  
anarchy that exists in a more absolute sense, as wholesale anarchist societies, such as primitive  
societies, and the brief but important period of anarchism in Spain.
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a) Pockets of Anarchy   
Colin Ward, one of the most influential and, in my opinion, engaging and honest anarchist writers  
(or propagandists, as Ward saw himself) has written a great deal about what he often referred to as  
anarchy  in  action;  experiments  in  non-hierarchical  living  that,  unlike  those  of  the  Spanish  
anarchists or primitive people, exist within the wider environment of the state. They are the famous  
‘seeds beneath the snow’, the pockets of anarchy that may one day grow – along with many others -  
into fully fledged free societies (Ward 2008), although, as we shall see, Ward has questioned the  
extent to which anarchism can ever be the sole, or even primary form of social life (Ward 1973,  
135-136).
The idea that evidence of anarchist practices exist all around us is a common one, and goes back to  
at  least  the work of  Kropotkin,  who advanced various arguments to  demonstrate  the persistent  
nature of mutual  aid,  despite the overbearing presence of the state.  In  The Conquest of  Bread, 
Kropotkin points  to  numerous examples  of  what  he considers  to  be evidence for  his  anarchist  
philosophy (Kropotkin 1985, 129-142). He cites the European rail and postal networks, the British  
Lifeboat Institution, and a guild that oversees barge movements on the Dutch canal system to ‘prove  
that  men,  as  soon as  their  interests  do  not  absolutely  clash,  act  in  concert,  harmoniously,  and  
perform collective work of a very complex nature’ (Kropotkin 1985, 130) 10. For Kropotkin, such 
‘spontaneous associations’, as he somewhat misleadingly calls them, provide such a convincing  
argument for anarchism that he confidently and rhetorically puts the onus on defenders of the state  
to explain how this anarchy could possibly work:
And the most interesting thing in this organisation is, that there is no European Central Government of  
Railways! Nothing! […] Everything is done by contract. So we ask the believers in the State […] ‘how do  
European railways manage without them’? (Kropotkin 1985, 131-2).
Kropotkin sees in these examples the existence of the anarchist principles of mutual aid and self-
government,  although  he  does  not  suggest  the  people  behind  such  examples  are  consciously  
anarchists. In recent years, the global justice movement, much of which  is consciously anarchist, 
has made similar claims to have demonstrated the viability of these same libertarian principles.
10The extent to which people’s interests will inevitably clash is a question I explore in depth in Chapter Three.
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b) The Global Justice Movement
The postanarchist Saul Newman argues that
one of the ways of demonstrating the capacity of non-state political alternatives is the development of  
autonomous communities, collectives and organisations that exist beyond the control of the state. The  
countless experiments in autonomous politics taking place everywhere – squatters’ movements, social  
centres,  indigenous  collectives,  land  re-occupation  movements,  blockades,  workers’  occupations,  
alternative  media  centres,  communes,  numerous  activist  networks  and  so  on  –  are  evidence  of  this  
possibility (Newman 2010, 116).
Such arguments are commonplace (Morland 2004, 34-7; Heckert 2010, 190-1; de Angelis 2001,  
115) and anarchy in action is in fact one of the defining features of contemporary anarchist theory,  
or, as it is more commonly called, praxis (Gordon 2007). Indeed, even within much recent academic  
work there is  often a  conscious  rejection of  theory (or  at  least  being overly theoretical);  what  
matters is what people are actually doing, and what they are doing, we are told, is creating new  
forms of democracy. Marianne  Maeckelbergh, for example,  suggests that ‘if one wants to know 
what the alterglobalisation movement is for, one must look at what the alterglobalisation movement  
does’ (Maeckelbergh 2009, 4). In doing so, she argues that
we  find  that  what  this  movement  is  doing  is  radically  changing  the  meaning  of  democracy  and  
simultaneously constructing a democratic world based on principles of diversity and horizontality. [...]  
Taking an ethnographic approach [...] allows for an exploration of the actual decision-making practices  
already in place, which make visible the beginnings of an emerging democratic alternative  
(Maeckelbergh 2009, 4-5). 
In  other  words,  Maeckelbergh claims  that  by  looking  at  the  practices  of  the  alterglobalisation  
movement, its forms of organising, its decision-making structures, its meetings, and so on, we get a  
glimpse of the ‘other world’ we hear so much about: we see, then, ‘the beginnings of an alternative  
democratic  praxis’ (ibid.).  Rather  than  engaging  in  stale  rhetoric  and  abstract  theory,  they  are  
practising anarchy – anarchy really is ‘alive’ (Gordon 2008). David Graeber makes a similar point  
when he argues that activists organise their actions – such as the protests in Seattle – ‘according to  
directly  democratic  principles  and  thus  provide  a  living  example  of  how  genuine  egalitarian  
decision making might work’ (Graeber 2008, 210). In fact, this is a standard position throughout the  
alter-globalisation movement, which argues not only that another world is possible, but that, thanks  
33
to the movement’s prefigurative politics, it actually at times lives out that other world, however  
momentarily. 
c) Absolute Anarchy: Life in Primitive Societies.
Although such examples are rare glimpses of anarchy emerging out of the confines of the state, the  
state itself is ultimately something of a rarity when the long history of humankind is taken into  
account (Moseley 2007, 124); the majority of our species’ existence has in fact been made up of  
stateless societies. The state is a relatively new phenomenon, and people certainly existed before the  
state did: furthermore, it is not only in the past, but also in a few rare places in the present, that  
people can and do live together in relative peace without state apparatus (Graeber 2007, Chps 5,6,7  
& 8). Primitive11 societies have long been, and continue to be, used by anarchists to demonstrate the  
viability of stateless societies. Once again, Kropotkin, in his classic text Mutual Aid (2008), drew 
significant conclusions from his (usually indirect) study of primitive life, and argued that, far from  
being a war of all  against all,  pre-state societies generally existed in relative peace.  There was  
violence, there were disputes, and Kropotkin makes no attempt to hide this, but these conflicts were  
largely kept under control, and daily life was far from being a constant, chaotic battle for survival.  
Similar arguments are abundant. The Anarchist Teapot 12 (n.d.), for example, in their Introduction to  
Anarchy, note that
 
99% of human existence has been shaped by tribal society, real communities peacefully roaming around  
eating berries and having a good time without any conception of needing states or government. Their lives  
were nothing like the constant struggle against hostile nature and other tribes we might imagine.
In fact,  many of these ‘anarchic cultures have flourished to modern times’ but are increasingly  
coming under threat from the related machinery of ‘the state’, ‘corporations’, ‘armies’, and ‘aid  
workers’ (ibid.). It is the state that is the anomaly, and not anarchism.
This position has been laid out most starkly by anarcho-primitivists such as John Zerzan (2005) and  
Derrick Jensen (2006), who believe not only that primitive life shows us that life without the state is  
possible, but that such forms of life are necessary if  we are ever to escape social division and  
11 I recognise significant problems in using the term primitive, but given the consistent use of the term by anarchists,  
both to describe stateless societies, and as a particular form of anarchism, i.e. anarcho-primitivism (Zerzan 2002), it  
seems appropriate to continue to use it in the way they intend; without, that is to say, any normative connotations of  
inferiority, etc..
12 The Anarchist Teapot is an anarchist collective that cooks food for large activist events and gatherings.
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environmental  destruction.  Anarchists  have  also  drawn on  the  works  of  theorists  who  are  not  
necessarily anarchists but whose work strengthens the basic argument that life without the state is  
possible; in particular, Pierre Clastres’ Society Against the State  (1987) Marshall Sahlins’ Stone Age  
Economics (1974), and James C. Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed (2009).
d) Anarchy in Spain
Another source of both inspiration and an argument for the feasibility of anarchism is the Spanish  
Civil War, during which anarchists successfully ran not only large areas of rural Spain, but also,  
significantly, the industrialised city of Barcelona. Not surprisingly, ‘this quintessential moment of  
anarchism’ (Amster et al 2009, 3) features extensively in anarchist writing, and is of course held up  
as another – and at times, a more relevant – example of anarchism’s viability. The anarchist period  
in Spain contains two important elements lacking from examples of primitive societies. 
Firstly, those involved were self-consciously anarchists. It is often noted that primitive people are at 
times aware that states exist: in other words, they are aware of other forms of social organisation,  
yet they consciously remain ‘anarchic’ (Maddock 1987, 62; Scott 2009). Nonetheless, whilst this is  
no doubt  true,  it  seems there is  an important  difference between people explicitly  putting into  
practice the culmination of several decades of anarchist thought, and people who have no such  
agenda; who have been, in other words, anarchists from birth. Similarly, it is important that the  
Spanish  anarchists  were  all  raised within  a  very  different  culture,  and  were  in  the  process  of  
actively creating new forms of social organisation, as opposed to continuing to live out old ones.  
The anarchist period in Spain demonstrated that people could become anarchists, or that societies 
could become anarchic, regardless of any prior social norms or structures. None of this is intended  
as a value judgement - neither is better or worse, but these differences are significant.
The second difference is one of scale; whilst primitive clans or tribes unite and form alliances with  
each other in any number of ways, the standard unit of daily life is, by modern terms, tiny. The  
importance of political equality for anarchism, and the need for face-to-face meetings to ensure this  
equality is genuine, makes this issue of very real importance, and the scale of anarchism in Spain  
provides compelling evidence that much larger communities can be run in non-hierarchical ways. 
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These examples of anarchy in action provide anarchists with an important weapon with which to  
defend the idea of a stateless society. Whilst many people might believe that  anarchism is a nice  
idea  in  theory,  but  that it  would  never  work  in  practice ,  examples  of  anarchy in  action allow 
anarchists to turn this on its head; anarchism might seem theoretically implausible, but it does work 
in practice. But do such examples really demonstrate the validity of this claim? And, if they do,  
what  sort  of anarchy do they provide evidence for? In the following section, I want to critically  
assess  these  claims,  concluding  that  whilst  there  is  much  to  be  learnt  from  these  anarchic  
experiences,  their  value  must  be  understood  to  be  limited  in  important  ways;  in  particular,  
anarchists must acknowledge that context is crucial when thinking about alternative social systems  
– a point which, interestingly, is well recognised, as we shall see, when the idea of blue-prints come  
under scrutiny, but which is often over-looked when anarchy in action is being discussed. And, as  
we progress through the thesis, we will also begin to see that the question of what forms of social 
life these examples demonstrate is crucial; even if anarchism is possible, does a life without the  
state automatically translate into the sort of world anarchists today wish to see?
Anarchy in Action: A Critical Response
I readily accept that there is much to be inspired by and to think about in these examples. But can  
we really learn from them that anarchism, in the twenty-first century, offers a viable alternative to  
the state? While they may be of tremendous use for anarchists in thinking about anarchism, I want 
to fundamentally challenge the idea that they somehow prove its viability. In fact, these examples  
raise a number of issues which, when considered honestly, cast an even greater shadow over  
anarchism’s prospects. Although we will return to these examples throughout the work, I want to  
present a brief analysis of them here.  
a) Pockets of anarchy
Kropotkin, as we saw, was so taken with the examples of mutual aid which he saw all around, he  
confidently asked defenders of the state to explain how it was that the European rail network, for  
example, could exist without the aid of a national government. Sadly, the answer is a rather simple  
one: they don’t. The European rail network, and all the other examples Kropotkin cites, are deeply  
embedded in numerous ways within the state. Whilst they offer certain interesting and possibly  
inspiring insights into the ways humans can and do organise, insights that could well be used to  
36
advocate an expansion of democratic reforms in the work place, for example, they do not offer any  
real argument for such reforms on a societal level. It can reasonably be argued that train companies  
operate within the  safe space provided by the state ; their ability to act together for their mutual  
benefit is not evidence that the state is unnecessary, but rather evidence that each of the states these  
companies operate in are doing their job perfectly well, allowing individuals and companies to get  
on with their daily lives whilst simply ensuring that they are protected from the careless and corrupt  
– precisely as liberals argue it should. Kropotkin himself says: ‘Everything is done by contract’; but  
who enforces such contracts? That they could be enforced without the state is an argument that can  
well be made, but these examples do nothing to add to such a position, because these contracts are 
in fact safeguarded by the state. What Kropotkin argues, ultimately, is that different groupings of  
people can come together without an overarching authority that subsumes them all: unfortunately, 
we could just as easily point to any number of international wars to make a similar point. 
Furthermore, we must take into account the fact that the power of the state does not simply exist in  
the form of a looming policeman: people learn to police themselves to a great extent, even when the  
prospects of being caught and punished are extremely low. Interestingly, David Graeber misses this  
point when he suggests that the fact of activists refraining from physically overpowering a truck  
driver about to dump toxic waste ‘is a remarkable testimony to most activists’ dedication to non-
violence’ (Graeber 2009, 203), but then fully acknowledges it when discussing, not the activists’  
motives, but those of the truck driver, who is, in similarly refraining from violence, ‘likely to be  
thinking about the possibility of being brought up on charges of negligent homicide’ (ibid. 208).  
Somehow, the authority of the state is only felt by the truck driver, and not the activists; Graeber  
makes no attempt to defend such a claim (which is in any case only implicit) and I am not sure how  
he would even begin to do so. What seems clear is that our daily lives are heavily influenced by the  
knowledge that the state, with the full power of the law behind it, is always present; the fact that  
some anarchists would prefer that it were not does little to negate the point that people’s behaviour  
is constantly, if often sub-consciously, informed by this reality – and that holds as true for anarchists  
as anyone else.
What is lacking from these examples is evidence that any of them would work without the various  
legal and social functions the state is supposed to provide. Once again, the idea of the liberal state is  
precisely that people  can and should act together without undue interference from government.  
Many more examples of these ‘seeds beneath the snow’ have been given over the years, but they all  
ultimately suffer the same fate. They do indeed offer anarchists many valuable philosophical and  
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sociological  insights,  and  in  as  much  as  they  do  so,  it  could  well  be  argued  that  they  add  
considerably to the argument for a life without the state. What they do not do is in any way prove  
that the state is unnecessary.
b) The Global Justice Movement
We can of course apply much the same critique to the examples of anarchy apparently demonstrated  
by the global justice movement. Within the movement, it is commonly argued that in  temporary  
autonomous zones the power of the state is rendered effectively redundant . As an anonymous writer 
in  Do or Die puts it: ‘Where the barricades begin, the state ends’ (anonymous 2003, 22). These  
claims to have achieved autonomy raise questions about how anarchists understand the way power  
works, and the extent to which anarchists believe people can escape certain power relations. Much 
of the recent work by postanarchists such as Saul Newman argues that anarchists have failed to  
acknowledge the capacity for other forms of power relations to exist without the state.  As Saul  
Newman suggests:
To insist simply on an autonomous and self-determined space avoids the question of the shape of social  
and  political  relations  within  that  space;  autonomous  spaces  can  be  subject  to  the  worst  kinds  of  
authoritarian, repressive and fundamentalist politics. It is clear, then, that autonomy must refer not only to  
the independence from the state of a particular political and territorial space,  but also to the internal  
micro-political constitution of that space, to the organisation of social life within it (Newman 2010, 179).
I return to discuss the question of power in Chapter Four, but other considerations arise within these  
recent examples of anarchist practice. For instance, it is important to note the brief time spans of  
many of these autonomous zones, most of which are indeed temporary: during a two week protest 
camp, the organisation of daily life is fundamentally different from that of a sustained community.  
Discussions about how the land is to be divided up and used by the people on it are unlikely to ever  
occur, except as hypothetical campfire chats. Economic questions are for all intents and purposes  
redundant  in  such  spaces:  people  bring  in  money –  and resources  –  from the  capitalist  world  
‘outside’ and difficult questions around the distribution of goods never arise.
Another important factor to consider is the intentional element of such projects. Such spaces work  
effectively in large part because there is a considerable degree of trust and a united sense of purpose  
– based on shared political, ethical and often cultural views, and of course on many interwoven  
personal relationships. Another way to think of this is to see such spaces as creating temporary  
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communities.  This may be seen as a positive thing, and indeed the idea of community is often  
considered  key  to  the  functioning  of  an  anarchist  society  (Taylor  1982).  However,  whilst  
communities may exist in various forms (we might talk of, for example, an artistic community) for  
Taylor, for societies to function effectively without the state, the community must be small and  
stable  (ibid., 94). If they are to effectively maintain some degree of order, then, they must ‘have  
little turnover in their memberships’ (ibid., 91). However, as we shall see  in Chapter Five, the idea 
of consensus-decision making which is almost exclusively used in temporary autonomous zones is  
premised, according to those who support it, on the ability of individuals to leave one community  
and enter another with ease (Seeds for Change, 2007; Gordon, 2008: 69; Maeckelbergh, 2009: 226;  
Graeber 2009, 316). Taylor also stresses the need for members of a community to hold ‘beliefs and  
values in common’ (ibid., 26), something which I have suggested is inevitably the case in protest  
camps, but which is unlikely to be true in larger, or what we might call unintentional communities. 
Such issues raise questions about the need for a strong foundation of shared values within anarchist  
societies, and the extent to which the need for communities to form and maintain such foundations  
suggests certain limitations on individuals’ ability to move freely from one community to another,  
or to hold different values – questions I return to throughout the thesis.
c) Primitive Societies
The claim that life in primitive societies can teach us about the possibility of anarchy in the modern  
world is also problematic: small-scale and traditional communities are, it might be said, not simply  
quantitatively but also qualitatively different,  in important respects. As we saw above,  a strong  
sense of community and of tradition is usually considered fundamental to the orderly functioning of  
such societies, but this is not something which is currently shared in much of the modern world.  
Whether we could regain this sense of community, and what it would mean to do so, is, at best, an  
open  question  (see  Bauman  2001  for  some interesting  reflections  on  this  subject).  And  many  
anarchists  argue  strongly  against  the  anarcho-primitive  position  and  believe  that  technological  
solutions to be a necessary component of a libertarian society (Thorpe & Welsh, 2008).
However, I want here to focus on another, more specific, problem. Samuel Clark, in his book Living  
Without Domination (2007), presents a more thorough analysis of primitive societies, in particular  
the Nuer, who he uses to demonstrate ‘[...] some human capacities for living together and especially  
for conflict resolution’ and to show that the ‘[...] range of human social possibility includes systems  
of egalitarian social networks, without institutionalised domination, in which violence is limited and  
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conflict can be resolved’ (Clark 2007, 119). However, throughout the book, Clark uses the terms  
‘domination’ and ‘institutionalised  domination’ interchangeably and without comment, but it is far  
from clear if they are in fact the same thing. Does Clark really present examples of a life without  
domination, as the title of his book suggests, or simply without certain forms of domination? Even 
if we concede that examples of primitive societies have shown that life without the state is viable,  
we are still left with perhaps a more fundamental question : is it  desirable? Does it really offer us 
freedom? Or, a better question: what sort of freedom does it offer? Life without the state might not  
be as ‘nasty, brutish and short’ as Hobbes thought, but can it offer the freedom that we have come to  
expect  after  –  somewhat  ironically,  perhaps  –  several  centuries  of  liberal  democracy?  Harold  
Barclay,  one  of  the  most  prominent  anarchist  academics  to  focus  on  primitive  peoples,  draws  
similar conclusion to myself with regards the inevitablitiy of power relations within any form of  
society (Barclay 2005).
As Ernest Gellner argues 
historically, mankind has not always suffered under centralised despotism. ...[Q]uite frequently it was free  
from  such  oppression.  [However],  in  the  traditional  agrarian  world  [communities]  maintain  their  
cohesion, internal discipline and solidarity with the help of much ritual, employed to underscore and  
enforce social roles and obligations. [...D]iscipline is enforced by a proliferation of minor rules and hence  
additional possible transgressions, the avoidance of which puts a heavy and constant burden on each  
individual [...whose] role is stable and ritually orchestrated. It is both internalised and externalised [...] He  
knows only too well who he is and what is expected of him: his prospects of redefining his own identity  
are negligible (Gellner 1994, 6-7).
 
He concludes: ‘Traditional man can sometimes escape the tyranny of kings, but only at the cost of  
falling under the tyranny of cousins, and of ritual [...]’ leading to a life ‘[...] which modern man  
would find intolerably stifling’ (Gellner 1994, 7-8).  Indeed, only a cursory glance at life in some  
primitive societies, including many of those held up by anarchists as examples of stateless living,  
quickly reveals a world that is no stranger to threats,  coercion,  bullying,  violence,  punishment,  
blame; no stranger to, in other words, various forms of domination. Life in stateless societies may  
have been largely peaceful, and free from coercive institutions, but it also limited the life of each 
individual  in  ways  that,  as  Gellner  argues,  we  may  no  longer  find  acceptable.  As  Alexander  
Moseley13 suggests,  ‘historically  anarchic societies  often possessed illiberal  cultures  that  stifled  
13 It is perhaps worth reflecting briefly on the fact that neither Gellner nor Moseley are anarchists, a point which  
perhaps allows them to see more clearly the problems of stateless societies - an insight that is crucial in reference to  
the libertarian demands of anarchists. 
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individual  creativity’,  and,  therefore,  ‘[...]  the  modern  anarchist  seeks  the  moral  plurality  
corresponding to modern civilisation without the fastidious conservatism of the primitive’ (Moseley  
2007, 125). The life of a housewife who spends her day cleaning her husband’s shirts and making  
his dinner, could, after all, be perfectly peaceful. The ‘capacities and tactics humans have for living  
together and resolving conflict, without states’ that Clark discusses with great admiration (Clark  
2007, 110) are also, not surprisingly, used to instil a general conformity of thought and behaviour.  
As Kropotkin, seemingly approvingly, notes: 
Primitive folk [...] so much identify their lives with that of the tribe, that each of their acts, however  
insignificant, is considered as a tribal affair. Their whole behaviour is regulated by an infinite series of  
unwritten rules of propriety which are the fruit of their common experience as to what is good or bad –  
that  is,  beneficial  or harmful for their  own tribe.  Of course,  the reasoning upon which their rules of  
propriety are based sometimes are absurd in the extreme. [...] But, absurd or not, the savage obeys the  
prescriptions of the common law, however inconvenient they may be. He obeys them even more blindly  
than the civilised man obeys the prescriptions of the written law. His common law is his religion; it is his  
very habit of living (Kropotkin  2008, 74).
Later, he summarises the point well when he notes that a ‘rebellion against a right decision of the  
customary  law  was  simply  ‘inconceivable’ [...]  because  ‘law,  morality  and  fact’ could  not  be  
separated from each other in those times’ (ibid. 86). Are these the ‘tactics and capacities’ that Clark,  
a self-confessed Kropotkinite, has in mind, when he suggests a life without domination is possible?  
Are we really faced with the choice of, as Gellner puts it, either kings or cousins? Must we decide  
between institutionalised state regulation, or ‘absurd’ common law we are compelled to obey?   
 
Colin Ward is honest enough to acknowledge that this form of social control ‘also inhibits many  
other varieties of non-conforming behaviour as well’ (Ward 1973, 128), and he readily conceded he  
would not like to live in such a society. Earlier in the same work, he explains 
[E]arly observers […] labelled certain societies as anarchistic when a more searching examination might  
show that they had as effective methods of social control and its enforcement as any authoritarian society,  
or that certain patterns of behaviour are so rigidly enforced by custom as to make alternatives unthinkable.  
The anarchist, in making use of anthropological data today, has to ask more sophisticated questions than  
his predecessors about the role of law in such societies (ibid., 45).
Of course, no one explicitly argues that we either should or could mimic these primitive societies in  
every respect, but surely then we are faced with the question: if the sorts of cultural tools employed  
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by primitive societies are needed to resolve conflict and maintain stability, are anarchists suggesting  
we adopt these tools, or that there are moderated forms we can now access which will perform the  
same function? The former proposal seems highly unappealing, but with regards to the latter, we are  
left wondering what those forms might be exactly. The closer to primitive life anarchism hopes to  
be, the less it suggests a life without domination; rather, it merely presents a different form of  
domination: but the further away we take anarchism in response to this critique, the less useful any  
comparisons become. At best, the simple claim is made that life is possible without the state: but 
what is possible and what is desirable are two very different things. The question of what sort of  
freedom anarchism hopes to offer is the basis of Chapter Two.
d) Anarchy in Spain
The events that took place throughout Spain in the mid to late 1930s are, without doubt, both  
inspirational and informative, and they do demonstrate, far more than primitive societies, that  
anarchism is more than a utopian fantasy. Yet to do justice to the many people that lived and died to  
defend anarchism, we need to acknowledge that both the context of the civil war, and the beliefs  
and cultural understanding of those involved, raise questions about the extent to which we can point  
to this time as some sort of evidence of anarchist success, and, importantly, what sort of freedom  
was attained. Once again, we need to ask what social processes were employed to make daily life  
possible, and, having done so, ask whether we would be happy to live under such conditions, or  
indeed, whether such conditions constitute, despite the lack of an official state, a genuinely  
libertarian society.
The most obvious factor to take into account is that Spanish anarchism was realised during a time of  
civil  war;  a  war which cost  the lives of half  a  million people and which ended with a  fascist  
dictatorship in control of the country for the next three and a half decades. I do not want to dwell,  
however, on the obvious fact that the anarchists ultimately lost. Whilst this is important for some  
discussions, it is not for mine 14. What is important is the marked differences of perhaps every aspect  
of daily life – ethical, political, social, cultural – during an event such as a civil war (Taylor 1982,  
37-8). For our purposes here, we might begin by posing some obvious questions. To what extent  
were differences of opinion amongst anarchists left to one side, were sacrifices made, was self-
control exercised, were people united – due to the ever present threat of a fascist victory, in ways  
14 As I suggested earlier, questions of anarchism’s viability in relation to other existent, non-anarchist, societies are  
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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that we might not be able to recreate without such a threat? Ultimately, it is perhaps impossible to  
answer these questions; or, rather,  there will  be multiple answers. And it  may be unrealistic to  
attempt to disentangle the many and complex emotions that were being experienced; how does one  
separate, for example, the desire to fight against something from the desire to fight for something? 
The Spanish anarchists were indeed fighting against Franco and his troops, but they were also very  
much fighting to realise their dreams of a libertarian society (which is why they also ended up  
fighting communists as well as fascists). A question we may want to pose then, without hoping to  
ever have any generalisable answer, is: can a  common good unite people in the same way that a 
common enemy so clearly does?15 Even without answers to such questions, it seems reasonable to  
conclude that the unusual circumstances that present themselves at such times must be taken into 
account;  and that  anarchists’ reference  to  the  Spanish period  as  proof  of  anarchism’s  viability,  
without  reference to  the important  contextual  issues  surrounding this  time,  are,  in  this  respect,  
considerably weakened. As one Spanish anarchist put it: ‘we ate from the same dish, took part in  
the same action; we were all in the same situation – when men’s lives are at stake there can’t be  
very deep differences’ (quoted in Fraser 1981, 430). Such relevant issues must be, but, I would  
argue are generally not, taken into account.
There are other things we can learn from this period however. Two important points ought to be  
considered. The first is that, amongst the Spanish anarchists,  morality was not, as it has been for 
many anarchists,  a  dirty  word  (a  matter,  which,  again,  I  return  to  in  Chapter  Three).  In  fact,  
revolutionary  rhetoric  was  very  often  endowed  with  a  strong  moral  sentiment.  The  Spanish  
anarchists have at times been compared to medieval millennialists, and whilst this comparison is in  
many ways unhelpful, as Sam Clark argues (Clark 2007, 121-122) it should also remind us that the  
anarchists had, as Clark himself acknowledges, an ‘[a]scetic ideal of purification’ (ibid., 121; see  
also  Alexander  2002,  219).  Indeed,  despite  attacks  on  religious  institutions,  physically  and  
ideologically, ‘puritanism increased as a result of the anarcho-syndicalist revolution’ (Fraser 1981,  
288). This resulted in many anarchists living according to a strong set of moral values: some of  
which, such as vegetarianism, would be applauded by many contemporary anarchists, such as Bob  
Torres (Torres 2007); others, such as a rejection of caffeine and alcohol, I suspect might not be  
looked upon quite so favourably. Perhaps most disturbingly, in some areas patriarchy, perhaps the  
most prevalent form of hierarchy throughout human history, remained firmly in place. Inequality  
between the sexes  was often  left  unaltered;  women still  occupied  traditional  roles  as  cleaners,  
cooks, child-minders, etc., and were often denied a voice in public meetings. Women were criticised  
15 I discuss the idea of a common good – whether such a thing is possible, or indeed desirable – in Chapter Three.
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for wearing lipstick, and, whilst free union between men and women was encouraged in some areas,  
in  other  anarchist  controlled  communities,  people  choosing  to  live  together  unmarried  were  
condemned as ‘living like animals’ (Fraser 1981, 289). 
The second point is the unsavoury truth that anarchists were often involved in activities that were a  
far cry from the libertarian ideals which motivated them. Forced collectivisation and assassinations  
were, if not common, certainly far from rare. It is, of course, impossible to get the full picture, but  
there is no doubt that anarchists were involved in coercion in a wide variety of ways. From forcing  
religious children to be educated along secular principles (ibid., 294-295), to intimidating people to  
join collectives; from seizing land and machinery, to murdering not only Fascist soldiers, but also  
members of an Anti-Fascist committee who were accused of cowardice (ibid., 353). Although often  
keenly aware of their own contradictions, anarchists often felt themselves simply unable to abide  
absolutely  by  their  libertarian  values,  and  they  rapidly  created  their  own  forms  of  authority,  
including a basic police force (sometimes known as Control Patrols) and law courts (Alexander  
2007, 1111-1113). Perhaps not surprisingly, then: 
Almost from the beginning of the Civil War, the Spanish anarchists suffered from criticism and even  
denunciation  from  the  ranks  of  [some]  foreign  anarchists  who  could  not  forgive  the  Spaniard’s  
compromise  with  libertarian  principles  in  the  interests  of  prosecuting  the  Civil  War.  The  Spanish  
Anarchists  [replied  that  their  critics]  had  never  had  to  deal  with  the  practical  application  of  their  
movement’s principles (ibid., 1161).
A fact which is conveniently over-looked in modern accounts of the Spanish anarchists.  What the 
anarchists achieved in Spain is, I repeat, no doubt inspiring, and I have deliberately focused here on  
the problems, rather than the many successes; but those problems remain, and to ignore them is to  
suggest, without argument, that they are irrelevant. It is not my argument here that what happened  
in Spain could not have occurred without these violent and coercive elements, but simply that the  
historical fact is that it did not occur without them. And neither do I claim that the period of Spanish  
anarchism ought not to be considered successful in its own right. Murray Bookchin, for example,  
claimed, in a characteristically dismissive manner, that without 
the means for an analysis of their situation [the Spanish anarchists] revealed only a minimal capacity to  
understand the situation in which they found themselves […] and no capacity to take ‘the next step’ to  
institutionalise a workers’ and peasants’ form of government (Bookchin 2007, 93)
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I offer no such criticism, and, indeed, find such a statement misguided and offensive. My claim is  
simply that anarchists could do much more to recognise the practical limitations these anarchists  
encountered when trying to put their libertarian ethos into practice. In other words, any mistakes –  
if we can call them such – the Spanish anarchists made, must be considered as broadly inevitable;  
the failure to  implement  a  pure anarchy of absolute  liberty  and equality was not down to any  
‘minimal capacity to understand the situation’, indeed, they were not ‘mistakes’ at all, but, as I hope  
to have shown by the end of the thesis, the unavoidable consequence of organising that complex  
and troublesome phenomenon – human life. Of course, it might be hoped that any limits to freedom  
would come about through, and be enforced by, more genuinely democratic processes than often  
happened in  Spain,  but  I  would  argue  that  this  is  far  more  likely  to  be  the  case  if  anarchists  
acknowledge – and thereby anticipate – the problems any libertarian society is likely to face.   
Anarchy in Action: Some Lessons
A number of interesting questions are raised by these examples of anarchy in action. Firstly, there is  
the distinction between anarchy viewed almost as a philosophical approach, a libertarian tendency,  
creating and fostering spaces of greater freedom, solidarity and self-governance,  within a wider 
political  system  largely  antithetical  to  these  values;  and  anarchy  viewed  as  a  much  more  
comprehensive  social  system  where  freedom  is  absolute,  and  no  coercion  or  compromise  is  
accepted.  In  the following chapters,  we will  return to  these  competing understandings  of  what  
anarchism is, or can be, yet it  seems clear that anarchism is presented in what amounts to two  
radically  different  ways,  and  that  this  distinction,  crucial  though  it  is,  is  rarely  explicitly  
acknowledged  or  discussed.  Indeed,  it  is  not  always  clear  how arguments  for  anarchism as  a  
libertarian tendency within the state  differ from a standard liberal position; in fact, theorists such as  
Ward have at times been dismissed as little more than liberal reformists (see Benjamin Franks’  
discussion on Class War’s view about Ward in Franks 2003, 57). Certainly, it is much easier to  
accept the sort of arguments presented by Kropotkin, and more recently by the likes of Marianne  
Maeckelbergh, that much greater democratic engagement in all areas of life is possible – within the  
state. Ward was quite unusual in his belief that anarchism may well never be the sole ideology  
under which a society operates, at times explicitly acknowledging that anarchism was only ever  
likely to be one strand of the organisational fabric of any society (Ward 2008, 163-4); usually, the  
underlying assumption appears to be that anarchism in fact needs to, and potentially could, do away  
with the state entirely. All too often, these two understandings of anarchy seem to go hand-in-hand,  
with ideas about one form merging with thoughts about the other, with no real acknowledgement of  
45
the fundamental differences between them. 
In Chapter Six I suggest that the idea of prefiguration – that is, anarchy in action, within a wider, 
non-anarchist  environment  -  can  play  an  important  role  in  advancing  the  anarchist  project,  
especially when it responds openly to the critiques of the following chapters. What I hope to have  
shown here is that claims that such prefigurative experiments demonstrate the viability of entirely  
anarchist societies are fundamentally flawed. Whichever way  we understand the idea of anarchy in 
action, however, we encounter a further paradox when it is placed alongside an equally important  
idea in the anarchist tool-box – that of blue-prints, or rather, the opposition to them. Although there  
is much to be said for the resistance to creating blue-prints, I will argue in the following section that  
this opposition has, like the idea of anarchy in action, helped foster a culture where anarchists all  
too often fail to ask critical questions about the ideology.
The Anarchist Opposition to Blueprints: Trifling Details, or Necessary Reflections?
I have so far argued that anarchists have, on the whole, failed to critically engage in discussing the  
viability of anarchy. Above, I suggested that discussions about the existence of stateless societies,  
and of people working co-operatively without state interference, have been used to defend the basic  
principles of anarchism. However, anarchists also argue that it is contrary to the anarchist ethos to  
outline how an anarchist society might work, because to do so is to already limit the freedoms of  
those who might at  some point  live in such a place.  On the one hand, the claim is  made that  
anarchism already exists, and, on the other, that anarchist forms of social organisation cannot be  
predefined. But if they already exist, why not at least explain in detail how they work? It might be  
argued that that is precisely what anarchists do, when they point to anarchy in action, but this only  
brings us back to the question of precisely how these examples are to be understood. Are they  
meant as detailed examples that anarchists ought to follow in a strict sense? If so, we are not only  
faced with the problems I outlined in the discussions above, but also with the question as to what  
this would constitute, if not a blue-print? 
From the early theorists onwards, anarchists have taken their libertarian ethos to (one of) its logical  
conclusions, and argued against the possibility of detailing what an anarchist society would actually  
be like.
 
Diversity is [...] a core anarchist value which leaves little place [...] for detailed blue-prints and designs for  
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a free society (Gordon 2008, 5)
It is against the nature of anarchism to offer a blue-print for a free society, for free people must decide for  
themselves how they want to live (Marshall 1993, 625).
I am really too much of an anarchist to work out a programme for the members of that society; in fact, I  
do not bother about such trifling details, all I want is freedom, unrestricted liberty for myself and others  
(Emma Goldman, quoted in Marshall 1993, 398).
Many more  such  quotes  are  easily  found –  indeed,  when reading anarchist  literature,  they are  
difficult  to avoid.  In fact,  with a  certain irony, the rejection of blue-prints  is rolled out  with a  
uniform regularity that can begin to sound like a rather unhealthy mantra. However, this resistance  
is rooted in a commitment to self-governance, and its concomitant rejection of hierarchical authority  
– which includes a  rejection of any temporal inequality, where those in the present dictate life for  
those in the future (de Angelis 2001). As Simon Tormey argues, the creation of detailed plans about  
how the future might look often closes off important space in which to create our own visions of  
another world (Tormey 2005). And it is true that the rejection of blue-prints does not always and  
necessarily entail a refusal to discuss the workings of an anarchist community; anarchists tend to be  
quite  comfortable  with  paradoxes,  and  this  is  no  exception  (see  Kinna 2009,  221-  240 for  an  
interesting discussion about the tension between utopian thinking 16 and the rejection of blue-prints;  
see also Newman 2009). Yet I would argue that, over-all, anti-blueprint rhetoric has had a negative  
impact on anarchist thought, for three reasons. Firstly,  this resistance to blue-prints has itself, with a  
certain  irony,  often resulted in  closing off  the  possibilities  of  imagining,  and creating,  a  better  
world. Secondly, the refusal to discuss in more concrete ways the possible workings of an anarchist  
society  has  meant  that  potential  problems are  not  easily  anticipated,  and  are  often  overlooked  
entirely. And, finally, the lack of alternative visions – to inform and inspire – has helped maintain  
the popular view of anarchism as hopelessly unrealistic and naïve. I now discuss these issues in  
turn.
16 Anarchism has had a somewhat ambivalent relationship with the notion of utopia, partly because of the criticisms of  
blue-print utopianism levelled by Engels in Socialism Utopian and Scientific. Utopian visions are deemed both  
necessary, to galvanise support for changing the world and to constructively shape revolutionary action, and illiberal  
in subordinating individual desires to collective goals (Davis & Kinna 2009). But the notion of utopia can be  
disentangled entirely from the creation of blue-prints, so that, as E.P.Thompson suggests, ‘the scientific/utopian  
antimony of Engels must be rejected ... a new kind of utopian writing may be found among European Socialists after  
1850, prefigured by Dejacque and Coeurderoy, and of which Morris is the most notable exemplar. This new  
Utopianism turned away from the forms of classical Utopianism - those of juridico-political model-building - and  
turned towards a more open heuristic discourse’ (Thompson, 1976).  
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Firstly, the resistance to creating blue-prints is rooted in a libertarian belief that individuals must be  
free to define their  own utopias,  their  own visions of alternative worlds.  But there is  a certain  
paradox  to  this  position.  Although  there  may  be  a  clear  difference  between  the  creation  of  a  
manifesto by the vanguard of an authoritarian party, and an individual sharing her hopes and visions  
around a campfire, the frequent and forceful denouncing of blue-prints has led, I would argue, to a  
general reluctance to ever present one’s own visions, however tentatively, of another world. Rather  
than  opening  up  space  for  a  plurality of  visions,  as  Tormey suggests  is  happening  within  the  
movement (Tormey 2005),  what we see is an extreme reluctance to offer  any visions; and this 
should hardly be surprising, because unless we wrap our own visions of a better world within a host  
of sufficiently humble provisos – this is only my view, I don’t want to force this on anyone else, and  
so on – then the danger is our vision will itself be denounced as being nothing more than another  
dreaded blue-print. Indeed, Tormey argues, in relation to the Social Forum Process, that: 
To the great frustration of all those who would like to see the social forums aid in the construction of a  
party or movement ‘proper’, the tone and orientation of such meetings remains resolutely one of negation, 
of resistance, as opposed to affirmation of an alternative. Resistance opens the way to alternatives; it does  
not affirm or celebrate one alternative over all others (Tormey 2005, 405) .
Yet how can ‘resistance open the way to alternatives’ if we can not discuss, or debate, or share our  
thoughts on what these alternatives might be? Tormey emphasises a  diversity of visions, yet the 
strength of his position would appear to  exclude any vision that is not sufficiently open-ended or  
vague to meet his approval. Whilst grounded in a valid concern to keep spaces such as the Social  
Forum, and any forms of politics that stem from them, equal and non-hierarchical, I would suggest  
that anarchists have often reacted to these concerns in an extreme and ultimately damaging way,  
denying not only the validity of a vanguard to proscribe how we ought to live, but, in the process,  
limiting the potential for  anyone to engage in such thinking. As I discuss below, this paradoxical  
situation can easily be addressed once it is adequately recognised; at present, however, I would  
suggest  this  rather  simple  problem  has  eluded  many  anarchists  who  are,  as  a  result,  unduly  
restricting the radical imagination.
The  second problem in  need  of  discussion  relates  to  the  fact  that,  in  failing  to  consider  how  
libertarian communities might actually deal with practical issues, such as the distribution of goods,  
and  the  maintenance  of  social  order,  anarchists  are  failing  to  anticipate  and  therefore  discuss  
potential problems that may arise if and when an anarchist society comes into being. As we shall  
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see in the following chapters, many important debates, about freedom, ethics, power, and so on, are  
therefore  being  ignored  or  excluded;  this  happens  either  because  the  problems are  simply  not  
recognised (because they only arise when more concrete questions about anarchism are asked –  
something precluded by the rejection of blue-prints) or because, if they are recognised, they are not  
considered legitimate topics for discussion, because this is precluded by the rejection of blue-prints.  
As such, the anarchist has a sort of ‘get out of jail free’ card; when asked a troubling question about  
how an anarchist society might resolve a well acknowledged problem, they can simply say ‘that’s  
not for me to answer’. The result, then, is a lack of engaged, challenging and self-critical debate  
within  anarchism about  a  number  of  important  issues  (Bufe  1994,  1).  As  we  shall  see  in  the 
following chapter, for example, too often, difficult questions about freedom are left unanswered or  
unexplored. 
And, finally, this lack of clarity and vision makes it extremely difficult to convince people about the  
merits  of anarchism.  Michael  Albert,  who,  along with Robin Hahnel,  has  developed a detailed  
economic system – Parecon - which is, they argue, compatible with anarchist principles (see Albert  
2003; Hahnel 2005) argues that: 
Citizens of developed countries are not going to risk what they have […] to pursue a goal about which  
they have no clarity. How often do they have to ask us what we are for before we give them some […]  
answers?  Offering  a  political  vision  that  encompasses  legislation,  implementation,  adjudication,  and  
enforcement, and that shows how each would be effectively accomplished in a non-authoritarian way […]  
would not only provide our contemporary activism much-needed long-term hope, it would also inform  
our immediate responses to today’s electoral, law-making, law-enforcing, and court systems, and thus  
many of our strategic choices.  So shouldn’t today’s anarchist community be generating such political  
vision?  (Albert 2001, 326-7).
Clearly, there is always the danger that ideas offered simply as options eventually solidify and turn 
into unquestioned principles that must be obeyed, but anarchism can not defend itself absolutely  
against the ever present authoritarian threat by constantly refusing to provide any ideas about how  
an  anarchist  society  might  function.  Furthermore,  anarchists  need  to  ask  how  inspiring their 
demands for a libertarian world are when they are left so deliberately vague. As Trevor Blackwell  
and Jeremy Seabrook note in their thought-provoking book The Revolt Against Change :
Even steel-makers and coal miners have fought to preserve their places of work, once pictured as the most  
dreadful hell-holes devised by an inhuman system to oppress its captive peoples. […] Their caution in  
giving up the familiar for another unknown destination comes from a well-grounded fear that there will be  
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further pain and sacrifice in store (Blackwell & Seabrook 1993, 16).
Of course, even with detailed blue-prints, people will question to what extent any political change  
will result in its promised benefits, and rightly so; but without any real sense of what an anarchist 
future might look like, is it not reasonable to anticipate an even greater aversion to taking a risk as  
huge as dismantling the state? This does not mean that anarchists must renounce their principles to  
win more support,  to achieve anarchism at all  costs,  so to speak;  the resistance to this type of  
politics is of course one of the core elements of the prefigurative ideal. But anarchists must ask  
themselves whether some more helpful balance cannot be found.
In the final chapter I return to the question of blue-prints, and suggest that a balance needs to be  
struck; anarchists must be wary of creating restrictive plans for societies they themselves may never  
live in, but they must also seek to expand their vision and create inspiring and useful ideas that can  
help push anarchist  ideas forward.  And I  will  suggest  that  a greater  emphasis  on prefigurative  
politics will help anarchists in finding such a balance, by offering more opportunities for anarchists  
to engage with difficult moral and political questions, not through abstract theoretical reflection, but  
as an outcome of living one’s everyday life according to anarchist values.
Whilst the rejection of blue-prints is informed by a principled commitment to genuine political  
equality, I believe that the anarchist response to this critique itself has a negative and wide-reaching  
impact  on the  chances  of  ever  creating  such a  free  society.  There  is  a  fundamental  difference  
between offering a solution to a problem as an option, and on insisting that everyone must follow 
that solution. Discussing how an anarchist society might deal with problems of anti-social behaviour  
or disputes about resource allocation, for example, does not mean they must deal with them in this 
way, but it does provide a necessary space for much need critical reflection.
 
Conclusions
I started this chapter with the claim that anarchists have failed to address some serious concerns  
about their ideology, and I suggested that at least two reasons for this were internal to anarchist  
discourse  itself:  first,  the insistence that  anarchism has  already been shown to be  viable,  as  is  
evidenced both by the existence of non-state societies, and by the fact of anarchy in action within  
existing state structures; and second, the rejection of blue-prints, which stems from anarchism’s  
deeply held commitment to freedom, which negates the rights of a self-selected vanguard to detail  
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how an anarchist society should function. Whilst anarchists can and should learn from anarchist  
societies, and from the day-to-day practices of people organising their lives without hierarchy, I  
have argued that there are serious limitations in doing so; ultimately, such examples can only teach  
us so much about a possible libertarian life. And whilst the rejection of detailed blue-prints should  
be valued, it too has limitations; this rejection of a vanguardist approach to politics has led, I have  
argued,  to  a  problematic  refusal  to  engage  in  discussing  a  number  of  difficult  questions  that  
anarchism surely must face if it is to be more widely embraced – and if, crucially, it is to work, if  
ever it gets the chance. 
The failure to see the limitations in these approaches have led, therefore, to a number of serious  
shortcomings in the anarchist project. Questions of freedom, ethics, power, questions any political  
movement must address, have been left  without answers. In the chapters that follow, I want to  
explore these challenging issues, and to attempt to tease out the underlying anarchist assumptions  
about them. What do anarchists mean by freedom, and how do they hope a free society will actually  
work? How will issues of crime be resolved, and how will freedom be reconciled with equality? Is  
there  a  specifically  anarchist  approach  to  ethics,  and  if  there  is,  what  is  it?  Do  anarchists  
misunderstand the nature of power, and have they therefore underestimated the extent to which it  
will continue to be a source of problems, even within a libertarian world? 
Without access to any precise details of what an anarchist society would look like, we must look  
more thoroughly at these fundamental questions, and see whether anarchists know themselves the 
answers to the basic questions of social organisation. It is, after all, one thing to refuse to outline a  
blue-print, and another thing entirely to be unable to imagine for oneself what the answers might be.  
In Chapter Five, I go on to demonstrate how a failure to consider these issues has resulted in a  
problematic support for consensus-decision making, a process which, its supporters claim, does in  
fact  respond  to  problems  of  freedom,  ethics  and  power,  but  which,  I  argue,  fundamentally  
misunderstands  them.  In the  final  chapter  I  return  to  the  matter  of  anarchy in  action,  and  the  
question of blue-prints, and make some tentative suggestions as to how they might be re-aligned in  
response to the issues raised throughout the thesis.  
So we turn now to the question of freedom; are anarchists ‘fanatical lovers of liberty’, as Bakunin  
famously  declared?  Not  surprisingly,  the  answer  to  this  question  is  complex  and,  ultimately,  
incomplete; what will become clear is that freedom is indeed a core anarchist value , but one which 
is often misunderstood, and  which presents very real problems for those who hope to see this value  
realised in practice.
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Chapter Two
Fanatical Lovers of Liberty?
IN the Introduction,  I  highlighted the uncontentious point that anarchism is a libertarian  
philosophy; freedom is considered a key value by anarchists. However, I went on to suggest that  
what  this  meant,  theoretically  and  practically,  was  often  far  from clear.  In  short,  I  offered  the  
premise that anarchism suffers from a lack of clarity regarding its aims, or principles (or both). So 
what  have anarchists  had to say about freedom, and what are the problems I  seem so keen to  
highlight? 
Freedom, noted Isaiah Berlin, has been praised by almost ‘every moralist in human history’ and yet,  
like ‘happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that  
there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist’ (2002, 121). Indeed, if we assume we can  
gain some understanding of what anarchists mean by freedom by looking at what anarchists believe  
are some of the living examples of anarchism we saw in the preceding chapter, then we are forced  
to concede freedom is no less porous for the anarchists than it is for anyone else. The tribes people  
of the Nuer, for example, might be free from the state, but it is highly questionable whether they  
have many other sorts of freedom that we might associate with contemporary life. 
In the following chapter, then, I begin by briefly exploring freedom outside of anarchist discourse,  
concluding that it is a complex concept which escapes any easy definition. Narrowing the focus to  
see what  freedom means for  anarchists,  I  discuss the difference between negative and positive  
freedoms, and ask which of these  – if any – anarchists favour. I then go on to discuss freedom in  
context, to get an impression of what it might mean in concrete terms; the issues of crime and  
equality are therefore discussed in relation to freedom. Ultimately, I conclude that, though central to  
the anarchist ideology, what form of freedom anarchists favour, what it means to talk of a free  
society, or the freedom of the individual, and indeed, to what extent the negation of freedom –  
coercion,  domination,  and the like – might reasonably be expected to disappear in such a free  
society, are questions with no clear answers. Let us begin, then, with a brief exploration of freedom,  
independent of any anarchist connections.
Freedom – a ‘perplexingly polymorphous notion’ 
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To begin, it might help to think a little about the idea of freedom more generally; to understand it in  
its wider philosophical and political context. Doing so will, if nothing else, help us keep in mind the  
fact that anarchism is far from alone in promoting – and struggling with – the basic concept of  
freedom.  Perhaps  the  simplest  but  most  important  thing  we  might  say  about  freedom is  this:  
freedom is not simple. Not philosophically, and certainly not practically. Indeed, philosophers –  
political and otherwise – have long considered the idea of freedom, and recognised and discussed  
the complexity of this powerful word. As Benjamin Gibbs notes:
To investigate  freedom is  to  enter  into a  labyrinth of  concepts  and principles,  and face problems as  
complicated and intractable as any in philosophy. We are prone to misconceive and misrepresent this  
perplexingly polymorphous notion, to abstract from it something thin and stunted which we take to be the  
real essence of freedom. If such abstractions are applied as principles of social policy, there may be a high  
price to pay in human suffering. What is brought into being may be  a negation of true freedom (Gibbs 
1976, 10, my emphasis).
 
In his classic essay Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin argues in a similar vein that ‘conceptions 
of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man [sic]. Enough  
manipulation of the definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator  
wishes’ (2002,  181).  Indeed,  freedom  has  meant  a  great  many  things  to  as  many  different  
individuals and ideologies. As anarchists are well aware, freedom is frequently used to defend any  
number of things they actively fight against; capitalism, liberal democracy, even war, have all been  
defended on the grounds that they will protect – or extend – freedom. As George Bush II said on the  
morning of September 11th, 2001, ‘freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward.  
And freedom will be defended’ (Bush, 2001). Bush’s closest ally in the fight to spread freedom  
throughout the world, Tony Blair, argues in a similar fashion: ‘[A]ll nations that are free value that  
freedom, will defend it absolutely, but have no wish to trample on the freedom of others’ (Blair,  
2003).
It is easy enough – especially for radicals - to simply label Bush, Blair and company as hypocrites,  
or liars; easy, but unsatisfactory. Because whatever the intentions of these particular individuals, the  
important point is that their ideas of freedom make sense on some level, and they make sense to a  
great many people. The freedoms offered by liberal democracies, however limited and corrupted  
they might be considered by some, are, for others, of the highest worth, and the culmination of  
many centuries of struggle. And, importantly, any limits these democracies place on freedom can  
be, and often are, justified (at least in the minds of many); more to the point, they are often justified  
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in relation to that very same freedom. As Nikolas Rose points out
the programmatic and strategic deployment of coercion, whether it be in the name of crime control or the  
administration of welfare benefits, has been reshaped upon the ground of freedom, so that particular kinds  
of  justification  have  to  be  provided  for  such  practices.  [..F]or  example  [...]  the  argument  that  the  
constraint of the few is a condition for the freedom of the many, that limited coercion is necessary to  
shape or reform pathological individuals […] or that coercion is needed to eliminate dependency and  
enforce the autonomy of the will that is the necessary counterpart of freedom (Rose 2004, 10).
Such paradoxes are common, and, as we will see throughout this work, it is a dangerous mistake to  
assume that they are always the result of disingenuous rhetoric. According to Paul Chambers, for  
example, for anarchists ‘it is a curious suggestion that liberty might be upheld by the denial of  
liberty’ (Chambers 2006, 37), but is it really so curious 17? That freedoms might be denied to defend 
other  freedoms  may  well  be  paradoxical,  but  we  might  more  honestly  suggest  that  such  a  
proposition is  troubling for anarchists, rather than curious. Indeed, freedom, I would suggest, is  
fraught with paradox, and the only way to eliminate troubling contradictions is to limit the scope of  
what we mean by freedom. Which is precisely what many people have attempted to do.  As F.A. 
Hayek put it:
The most effective way of making people accept the validity of the values they are to serve is to persuade  
them that they are really the same as those which they […] have always held […] And the most efficient  
technique to this end is to use the old words but change their meaning […] The worst sufferer in this  
respect is, of course, the word liberty. It is a word used as freely in totalitarian states as elsewhere (Hayek  
2003, 161-2).
Anarchists may raise a weary eyebrow at such words, coming as they do from such an influential  
defender of the free market – an economic system that is, for anarchists, 18 antithetical to freedom; 
but, once again, to do so without reflecting on why it makes sense for a free market liberal to talk in  
such a way does anarchism no favours. Freedom, it would appear, is inherently problematic and  
extremely vulnerable to abuse; its content is paradoxical and its meanings are plural. Which brings 
us  back  to  the  question:  exactly  which  forms  of  freedom  do anarchists  support?  What  have 
anarchists themselves said about freedom? If anarchists define themselves as lovers of liberty, and  
refuse to outline what an anarchist society might look like, how do they differ from Hayek, Blair, or  
17 The argument presented in the article this quote is taken from suggests that by ‘curious’, Chambers is implying that  
such a suggestion is in fact wrong.
18 As I noted in the Introduction, the following thesis does not discuss the work of anarcho-capitalists, who may in fact  
be sympathetic to Hayek’s arguments.
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Bush? 
Anarchist Freedom – an Overview
Murray Bookchin,  one of anarchism’s most  interesting,  prolific,  and also problematic  theorists,  
recognised the need for these issues to be at least discussed, if not quite resolved.
Freedom has its forms. [...] At one point or another, a revolutionary people must deal with how it will  
manage the land and the factories from which it acquires the means of life. It must deal with the manner  
in which it will arrive at decisions that affect the community as a whole. Thus if revolutionary thought is  
to be taken seriously, it must speak directly to the problems and forms of social management. It must  
open to public discussion the problems that are involved in a creative development of liberatory social  
forms (Bookchin 1974, 143).
Bookchin’s enquiries into what such a liberated society might look like, however, increasingly led  
him away from anarchism,  and in the last  decade of  his  life  he came to reject  the philosophy  
entirely,  describing  it  as  ‘the  most  extreme  formulation  of  liberalism’s  ideology  of  unfettered  
autonomy’ (Bookchin 2007, 91). Whilst I would by no means suggest that there can be no coherent  
anarchist view of freedom, it is perhaps not entirely without reason that, in pressing the question,  
and refusing to settle for easy answers, Bookchin was left feeling anarchism could not in fact offer  
any reasonable solutions to the various problems posed by an unswerving commitment to liberty. 19 
Alan  Ritter  held  out  higher  hopes  for  anarchism,  but  nonetheless  recognised  that  too  many  
questions  were  left  unanswered  by  previous  generations  of  anarchists.  He  opens  his  book  
Anarchism,  published  in  1980,  by  noting  that  ‘anarchists  are  commonly  regarded  as  extreme  
libertarians on the ground that they seek freedom above all else’ (Ritter 1980, 9). This view is false,  
however, because in fact, anarchists rely ‘on public censure to control behaviour’ (ibid.). How then,  
Ritter asks, do anarchists justify this control; how, in other words, do they understand  and limit 
freedom?  ‘Although  [anarchists]  have  long  deemed  this  question  crucial’  he  continues,  ‘no  
acceptable answer has yet been found’ (ibid., 10). Whereas Bookchin’s finer points are often lost in  
19 Although I disagree with much of Bookchin’s work, and the manner in which he presents it, I cannot help but  
sympathise with his increasing frustration with a philosophy whose adherents so systematically fail or refuse (with a  
few honourable exceptions) to engage in self-critical analysis and to ask some fundamental questions such as those I  
pose below. I should add, however, that whereas Bookchin lays the blame for this on an ad-hoc collection of groups and  
discourses of which he disapproves – postmodernism, spiritualism, and, seemingly,  youthfulness -   I  have already  
offered in Chapter One what I believe are more convincing reasons for this state of affairs. It is, in my view, deeply  
regrettable  that  Bookchin  wrapped  the  seeds  of  some  important  insights  in  such  heavy,  muddled  and  embittered  
rhetoric.
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a mist of vitriol, the opposite problem occurs here; for this is, in fact, a remarkable statement, made  
with such little fanfare as to be easily over-looked: after more than a century of anarchist thought,  
Ritter believes the answer to perhaps the single most important question anarchism faces remains  
unanswered. 
But was Ritter right? Are anarchists really not extreme libertarians, as they are so often portrayed?  
In her exploration of contemporary anarchism,  Giorel Curran states: ‘To anarchists the values of 
liberty and autonomy are everything, and they staunchly resist all attempts to trample them’ (Curran  
2006, 20). And, writing many decades earlier, Alexander Berkman argued that: 
Anarchism means that you should be free; that no one should enslave you, boss you, rob you, or impose  
upon you. It means you should be free to do the things you want to do, and that you should not be  
compelled to do what you don’t want to do (Berkman 1970 [1929], 2 ). 
He goes on to suggest: 
In the fewest words, anarchism teaches that we can live in a society where there is no compulsion of any  
kind. A life without compulsion naturally means liberty; it means freedom from being forced or coerced, a  
chance to lead the life that suits you best (ibid., 9, my emphasis). 
Anarchist thought is indeed peppered with such categorical statements. L. Susan Brown talks of  
‘anarchism’s concern for individual freedom,  unconstrained by any authority or power’  (Brown 
1993, 2, my emphasis), and Uri Gordon suggests that one of three key themes for the contemporary  
anarchist movement is ‘the rejection of all forms of domination’ (2008, 6). Yet while Brown rejects 
all authority, and Gordon denounces  all domination, we can also find hints of a more balanced 
view, which sees subtle distinctions between different forms of authority and domination. The title 
of Sam Clark’s book, Living Without Domination (Clark 2007) suggests an agreement with Gordon,  
yet,  as  I  suggested in  the previous chapter,  his  work  is  ultimately an argument about  life,  not  
without domination as such, but without the state. In fact, the examples Clark cites suggest multiple  
and complex relations of power and authority, and any claims that the individuals within these  
societies  are  entirely  free  from domination must  be,  at  best,  moderated and tentative.  What  is  
unclear in Clark’s work, and in the work of many anarchists, is whether this point is over-looked,  
denied, or considered acceptable. Is all authority and domination really rejected, or only certain  
forms?  
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Freedom as Rejection of the State/Authority
While there is no doubt that domination and authority have been forcefully condemned without  
qualification, it is equally true that it is their embodiment in the state, its related institutions, and the  
capitalist economy, which have historically formed, and to some extent continue to form, the basis  
of anarchist opposition20. My point here differs from the postanarchist claim that anarchists have  
tended to ignore non-state forms of power (Newman 2001; May 1994) – a question I will return to  
at much greater length in Chapter 4 – but it is certainly the case that anarchists’ discussions around  
freedom have often been understood within the parameters of a rejection of particular types of  
authority or domination; primarily, large-scale, institutional hierarchies. Indeed, it is the rejection of 
the state  that is often taken as being the one element that unifies otherwise diverse streams of  
anarchist thought. As Colin Ward puts it, ‘for anarchists the state itself is the enemy’ (Ward 2004,  
2). And for the postanarchist Saul Newman, the  ‘central claim of anarchism’ is ‘that life can be  
lived without  a state,  without centralised authority’ (Newman 2010, 1).  The term  anarchism of 
course means  without rulers (or some other synonym, such as leaders) and whilst I am cautious  
about placing too much emphasis on a word alone, especially a word that has a vast and complex  
history, it is nonetheless evident that it is this rejection of rulers that forms a fundamental bedrock of  
anarchism. As Ward continues, ‘threads of anarchist thought have different emphases. What links  
them all  is  their  rejection of  external authority,  whether that  of the state,  the employer,  or  the  
hierarchies of administration and of established institutions like the school and the church’ (Ward  
2004, 2).
Yet  somewhat  frustratingly,  understanding the  fundamental  principle  of  anarchism as  being the  
rejection of centralised authority only shifts the question: we would now need to be clear what was 
meant  by  rejection,  centralised,  and  authority.  Rather  than  analysing  these  terms  in  isolation,  
however, as the analytical philosopher Paul McLaughlin has done (2007), I think it would be more  
helpful to explore them in relation to other terms and ideas, both directly and indirectly related to  
the basic concept of freedom. Do anarchists ever talk of acceptable acts of coercion? Are there  
times when freedom is seen as being legitimately denied? What have  anarchists in action done 
when  freedoms  have  conflicted?  And  does  this  rejection  of  authority  suggest  a  support  for  a  
negative form of freedom, for example, or is it more compatible with a positive freedom?
20 I noted in the Introduction the commonplace claim that contemporary anarchists have expanded their focus to look  
well beyond these more traditional foci of authority and power, to explore issues around race, gender, and so on.  
However, I would suggest that whilst this is reflected in the way anarchists think about the world, the targets of  
anarchist activism remain much the same as they always have: corporations, institutions, and governments.
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Anarchist Freedom – Positive or Negative?
One of the most basic – but nonetheless fundamental – distinctions to be found within discussions  
of freedom is that between its positive and negative manifestations.  As Isaiah Berlin notes, the 
difference between negative and positive liberty  'is a cardinal issue. These are not two different 
interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the  
ends of life’ (Berlin 2002, 212).  On the most basic analysis, negative freedom relates to freedom 
from, whereas positive freedom relates to freedom to21. On a strictly philosophical reading, I agree  
with  critics  of  this  approach,  who  have  suggested  Berlin’s  distinction  is  simply  wrong:  these  
freedoms are in fact the same thing, referred to in different ways – we are only ever free  from 
something in order to be free to do something (see Gray 1991, and Gerald C. MacCullum 1967, for  
some useful explorations of these debates). However, I would agree that politically, and practically, 
the distinction remains a useful,  if nonetheless problematic way to think through certain issues;  
hopefully, this point will become clearer as the discussion continues. Taken on this level, we might  
understand negative freedom as a general stance of non-intervention, where people are best left  
alone to get on with their lives. Positive freedom, however, is seen as being part of a broader parcel  
of values, all of which may at times need to be pro-actively defended (see Nursey-Bray 1996, for a  
useful overview of positive and negative freedoms in relation to anarchist thought).   
The quotes we have seen so far would appear to suggest that anarchists adhere to a negative view of  
freedom, with such freedom being seen as  absolute  and non-negotiable.  Bakunin,  for example,  
famously declared anarchists to be ‘fanatical lovers of liberty’ (Bakunin 1984: 17). More explicitly,  
David Graeber and Andrej Grubacic contend that ‘anarchism as a whole has tended to advance what  
liberals like to call ‘negative freedoms” (Graeber & Grubacic 2004, 11) .  Yet we saw earlier how 
Alan  Ritter,  while  recognising  that  anarchists  are  usually  considered to  be  defenders  of  such 
negative freedom, denied that freedom is in fact the sole value for anarchists, and argued that their  
libertarian tendencies are tempered by their commitment to other values  (Ritter 1980, 39). And, just 
as we can find plenty of support for negative freedom amongst anarchists, so too there is much to  
suggest many defend a more positive approach. Herbert Read, for example, suggests that ‘ we must 
prefer the values of freedom and equality above all other values’ (Read 1974, 35, my emphasis),  
and Nicholas Walter argues that ‘freedom and equality are not contradictory, but complementary’  
(Walter  1979,  43).  It  is  not  without  reason  then  that  Randall  Amster  contradicts  Graeber  by  
21 Berlin’s work itself goes into much greater detail; for example, within the notion of positive freedom he dicusses the  
question of self-determination. However, for the purposes of the following discussion, this level of enquiry is not  
necessary, and indeed may will confuse matters. 
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declaring that ‘the anarchist is mainly interested in positive liberty’ (Amster 1998, 3). It should be  
made  clear  that  there  are  no  obvious  chronological  or  cultural  ‘sides’ to  these  disagreements;  
Amster  and  Graeber,  for  example,  who  argue  for  differing  concepts  of  freedom,  are  both  
contemporary theorists writing about anarchism as it is currently manifest.
So what are we to make of this? Do anarchists simply defend different forms of freedom? This  
ought not surprise us: it would be somewhat paradoxical, after all, if anarchists were all expected to  
agree about what sort of freedom they believed to be desirable. Indeed, some may argue that this is  
precisely the case, and for some anarchists this may well be so. I would argue, however, that on the  
whole we must draw more critical conclusions. Take Peter Marshall’s position. Marshall argues that  
‘all anarchists share certain common concerns. [...]  Above all,  they reject all coercive forms of  
external authority in order to achieve the greatest degree of freedom and equality’ (Marshall 1993,  
36). Marshall appears to seek to defend an absolute freedom – a negative freedom – and at the same  
time, to incorporate this freedom with other values – that is,  to also defend a positive form of  
freedom. So anarchists support both positive and negative freedom. But is such a thing possible?  
Berlin  certainly  didn’t  think  so,  and  this  approach  clearly  demands  answers  to  a  number  of  
challenging questions.  Which values exist  alongside freedom, to form this combination of both  
forms of freedom – a combination which Ritter (1980) calls communal individuality? What political 
and cultural tools are to be used to help mediate between them? What must anarchists do when  
conflicts between competing freedoms and values occur? How does equality relate to freedom?  
What about crime, and security? 
Such questions are the standard fare of political philosophy, but where are they to be found within  
anarchist thought? It is not my intention to suggest that these questions have never been asked, but I 
would suggest honest attempts to answer them are all too rare, and, to the extent such issues have  
been discussed, any answers arising from such discussions have failed to seep into the broader  
anarchist  conscience;  the  anarchist  common  sense ,  in  other  words,  has  no  ready  response.  
Furthermore, answers such as those presented by Ritter, which I discuss briefly below, are often  
abstract and presented without reference to any wider context; even a clearly defined defence of,  
say, positive freedom, which sees equality and freedom as being of equal importance, may give us  
little idea of how such a position is to be realised in practice. At this point, then, I want to explore 
anarchist  approaches  to  freedom in  relation  to  another  key  anarchist  value,  equality,  and  with  
reference to an issue that poses problems for any libertarian – that of crime. Doing so, we shall see  
how the wider anarchist movement understands freedom on a more practical level.
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Equal-Liberty
Discussions about the conflicting demands made by freedom and equality form a significant part of  
political, moral and economic theory. Robert Nozick’s famous discussion of the basketball player  
Walt Chamberlain accumulating wealth through the freedom of countless individuals paying to see  
him play (Nozick 1996, 161-4) is just one example of how complicated this problem is – or is  
argued  to  be.22 Indeed,  balancing  freedoms  with  other  values  is  a  notoriously  difficult  act  to  
perform,  which  is  one  reason  why  Berlin  sees  negative  and  positive  freedom  as  being  
fundamentally at odds with one another. 
But perhaps these are merely false dichotomies, which anarchism has seen through; or perhaps they  
are real enough within some social structures, but are broken down by the implementation of others,  
such as anarchism. Is it possible that anarchism is (amongst other things) precisely the resolution of  
these (supposedly) irresolvable problems? Or, conversely, that other ideologies, such as liberalism,  
with the aid of capitalism, are responsible for  creating such problems? Indeed, anarchists often  
simply  deny that  this  is  a  genuine  problem:  freedom and equality  are  seen  as  being  not  only  
compatible, but in fact mutually re-enforcing. We saw earlier that  Nicholas Walter claimed that 
‘freedom and equality are not contradictory, but complementary’ and he goes on to suggest that the  
‘crucial  contribution  to  political  theory  made by  anarchists  is  the  realisation  that  freedom and  
equality are in the end the same thing’ (Walter 1979, 43). Iain McKay states simply that ‘social  
equality  and individual liberty are inseparable’ (McKay 2007,  33),  and Saul  Newman makes a  
similar argument: ‘Equal-liberty is simply the idea that liberty and equality are inextricably linked,  
that one cannot be had without the other’ (Newman 2010, 20). Understood this way, ‘this generous  
formulation of equal-liberty does not see another’s liberty as potentially threatening but,  rather,  
mutually enhancing’ (ibid., 21) meaning that ‘anarchism provides the fullest development and most  
radical expression of equal-liberty’ (ibid., 24).  Newman makes a similar point when discussing the  
more widely discussed question of  the relationship between the individual and the community,  
arguing  that  the  division  between  personal  and  collective  freedom is  not  only  false,  but  was  
recognised as being so by some of the earliest thinkers. For Bakunin and Kropotkin, ‘the anarchist  
idea of freedom embodies and, indeed, maximises (‘extended to infinity’) the idea of individual  
liberty or autonomy, refusing to see it in opposition to the liberty of others or to the desire for social  
equality’ (ibid.,  144).  Such  a  conception  of  freedom  ‘refuses  to  see  an  opposition  between  
individual  freedom  and  collective,  egalitarian  freedom,  between  the  one  and  the  many,  any  
22 This is not to say I agree with Nozick's analysis, but that the basic problems he discusses are worthy of our attention.  
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constraint  on  one  involves  a  constraint  on  the  other’ (ibid.).  This  view,  which  is  ‘central  to  
anarchism’ (ibid.)  fundamentally  differentiates  it  from liberalism and socialism,  both  of  which  
‘imagine a tension between the individual and society, and between liberty and equality’ (ibid.,  
145). And while liberalism prioritises the individual over the collective, and socialism the collective  
over the individual, it ‘is only anarchism that refuses this opposition’ (ibid.).
Rather  than  seeing  conflicts  between  liberty  and  equality  (or  between  the  individual  and  the  
community) as being inevitable, Newman suggests they are the result of a philosophical failing:
Because liberalism is based on the sovereign self-interested individual, it does not have the conceptual 
language to think in these terms – it sees only a competition of liberties that must be balanced with one 
another. Unlike anarchism, it cannot imagine liberty as a collective entity, as a social being (ibid., 22-
23). 
But do all of these problems really come down to differing philosophical positions? Believing in  a 
moral or philosophical equivalence between freedom and equality is  simple;  providing genuine  
equality within a community of humans – especially within a community that is currently deeply  
divided and unequal – is much more difficult.  I  recognise this is a somewhat question begging  
statement:  what  is  meant,  precisely,  by  genuine  equality?  Perhaps  genuine  equality  really  is  
dependent on freedom, and conceptions of equality which appear to conflict with freedom – as they  
do for Nozick,  for example – are therefore not real expressions of equality,  or freedom, at all.  
Rather than resolving the issue, however, this merely complicates it further, and leaves us asking yet  
more questions: what would this genuine equality, and freedom, look like? How would it work in  
practice? In what ways,  precisely,  is  this  anarchist  equality different  from that  sought by other  
socialists? In what ways, precisely, is this anarchist freedom different from that sought by liberals? 
Just as we have asked what forms of freedom anarchists support, we might also enquire what sort of  
equality they believe to be compatible with this freedom. Like freedom, equality can be understood  
in different ways. Perhaps the most basic distinction is that between responding to, or over-looking,  
difference;  in  other  words,  equality can be understood as treating everyone the same,  whereby  
equality means ignoring their differences, or as treating people differently, whereby equality means  
respecting their differences (Kymlicka and Norman 2000). The first approach, sometimes referred  
to as being ‘difference-blind’, argues that we must look beyond people’s individual circumstances  
and create a level playing field for all. But sometimes, people’s differences are relevant, and to treat 
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everyone in the  same way is to, ultimately, deny those differences; in other words, the practical  
result is an inequality of treatment. But the second approach  - of responding to people’s differences  
- relies on absolute agreement about which differences are relevant, and in which ways; without  
such agreement, there would be a need to enforce the outcome of any decisions which are based on  
these differences (Nursey-Bray 1996, 106). 
In the sorts  of temporary autonomous spaces which contemporary anarchists  use to defend the  
viability of anarchism, for example, the provision of food is meant to establish and uphold the  
ideals of equality; however, this usually means that everyone is given the same amount of food.  
Clearly, this disadvantages those who are larger, or who have been engaged in more physically  
demanding activity; whilst people may grumble about this injustice around the camp fire, there are  
no real attempts within the movement to address these issues. Is the reason for this perhaps an  
implicit awareness that once such concerns are voiced and addressed, equality would soon become  
– as it has for liberals – a matter of contention, creating all manner of difficulties? Would people’s  
differences lead  to  disagreements?  And  then  would  it  perhaps  become clear  that  freedom and  
equality are not so harmoniously aligned?
It is not enough to morally condemn the conflict between liberty and equality, as though it simply  
exists at the whim of our political leaders, or due to some philosophical error. Those who see a  
conflict between equality and liberty see it as a problem occurring wherever humans gather: to be  
sure, it may be greatly exacerbated by certain social arrangements – a capitalist economy being a  
prime example – but are such conflicts and problems the result solely of these conditions?  No  
doubt they have a huge impact on the extent to which the problem is experienced, and I would  
defend the view that  anarchism is  best placed to respond to this conflict  in a just  manner,  but  
anarchists have failed to argue that no such conflicts would occur at all, or to discuss what they  
would do when they did.  
Iain McKay argues that ‘there has been much nonsense written about ‘equality’ and much of what is  
commonly believed about it is very strange indeed’ (McKay 2007, 31). Certainly, the image McKay  
himself  presents  suggests  this  is  the case:  anarchists  ‘have  no desire  to  live in  a  society were 
everyone gets the same goods, lives in the same kind of house, wears the same uniform, etc.’ (ibid.,  
31), nor do they believe that everyone should be identical. The fact that some people might believe  
such things ‘is a sad reflection on the state of present-day intellectual culture and the corruption of  
words’ (ibid.). It is not clear who in fact believes such things, and McKay fails to engage in a more  
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nuanced discussion, trivialising the debate by suggesting that the matter is a simple one once we  
dismiss the people who believe equality means a life of communist –style clones. More mainstream 
political theorists concerned with the question of how best to create and sustain an equal society  
have, however, explored in great detail this problem, and it is clear that equality is, like freedom, far  
from being a simple matter; as we have seen, equality can be seen as referring to outcomes, or  
opportunities;  it  can  also  refer  principally  to  economic  equality,  or  political  equality,  or  social  
equality, or a combination of these (for an interesting exploration of the concept of equality by a  
series  of  political  philosophers  see,  for  instance,  Franklin  1997).  However  equality  might  be  
realised in a libertarian society, as is often the case with anarchism, the real elephant in the room is  
the question of how such equality is to be achieved in the first place; how do anarchists hope to  
create equality from such an unequal world; crucially, how do they hope to do this whilst respecting  
their ideals of freedom?
Even if an agreeable understanding of equality could be arrived at, there is still the question of how  
we are to achieve an equal society, when the world is currently so unbalanced. We saw earlier that 
Uri Gordon believed anarchism to be against all forms of domination, yet even he acknowledges  
that certain groups will need to be forcibly coerced, at least in the creation of an anarchist society 
(Gordon 2008, 68). It is often argued that the ruling class, for example, may be ‘forcibly suppressed  
and coerced into the anarchist society’ (Schmidt & van der Walt 2009, 203). This, we are told, is  
‘not in contradiction with the anti-authoritarian principle. It is force used to remove the existing  
coercion of the capitalist system and can be seen as an act of legitimate self-defence by the popular  
classes’ (ibid.). Is the claim, then, that freedom and equality will  eventually be compatible, in an 
anarchist society? Perhaps. But this only raises more questions. How long will an anarchist society  
permit people being ‘forcibly suppressed’? Until everyone is equal? And how long will that be?  
And what does this say of the anarchist commitment to a prefigurative politics, where the means  
and ends of any action are seen to be inseparable?  
Anarchists  must  ask  themselves  how  the  tasks  of  redistributing  (economic)  wealth,  and  then  
maintaining an equal distribution, are to be performed in practice: what levels of coercion will be  
acceptable? How will communities prevent such activities ossifying into institutionalised roles of  
economic – and then social – control? If  freedom is the ultimate goal of the anarchist, why is the  
poor coercing the rich any more acceptable than the rich coercing the poor? Isn’t freedom being  
relegated here, superseded by the need to establish equality? Maybe this is just, but is it libertarian? 
Such questions lead us to ask broader questions about the anarchist position on crime and social  
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control, an issue to which we now turn.
Anarchy and Anti-Social Behaviour.
In the following section, I want to discuss the issue of crime and anti-social behaviour to see how  
they relate to anarchist demands for absolute freedom, and for an end to all forms of coercion and  
authority. Such demands have usually led anarchists to reject all forms of law enforcement, such as  
the  police  and  prison  services  (Richardson 1987,  274;  Wieck  2009,  227).  This  is  perhaps  not  
surprising; the legal  system restricts  an individual’s  liberty in a  way that is  both profound and  
explicit. Importantly, it  presents its coercive authority as necessary and inevitable, and therefore  
justified; indeed, it even convinces many of those whose liberty it denies of its inherent justice. This  
position is certainly ethically consistent with the anarchist commitment to freedom, but how would  
it work in practice? Is this rejection of the law really viable, or is it a morally worthy but ultimately  
unworkable ideal?  Colin Ward was acutely aware of the problem that the anarchist rejection of the  
law caused:
Every anarchist propagandist would agree that the aspect of anarchist ideas of social organisation which  
people find hardest to swallow is the anarchist rejection of the law, the legal system and the agencies of  
law-enforcement. [...] [People] may ruefully agree with our criticism [of the law … b]ut they remain  
sceptical about the idea of a society in which the protection offered by the law is absent (Ward 1973, 126).
Indeed, very often, anarchy, in common language, denotes chaos and disorder – and often violent 
chaos and disorder at that (Goodwin 2007, 127). Anarchists often dismiss this negative view of  
anarchism as the result of equally negative propaganda – deliberate distortions of what anarchism  
really means. No doubt they have some justification in taking this view. But there is little doubt too  
that even without such propaganda, people may reasonably believe that some sort of authority is  
needed to keep - especially large, modern – societies from disintegrating into chaos. Importantly,  
this does not necessarily entail the view that people who see the state as necessary believe that ‘man  
would tear his fellow-man to pieces like wild beasts’ (Kropotkin 1985, 129). People may readily  
concede that the majority of people would not act in such ways. But what about the small minority  
who might seek to exploit a society without laws? Of course, the majority of people’s day-to-day  
lives are not the result of explicit and direct police enforcement, but we must remember that the  
state’s power operates in multiple ways. Kropotkin argues that we can witness people interacting  
‘without any intervention of the law’, but is this true? As I argued in the previous chapter, the law  
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may not always intervene directly, and explicitly, but can we really assume its background presence  
has no effect on the way we behave? We do not need to applaud this fact to give it the weight it  
rightly  deserves.  Yet  Kropotkin’s  position,  echoed  by  many  anarchists,  appears  to  be  unjustly  
dismissive of people’s genuine concerns, stereotyping them all as simplistic Hobbesians. 
Within  the  state,  then,  people’s  lives  are  directly  and  indirectly  ordered  by  the  law.  From the  
mundane to the fundamental, a legal system structures and limits the very fabric of society, and so  
has unavoidable consequences for individual freedom. Whereas anarchism argues that the law is for  
this very reason unjustifiable, the majority of people see these limitations as acceptable – as an  
unfortunate paradox, a necessary trade-off, without which we would witness an even greater loss to  
freedom. Anarchists  must  defend their  claims that  freedom will  be  enhanced without  the tools  
usually believed to be the only ones capable of doing the job. So how have anarchists argued for the  
possibility  of  (some  acceptable  level  of)  social  cohesion,  without  the  state,  and  related  legal  
institutions? 
Anarchists have advanced arguments to combat claims that life without the state would be ‘nasty,  
brutish and short’ by arguing that, whatever view we may have of human nature, the majority of  
harm (committed by individuals) 23 is in fact the result of the way society is  organised; the majority 
of crime, it is argued, exists, not despite the state, but because of it. Massive inequality – of wealth,  
and general  life  prospects  –  creates the conditions  in  which crime will  flourish (Pilgrim 1993;  
Stamm  1995;  Kropotkin  1970,  212-18).  A  more  justly  organised  society  would  mean  that  
individuals were materially satisfied, so that their need to steal or cheat would be greatly reduced;  
communities would also be bound with stronger feelings of solidarity, rather than the envy, isolation  
and anger which flourish in a competitive and unequal  world.  Whatever anarchists  think about  
human nature then (an issue I return to in the following chapter), they place considerable emphasis  
on the  nurturing of individuals, not only through childhood, but for one’s entire life. Anarchism  
requires, as Ward argues, a different sort of human environment, not a different sort of human being  
(Ward 2008, 154). Well nourished individuals, morally and gastronomically, are far less likely to  
commit crimes than the many spiritually and nutritionally malnourished individuals that exist today.
However,  anarchists  do recognise  that  not  everyone will  be  motivated by  the  same communal  
ideals. To this end, anarchists have usually recognised the need for some form of social control,  
23 Anarchists often make the point that, whatever the arguments regarding the conduct of individuals, the crimes of the  
state are always far worse.
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usually understood as some form of censure or rebuke (Ritter 1980). For example,  Alan Ritter  
suggests that behaviour is ‘controlled by penalties, in the form of threatened or actual rebuke’ (ibid.,  
12), yet at no point anywhere in the book does he discuss exactly what form this rebuke might take.  
Censure is clearly placed by Ritter at a normative distance from coercion, without any concrete  
suggestions as to what this difference actually means, morally, and in practice. We can only hazard  
a guess that censure is simply considered as being a relatively mild, verbal (i.e non-physical) act:  
yet to the extent that censure is kept at an acceptable level, that is, as long as it remains essentially  
non-coercive or intrusive, it surely loses any credence as a reliable form of social control.  Ritter 
argues that ‘punishment, like authority, far from being at odds with anarchy, is one of its integral  
features’ (Ritter 1980, 76), but if punishment is understood to exist solely as rebuke, which Ritter  
suggests, then anarchists surely have their work cut out.  Kropotkin’s examples of censorial taunts 
(Kropotkin 1980, 69) for example – ‘Your mother does not know sewing, your father is blind in one  
eye’ – are, let us say,  unlikely to convince either the criminal to abandon crime or the liberal to  
abandon the state. Ritter also fails to discuss the extent to which the moral disapproval of a society  
towards  anti-social  behaviour  may  also  lead  to  an  oppressive  conformity,  where  alternative  
lifestyles are also prevented by a community. Once again, it is Colin Ward who most openly and  
honestly recognises the potential  dangers in harnessing the power of communities to encourage  
appropriate behaviour, because there is often no clear agreement on what is and is not appropriate; 
as such, ‘the censorious eyes of neighbours’ (Ward 2008, 156) may be used to effectively prohibit  
not only acts of violence or theft, but could also be used to discourage certain sexual behaviours, for  
example. Ritter’s view relies on a shared understanding of what constitutes good, or appropriate  
behaviour. 
In the following chapter, we return to this question, and ask whether such agreement is possible, or,  
indeed, desirable. Leaving aside such difficulties for the moment, another problem faces anarchists:  
such censure is primarily understood as functioning on the level of deterrent, whereby the majority  
in a community are convinced either of the normative ideals of acting in, broadly speaking, social  
ways, or, if they are not, of the costs involved in acting in anti-social ways. However, anarchists  
recognise the potential for what we might call pathological crime; the case of the Mad Axe Man, as  
Stephen Cullen puts it (Cullen 1993). Serial killers, for example, do not kill for bread, nor are they  
likely  to  be  prevented  from killing  by  a  censorial  community  that  frowns  on  their  homicidal  
proclivities. What would anarchists do about those people who kill, or rape, not for material gains,  
but because they are simply disturbed individuals? Anarchists reply with two key arguments: firstly,  
they  argue  that  these  individuals  are,  again,  ‘primarily  the  product  of  non-anarchist  forms  of  
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organisation  [...]  where  the  civic  culture  manifests  itself  in  the  form  of  competition,  social  
dislocation,  authoritarianism,  militarism  and  sexism’ (Cullen  1993,  140).  Just  as  people  steal  
because of the social inequality perpetuated by the state, so they are – at times – more profoundly,  
emotionally  and  psychologically  corrupted  (if  that  is  the  right  word)  by  the  same system.  An  
anarchist society would foster different values which would not create the sorts of isolated, angry  
individuals that turn into maniacal killers. Such arguments do not necessarily rely on an essentialist  
view of a benign human nature - hence my reservation to talk of corruption; they can just as easily 
refer to the possibilities of nurturing people in different ways, one more likely to create pathological 
murderers, the other less so.
  
The second argument is that these individuals exist today, and the state does little or nothing to  
protect us from them. As Cullen continues, ‘we are just as at risk from them in the most closely  
policed state as we are in the anarchist utopia’ (ibid.). Whilst the fear of prosecution may prevent  
the casual robber, people with psychological problems profound enough to turn them into murderers  
are unlikely to be so deterred. Furthermore, the psychologically disturbed nature of their crimes  
makes it hard for law enforcers to understand, and thus predict, their actions. Even within a state,  
people can, and do, quite literally get away with murder. In other words, if anarchic methods of  
social organisation are likely to fail in such cases, so too are those of the state. Such crimes could 
well be reduced in a more libertarian society that did not foster violent tendencies, and which did  
not seek to control its populace by means of oppressive moral conditioning; and to the extent that  
some such  crimes  would  continue,  the anarchist  need only point  to  the  obvious  fact  that  they  
continue now, despite the state and its institutions of law enforcement, and argue that things are  
unlikely to get any worse.
Can Mutual Aid Protect Us?
How well do these arguments fair? There is good reason to believe that mutual aid would indeed  
flourish without the state. As we saw in Chapter One, solidarity and mutual support are evidenced  
in all manner of societies that do not have forms of institutionalised control. Even within the state,  
the majority of people act in ways that foster community cohesion, and it is at least theoretically  
plausible that, without the law enforcement capabilities the state currently holds, societies could still  
maintain some degree of social  cohesion.  This,  of  course,  is  the basic  argument of  mutual  aid  
presented by Kropotkin. Similarly, there is a strong argument to be made that our current economic  
and political system is profoundly flawed and socially destructive and that there are better ways in  
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which  we  might  organise  social  life;  we  can  concur,  then,  that  capitalism,  and  the  state,  are  
responsible for a great deal of what we currently know as crime.
However, crime is more than serial killers and people stealing money to feed themselves: people  
want to know how anarchists would deal with all manner of social problems - domestic violence,  
for example. And some anarchists concede that such problems are indeed worrying. As one activist  
notes in a unusual display of honesty and concern:
One big thing I’ve always wondered is, what will we do with perpetrators? If we agree that the cops and 
courts are not our friends; if they do not work to keep us safe; if perpetrators are not ‘out there’ but ‘in  
here’- what solutions do we magic out of our guts to create safety, justice and healing? (Chen n.d, 7)
It is heartening to see such questions at least being posed, but anarchist discussions that take the  
question seriously – and there are far too few of them -  are either worryingly (but at least honestly)  
unable to offer any real solutions, or offer entirely unconvincing answers. Invoking the anarchist  
commitment to freedom, Cullen stresses the point that an anarchist society would be ‘undermined  
by the presence […] of anarchist prisons’ and asks rhetorically: ‘[Are they] really an option?’ As  
Cullen sees prisons as conflicting with anarchism’s commitment to freedom, he concludes that they  
have  can  no  place  in  an  anarchist  society.  However,  he  acknowledges  that  prisons  do  serve  a  
purpose,  and  that  anarchists  would  therefore  need  to  find  a  suitable  alternative.  Unfortunately,  
Cullen is unsure what such an alternative might be, and concludes his piece by asking the readers if  
they have ‘Any answers?’ (Cullen 1993, 142). Similar discussions display a curiously contradictory  
acknowledgement of the issue, accepting the lack of any real solution, whilst simply assuming that  
there must however be one. Class War, for example, state in no uncertain terms that:
The question of what we’re actually going to DO when the cops fuck off, has been almost completely  
ignored by street revolutionaries, but it’s one of the most important problems we face. There is no way  
that people are going to be greatful [sic] to see the back of the filth if they think that muggers, rapists,  
smack-dealers, wife beaters, and other anti-social bastards are going to have a free hand (Class War,  
1986).
So how will anarchists stop the anti-social bastards? The article goes on to conclude: ‘There’s got to  
be a better answer than calling the cops or letting it happen. And we need to find it […] We need the  
answers quickly, and we haven’t begun to ask the right questions’ (ibid.). 
It  is  remarkable that the failure to find an answer,  and the recognition that throughout the last  
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hundred odd years of anarchism, such fundamental questions have barely been raised, do little to  
shake anarchists’ faith in a libertarian society: ‘there’s got to be a better answer’ - even if we don’t  
know what it is. However, other anarchists are unwilling to concede the problem is unresolved.  
Take this position, taken from The Anarchist Manifesto: ‘actions which are unpopular because they 
are destructive or selfish will cause the person who committed said actions to be exiled from the  
society  of  his  or  her  peers’.  A few  lines  later,  the  anonymous  author  goes  on  to  claim  that  
‘[a]narchist society does not rely on ‘enforcement’ or punishment of bad acts’ (anarchy.net). But if 
exile isn’t enforcement, or punishment, what is it? Isn’t sending someone into exile a serious breach  
of their freedom? And where, exactly, are we to exile them to? To another anarchist community  
with more hard-hitting taunts – ‘Your mother doesn’t know sewing, or cooking, your father is blind 
in both eyes’? Or are we to hope that at least one state, replete with prisons, continues to exist? The  
issues are passed over without comment,  as  though exiling someone, how a community would  
decide who to exile and which acts are deemed destructive or selfish, and how they would enforce  
their exile, are entirely unproblematic issues. 
I will return to assess these problems below; at this point, I want to turn to a more concrete attempt  
by anarchists to deal with the problem of anti-social behaviour -  the concept of ‘Tranquility teams’,  
developed and employed in anarchist spaces such as Climate Camps.
Temporary, and Tranquil, Autonomous Zones
We find another attempt to respond to the problem within the contemporary anarchist movement:  
the temporary autonomous zones (TAZs), which I discussed in the previous chapter, often include  
the role of ‘tranquility’. TAZs are far from lacking in organisational structures, but such structures  
operate  according  to  principles  of  horizontal  decision-making,  and  are  therefore  viewed  to  be  
compatible with anarchist principles. Individuals in a TAZ take on rotating roles  – media, transport,  
food,  and  so  on  –  to  facilitate  the  day-to-day  running  of  the  space.  One  such  role  is  that  of  
‘tranquility’. The job of the tranquility team – usually made up of four people – is to help mediate  
incidents  of  conflict,  if  and  when  they  arise.  Often  donning  deliberately  garish,  pink  plastic  
cowboys hats in a symbolic display of their non-aggressive and anti-coercive approach, tranquility 24 
wander around the camp, never spontaneously interfering but rather waiting to be approached, and  
for the most part doing very little. Occasionally, however, a confrontation occurs, and tranquility do  
24 The people engaged in this role are referred to as simply ‘tranquility’:  for  instance,  ‘That man is being really  
aggressive – can somebody go and get tranquility’.
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their best to deal with the situation. Generally, they do a remarkably good job; I have personally  
witnessed a number of tense situations where the anticipated moment of violence has been skilfully  
prevented from materialising.  Other  times,  however,  the aforementioned tool  of  exile has been 
brought  into  use.  Although the  term itself  has  not  been  used,  at  the  majority  of  TAZs I  have  
attended, at least one individual has been removed from the space – sent out, or ‘back’, for the  
permanently  unautonomous zone to deal with. Although such problems ought to have provoked  
anarchists to ask more probing questions about their capacity to organise life without authority or  
coercion, they are in fact all  too easily framed in ways that down-play their significance: such  
incidents are rare, and while communities in  temporary autonomous zones may be culturally ill-
equipped to deal with them when they do arise, many anarchists seem to simply assume that fully  
fledged anarchist societies would develop genuine alternatives in time. These arguments can be  
turned on their head however: such incidents are rare precisely because these spaces are short-lived,  
it could be argued; longer term communities would have to deal with problems that simply never  
arise in a TAZ. What seems clear is that this raises very real questions about the anarchist capacity  
to protect at all costs the freedom of the individual. If such spaces are intended to demonstrate the  
viability of anarchist organisation, as is so often claimed, then what can we infer from the need to  
effectively exile certain individuals? And the best we can do at this stage is indeed make inferences,  
because there have been no substantial discussions about this issue within the movement. 
Another reason for tranquility’s ability to remain predominantly placid is its extremely limited role:  
tranquility is there to mediate between parties only when there is a very clear potential for violent  
behaviour. While this may include psychological as well as physical violence, it is limited to quite  
clearly  defined  acts  of  aggression.  Working  according  to  a  relatively  tight  understanding  of  
violence, tranquility is generally able to avoid embroiling itself in messy conflicts which divide the  
community. However, what constitutes violence, as activists are well aware, is open to considerable  
debate  (Richards  1993).  Shared  understandings  about  what  sort  of  behaviour  is  acceptable  –  
between tranquility and the rest of the community - allow for a generally friction free experience.  
But what would happen if a community held multiple definitions about what was and was not  
acceptable behaviour?  Dealing with violence, or anti-social behaviour is only half the problem;  
defining it is no less difficult, and is therefore a question we now need to explore.
What is Crime Anyway?
As I hinted at earlier, questions around crime, or anti-social behaviour, are not simply questions of  
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how certain actions are to be prohibited, but also about which actions. On one level, crime can be 
dealt with by simply deciding that something is no longer a crime. Anarchists could easily resolve  
the  problem  of  drug  related  criminality,  for  example,  by  ‘legalising’ drugs.  Indeed,  one  way  
anarchists deal with the problem of crime is to emphasise the extent to which the concept of crime  
itself  is  defined  by  the  state  (Ward  2008,  153-162).  However,  this  process  can  travel  in  both  
directions: what about those things which are currently legal – like children working fourteen hour  
days to make our clothes, or like throwing those clothes into a giant hole in the ground as soon as  
we  are  bored  with  them –  which  anarchists  might  disagree  with?  The  word  crime has  legal 
connotations which by definition exclude it from positive anarchist discussions; other terms, such as  
anti-social behaviour, are likely to be considered equally offensive by many: but surely anarchists  
do disapprove of certain acts and would hope to see their demise in an anarchy? As we shall see in  
the  following chapter,  anarchists  do attempt to  deny certain  actions  which they consider  to  be  
unacceptable. Fascists are prevented from holding street stalls by activists, for example. This raises  
the question of whether anarchists are genuinely opposed to coercion  as such, or simply certain 
forms of it. When anarchists themselves are in a position to define what is unacceptable behaviour, 
will they be any less inclined to act in ways to deny the freedom of those wishing to engage in acts  
they disapprove of? 
In the  Anarchist FAQ, Iain McKay suggests ‘an anarchist society is non-coercive, that is, one in  
which violence or the threat of violence will not be used to ‘convince’ individuals to do anything’  
(McKay 2007, 29), but then goes on to state categorically that: 
Anarchists do not believe that everyone should be able to ‘do whatever they like’, because some actions  
obviously involve the denial of the liberty of others. For example, anarchists do not support the ‘freedom’  
to rape, to exploit, or to coerce others. Neither do we tolerate authority (McKay 2007, 31). 
What does it mean to say anarchists  do not support rape? Does it mean they will prevent it from 
happening, or simply that they will disapprove of it when it does? If it is to be stopped, how? And  
what would anarchists do with someone who had been found to have already raped someone? And  
how is rape to be defined exactly? Is consenting sex between an adult and a fourteen year old  
considered rape, as the law in the UK currently states? And what would anarchists do with an  
individual  accused of  rape?  And there  are  countless  questions  of  a  similar  nature:  what  about  
pornography, prostitution, drug use, the ownership of weapons, vivisection; the list goes on. 
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The question of crime, then, is a major stumbling block for anarchists; in fact, it could justly be  
argued to be the primary reason why anarchism has remained such a marginal philosophy – Colin  
Ward certainly thought so. While anarchists may have faith that their rejection of legal authority  
will not lead to increases in crime, most people remain wholly unconvinced. As Ward comments,  
‘[m]aybe we are not worried [about this lack of faith...b]ut it is our fellow-citizens that we must  
convince if we are really concerned with gaining acceptance for the anarchist point of view’ (Ward  
2008, 126). Even an acknowledgement of the injustice of the capitalist system and the crime it no  
doubt  causes  is  unlikely  to  lead  most  people  to  accept  that  abandoning  the  legal  system is  a  
reasonable thing to do.
But it is not, as we have seen, simply the failure of anarchists to convince others of the arguments  
that has led to this situation; it is the failure of anarchists to provide arguments even for themselves.  
And when proposals are given, they throw into doubt the supposedly core principles of anarchism.  
When Schmidt & van der Walt concede that ‘[a]n anarchist society must also include a measure of  
legitimate coercive power exercised against  those who committed harmful  acts  against  [...]  the  
social order and the freedom of other individuals’ (Schmidt & van der Walt  2009, 70) they do so  
with no acknowledgement of the fundamental questions this so clearly raises. Yet surely we could  
replace the word anarchist with liberal in the above sentence – so what does this tell us about the  
anarchist project? Is it simply the state that differentiates anarchism from liberalism? Is anarchism  
as comfortable with coercive acts as liberalism is, as long as they are performed by the community,  
and not the state? Is this then the definition of anarchist freedom – freedom from the state, no more, 
no less?
Conclusions
In this chapter I have only been able to offer a very small representation of anarchist thought in  
relation to the idea of freedom, but I believe that what I have provided is broadly reflective of the  
anarchist common sense. If I am correct, then freedom appears to be primarily understood as an  
abstract, moral demand; the  practical implications of a society based on this demand, however,  
remain unclear. What  is clear is that such a society would not be organised around a state: at its  
most  basic,  we might  accept  the definition of  anarchism as  being a  rejection of  the state,  and  
anarchist freedom as being freedom from the state. Clearly, however, most anarchists would hope to  
support other values, such as equality, and also to challenge other forms of hierarchical structures.  
Two things follow directly from this. Firstly, we can perhaps conceptualise anarchism as being a  
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regulated system that at times uses coercion, adopts political systems, and so on, but which does so  
without the state (Nursey-Bray 1996, 107-111). When the political philosopher Jonathan Wolff, for  
example,  states  that  ‘as  the  anarchist  picture  of  society becomes increasingly realistic  and less  
utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal, democratic, state’ (Wolff  
2006, 30), what he fails to even entertain is the prospect that there may be other forms of relatively  
peaceful, and egalitarian social systems besides the ‘liberal, democratic state’. However, anarchists  
must  accept  some degree  of  responsibility  for  this:  when pushed,  at  least  some anarchists  are  
apparently willing to concede that some degree of coercion may at times be acceptable. But what  
this  means  in  practice  is  far  from clear;  more  importantly,  anarchism often  is presented  –  by 
anarchists - as rejecting all forms of coercion, domination, authority, etc. So Wolff can perhaps be  
forgiven for assuming that anarchism loses its essence the moment it accepts certain restrictions of  
freedom. Whether anarchists are comfortable with this and are prepared to begin to discuss more  
honestly how such a society might function, or whether they maintain their unequivocal demands  
for absolute liberty and refuse to engage with problems of crime, equality, and so on, is something  
we will return to in subsequent chapters.  
And  so,  secondly,  we  have  begun  to  see  cracks  in  the  libertarian  and  prefigurative  reality  of  
anarchism (although, as I argue in Chapter Six, this need not be considered as a problem, as long as  
it is recognised). Coercion is acceptable when it is an ‘act of legitimate self-defence’ (Scmidt & van  
der Walt 2009, 203): but by what criteria can we judge what is legitimate, and what is not? Ehrlich 
et. al. claim that in an ‘anarchist society, crime would be defined solely as an act harmful to the  
liberties of others’ (Ehrlich et. al. 1996, 12), but i f anarchism permits the use of coercion to defend  
freedom, or prevent harm, we need to ask what sort of freedom anarchists wish to see defended, or  
what constitutes harm.  We have already seen briefly how problems relating to freedom can be  
solved by simply formulating freedom in a particular way. This  narrowing of  the definition of  
freedom occurs in all  political philosophies,  so it  should be of no surprise that anarchists have  
attempted to follow this line of reasoning. The process of defining freedom in a particular way can  
often,  when  viewed  from  outside  whichever  discursive  environment  is  responsible,  appear  
disingenuous. We saw earlier how the likes of George Bush can define freedom in such as way as to  
justify  a  neo-liberal  imperialist  agenda.  But  it  can  also,  when  we  share  sufficient  values  with  
whoever is responsible for a new definition, appear perfectly reasonable. When anti-fascists disrupt  
BNP demonstrations, for example, it is easy to convince ourselves that there is no denial of freedom  
there. In fact, it may even appear grotesque to suggest that there is. Indeed, we saw above how  
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McKay discussed people’s ‘freedom’ to rape – his use of quotations marks suggesting that it would  
be misplaced to consider this a genuine freedom. And who could disagree? Malatesta makes a  
similarly  uncritical  point,  also  using  quotation  marks  to  highlight  the  supposed  absurdity  of  
referring to the freedom to perform certain acts:
 
So freedom for everybody and in everything, with the only limit of the equal freedom of others; which  
does not mean – it is almost ridiculous to have to point this out – that we recognise, and wish to respect,  
the  ‘freedom’ to  exploit,  to  oppress,  to  command,  which  is  oppression  and  certainly  not  freedom  
(Malatesta 1965, 53).
Rape may be a relatively easy act for anarchists to denounce without feeling they had breached their  
libertarian principles, but modern life is full of perplexing moral dilemmas where disagreement –  
even between anarchists – is extremely common, and where the line between what is legitimate and  
what  is illegitimate,  between what is  self-defence and what is  enforcement  of one’s principles,  
becomes far more muddy. Discussing the events in Paris in 1968, Murray Bookchin argued that: 
Having created  authentic forms of freedom  in which everyone could freely express his viewpoint,  the 
assembly would have been perfectly justified to have banned all bureaucratically organised groups from  
its midst (Bookchin 1974, 254 my emphasis). 
It seems to me that such a view either makes perfect sense, or no sense at all, depending, simply, on  
how we define freedom; for Bookchin there are authentic, and so presumably inauthentic, forms of  
freedom. But on what basis can we make such a distinction? The idea that freedom takes certain  
forms, that, for example, it might make no sense to talk of my freedom to shout racist slogans, or  
my  freedom  to  strike,  relies,  explicitly  or  otherwise,  on  either  a  metaphysical  or  ethical  
understanding of what is either natural and unnatural, or right and wrong – or both. Although, as we  
shall see in the following chapter, Bookchin did indeed believe that ethics could be objectively  
grounded in nature, I will argue in the next chapter that anarchists generally do not, and at any rate  
should not, rely on any overly strong metaphysical ideas. Perhaps anarchists have a view of ethics  
which does not rely on such foundations, but which allows them to conceptualise freedom in a  
particular  way? If  so,  any anarchist  approach to  freedom would rest  on the more fundamental  
question of what an anarchist approach to ethics might be. 
In the following chapter, I argue that this is partly true, but that to the extent that it is, it too is an  
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untenable position. More commonly, however, I will suggest that rather than having an ethics that  
informs  a  particular  vision  of  freedom,  anarchists  have  tended to  adopt  an  ethics  of freedom, 
whereby it is freedom itself that is understood to provide a guide to moral behaviour, and not the  
other way round. 
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Chapter Three 
Ethics & the Limits of Freedom
            I argued in the previous chapter that anarchists have failed to provide a meaningful account  
of freedom. When pushed, at least some anarchists appear to accept that some denial of freedom is  
both inevitable and acceptable, but how this relates to their demands for an end to all coercion, and  
how  particular  limits  would  be  practically  enforced,  is  left  largely  unexplained.  However,  I  
suggested that the question of ethics may provide some answers. In the following chapter, then, I  
want to explore (and at times uncover) some key ethical ideas that have helped shape anarchism,  
especially in the last few decades. 
In the Introduction, I suggested that anarchism should no longer be understood as being dependent  
on a set of metaphysical assumptions, about rationality, human nature, and so on – if indeed it ever  
was. However, I begin this chapter by considering briefly whether the influential work of Peter  
Kropotkin and Murray Bookchin, both of whom did define ethics in relation to ideas about human  
nature, has not in fact seeped into the anarchist common sense. Despite the undeniable stature of  
both these thinkers, I conclude that in fact, their ethical theories have been largely uninfluential.
However, the idea of mutual aid, which is often entangled within a broader understanding of human  
nature,  but  which  need  not  be,  has  informed  anarchist  understandings  of  ethics;  similarly,  the  
concept  of  prefiguration,  which  sees  means  and  ends  as  being  inseparable,  has  also  provided  
considerable ethical guidance. I go on to explore these ideas in turn, but I argue that whilst mutual  
aid and prefiguration suggest a certain approach to ethics, they both lack a necessary component of 
ethics, namely, a definition of the good life. So I then turn to what I argue is a more fruitful way to  
understand anarchist ethics (and, through it, freedom); namely, the libertarian objection to ethics  
itself25. I will argue that rather than ethics defining a particular form of freedom, for anarchism,  
freedom defines a certain approach to ethics. However, it does so in a negative way, by limiting the  
scope of ethical discussions and restricting morality to the level of the individual. Anarchism is not  
25 As will become clear throughout this chapter, my claim that there can be seen within anarchism a libertarian  
objection to ethics does not imply that ethics is either entirely absent from anarchism, or consciously  relegated and 
placed under demands for freedom. An objection does not equate to an absolute dismissal, but rather suggests that  
libertarian philosophies necessarily struggle with the formation of clear ethical frameworks; that, in other words,  
there is a tension between the many values anarchists undoubtedly hold – and which I discuss throughout the thesis  
– such as mutual aid, equality, solidarity, and so on, and the value placed on individual freedom. More to the point,  
whilst this tension causes problems, it is the wide-spread failure to acknowledge this tension that is especially  
damaging. 
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unique in this respect, however; liberalism has often adopted a similar perspective, and so I go on to  
draw some useful parallels between the two ideologies, demonstrating that, differences aside, much  
can  be  learnt  from  assessing  liberalism’s  own  failings.  In  particular,  I  draw  attention  to  the  
similarity between the liberal notion of neutrality, and the anarchist support for diversity, arguing  
that they both underestimate the potential for value differences turning into value conflict. As such,  
I conclude that the anarchist conception of freedom is not only not resolved by an anarchist ethics,  
but actually appears more problematic when the possibility of value pluralism is discussed. 
Let us now turn then to an overview of anarchist approaches to ethics, and in particular, the work of  
the two anarchist  theorists most commonly associated with ethics,  Peter Kropotkin and Murray  
Bookchin.
Anarchist Approaches to Ethics
Within the anarchist canon, the work of two theorists stand out when the question of ethics arises;  
Kropotkin, and Bookchin. But are their arguments also part of the anarchist common sense? These  
two key theorists have defined ethics in relation to a certain understanding of humanity’s essential  
capacities, so it might be assumed that most anarchists would take a similar approach. But while the  
work of Bookchin is rightly argued to have been widely influential, I want to show that the focus of  
his work has varied considerably, and that his explicit attempts to define an ethical theory have not  
received the sort of enthusiastic attention as his other contributions. Similarly, the influence that  
Kropotkin has had on more than a century of anarchist  thought  must be understood in a more  
nuanced way. His writings on mutual aid clearly continue to inspire many, yet some of his ideas are  
undeniably problematic, and many anarchists have come to reject them. It is necessary, therefore, to  
demonstrate with regards to these two thinkers that whilst some of their ideas have indeed been  
taken up by many anarchists, their explorations of ethics, generally, have not. 
Of course,  there have been numerous other attempts  to  define an anarchist  approach to ethics,  
including a number  of  more contemporary theorists;  Benjamin Franks,  whose work focuses on  
virtue ethics (Franks 2010); Simon Critchley, who discusses an ethics of commitment, drawing on  
the works of Lacan and Levinas26 (Critchley 2007); Jamie Heckert, who proposes an ethics of care,  
26 Although it may appear that Critchley’s work in particular contradicts my own claims that ethics are subordinate to  
freedom within the anarchist common sense, this is because Critchely focuses on the assumed content of anarchists’ 
ethical discourse and not how (and if) this content exists outside of theoretical reflection, or how (or if) anarchists  
really understand ethics for themselves in the way Critchely, an academic philosopher, claims; `Critchely ascribes an  
ethical philosophy to a movement that has had little time for such theoretical endeavours, providing no real evidence  
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embodied  in  direct  relationships  (Heckert  2010);  Todd  May,  who  adopts  a  multi-value  
consequentialism (May 1995); and Saul Newman who employs the work of Max Stirner (Newman  
2010).  One conclusion of the following chapter is that anarchists need to engage more directly with  
discussions about their values and how they relate to their demand for greater freedom. As such, the  
work of these theorists will be of great value, if and when discussions around ethics become a much  
greater part of anarchist discourse, as I believe they should. I would therefore suggest that some of  
their ideas could helpfully be adopted into the wider anarchist tradition. However, whatever the  
merits of such works, none of these thinkers could be argued to have had the sort of influence that  
Bookchin and Kropotkin have had on the anarchist movement; their ideas are not, currently, part of  
the broad anarchist  common sense.  As this  thesis is focused principally on the current state of  
anarchist thought, the work of these theorists is excluded from the following discussion. Let us turn  
now then to the work of Peter Kropotkin.
Peter Kropotkin
Undoubtedly one of anarchism’s most famous and influential writers, Kropotkin wrote on a wide  
variety  of  topics,  including a number  of  lengthy  works  on ethics.  In  works  such as  Anarchist  
Morality (Kropotkin 1970),  Kropotkin went on to outline some basic principles of an anarchist  
ethics, as well as providing a basic genealogy of our existing moral order. Advancing the view that  
there is a  biological  basis  for morality,  which goes deeper than mere  human nature,  Kropotkin 
argued that in our quest to understand morality we ‘will never explain it so long as [we] believe it a  
privilege of human nature, as long as [we] do not descend to animal, plants and rocks to understand  
it’ (Kropotkin 1970, 81). Indeed, it is a ‘very striking fact that animals living in societies are also  
able to distinguish between good and evil, just as man does’ (ibid.)
The idea of good and evil has thus nothing to do with religion or a mystic conscience. It is a natural  
that this is how anarchists in fact understand ethics. However, he also makes a similar point to that made in the  
previous chapter, when he argues that contemporary anarchists such as Graeber hold ‘unquestioned and simply  
liberal conceptions of freedom’ (2007, 127) whilst also making strong ethical claims and pursuing a goal of  
consensus democracy. However, these attempts at consensus (and the values they incorporate) are ‘rooted in  
unquestioned conceptions of freedom’ (ibid). What Critchely doesn’t develop however, is how the supposed  
commitment to ethics that anarchists have relates to this liberal conception of freedom. I agree that anarchists hold  
strong ethical values, but my argument here is that these values and their relation to a demand for freedom is not  
properly understood, and that, as a result, these values are often silenced or marginalised. Rather than contradicting  
my work, then, I would argue Critchely’s work is simply too partial, failing to see how ethics becomes  
unintentionally  subordinate to the libertarian vision, and too complete, filling in the philosophical gaps and giving  
clarity and depth to a vision of ethics that is in reality messy, self-contradcitory and incomplete – a task which is  
much needed, but which must be clear in its intention. In short, Critchely is discussing what he believes ethics  
should be for anarchists, I am discussing what I believe, for better or worse, it currently is.
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need of animal races. And when founders of religions, philosophers, and moralists tell us of divine or  
metaphysical  entities,  they are  only  recasting what  each ant,  each  sparrow practices in  its  little  
society. Is this useful to society? Then it is good. Is this hurtful? Then it is bad (ibid., 91).
All morality, then, stems from the potential to tap into an innate sense of solidarity and of sympathy  
(ibid., 94), and in his classic text Mutual Aid (Kropotkin 2008), Kropotkin argued that the result of  
this – namely, co-operation - was as important to evolution as competition. This did not challenge  
Darwin’s basic premise, but rather emphasised one side of the evolutionary argument that had been  
over-looked,  or  even  denied,  by  the  more  prominent  Social  Darwinists  who  were  avidly,  and  
successfully, spreading the message that it  was only  competition that explained our evolution.27 
Kropotkin detailed case after case of mutual aid, from ants and bees to ‘savages and barbarians’,  
and  finally  to  examples  of  contemporary  co-operation,  to  show that  working  together  was  as 
beneficial, and often more so, than competing. In demonstrating this, Kropotkin was able to justify  
an ethics of mutual care, and a politics of anarchy, because his argument implied that the Hobbesian  
justifications for external authority were unfounded. Hobbes’ argument relied on a distorted view of  
human nature, which saw humanity as inherently selfish; in fact, life without the state was generally  
peaceful and conflict-free. 
Not  surprisingly,  Kropotkin’s  views  that  questions  of  morality  can  be  resolved  by  looking  to  
humanity’s natural essence, and that we can therefore conceive of an objective ‘science of morality’  
(Kropotkin 1970, 113) has been criticised by postanarchists such as Saul Newman (Newman 2001,  
173); below, I shall question the extent to which Kropotkin did see morality as being so objectively  
grounded. Either way, the important question here is whether Kropotkin’s view on these matters  
seeped into the wider anarchist common sense. Whilst Kropotkin’s idea of mutual aid is clearly a  
prominent one within anarchist thought, I believe it can be explored in ways which break from  
objective claims about human nature as such. I want to say more about both human nature and  
mutual aid below, but before doing so, it will be helpful to briefly examine the legacy of Murray  
Bookchin,  to  see  whether  the  idea  of  an  ethics  grounded  in  nature  has  in  fact  continued  to  
reverberate within the anarchist common sense.
Murray Bookchin
27 See Hawkins 1997 for an interesting discussion about Kropotkin and the wider context within which he, and many  
others, on the right and the left, used Darwin’s theory to promote their own ideological positions; Robert C. Bannister,  
1979, also provides an interesting account.
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Until  his  death  in  2006,  Murray  Bookchin  was  one  of  the  most  well  known,  influential,  and  
controversial of anarchist thinkers. Credited (by some, at least) with being one of the first thinkers  
to bring ecological issues and radical politics together, 28 he was both inspirational for and inspired  
by a generation of activists who, in part thanks to him, came to see the fight to save the planet from  
environmental destruction as being fundamentally linked with the fight against capitalism and the  
state. To explain and analyse this relationship, Bookchin developed the concept of social ecology, a 
philosophy ‘based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems originate in  
deep-seated social problems’ (Bookchin 2007, 19). In other words, ‘[i]ts primary insight is that the  
ecological crisis is a social crisis of values, with hierarchy the main culprit’ (Curran 2006, 157). To  
the contemporary mind, this is hardly revelatory, but as Giorel Curran notes, ‘social ecology has  
contributed significantly to the greening of anarchism’ (ibid.). What many anarchists now take for  
granted, in other words, is in no small part thanks to the work of Bookchin – although of course,  
Bookchin’s  own debt  to  Kropotkin  is  always  evident  (Albrecht  1994,  109-113).  However,  for 
Bookchin at  least,  social  ecology was about  much more than a  recognition of the problems of  
hierarchy.  In  The  Philosophy  of  Social  Ecology  (1995),  Bookchin  outlined  in  considerable  
philosophical detail his thesis of dialectical naturalism , which, he argued
not only grasps reality as an existentially unfolding continuum, but [...] also forms an objective framework  
for making ethical judgements. The 'what-should-be' becomes an ethical criterion for judging the truth or  
validity of an objective 'what-is'.  Thus ethics is  not merely a matter of personal taste or values;  it  is  
factually anchored in the world itself as an objective standard of self-realisation   (Bookchin 1995, 24).
If ever an anarchist waved a red flag at a poststructuralist bull, this was surely it. Yet the important  
question  to  be  asked  here  is  whether  this  view  receives  wider  support  within  the  anarchist  
community.  Thomas  S.  Martin  argues  that  the  ‘anarchist  project  has  been  shaped  by  Murray  
Bookchin for the past several decades, and rightly so – he is this generation’s Kropotkin, Godwin  
and Proudhon all rolled into one’ (Martin 1998, 39). While there may be some truth in this, it tells  
only half, or rather a third, of the story. Bookchin, who published work over the best part of five  
decades, is well known for his apparent ideological shift later in life (Davis 2010), but an equally  
large disconnect can be found between works such as The Philosophy of Social Ecology and essays 
such as Listen, Marxist! which was re-produced with other influential papers in the popular Post-
Scarcity Anarchism (1971). There is not, then, simply an ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ Bookchin, but also a  
third,  more philosophically inclined strand of his work.  So when Giorel Curran states that  The  
28 Though Bookchin clearly owes much to earlier thinkers, most notably Kropotkin, and potentially many others, such  
as Henry David Thoreau, for example.
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Ecology of Freedom constitutes ‘his major work’ (Curran 2006, 163) and that Bookchin’s analysis 
‘continues to inspire many’ (ibid.,  179) we are given a somewhat misleading impression of his  
impact.  Bookchin’s influence, I would argue, is by far the strongest in the areas that he himself  
generally ignored in his own philosophical writing, and explicitly rejected in his own later work; his  
writings on the events of May ‘68, for example, and his attacks on the hierarchical politics of the  
left, reverberate more strongly than his attempts to articulate a comprehensive moral doctrine. As a  
moral  philosopher,  advocating  the  kind  of  ideas  expressed  in  The  Ecology  of  Freedom,  it  is 
questionable whether Bookchin ever made much of an impact, beyond a small but dedicated group  
of adherents,  such as Chaz Bufe (1998) and Janet Biehl (1997).  His profoundly rationalist  and  
teleological views of nature are unlikely to be held in high esteem by many contemporary thinkers;  
again, they are not, I would argue, part of the anarchist common sense.
And there remains the important question as to whether Bookchin should even be considered an  
anarchist. It is certainly interesting, and perhaps no coincidence, that Bookchin grew increasingly  
unhappy with anarchism, and, in his final years, came to argue that ‘[t]he libertarian opposition to  
law [...] has been as silly as the image of a snake swallowing its tail’ (ibid., 95-96). Did Bookchin’s  
moral philosophy lead inevitably to a rejection of anarchist politics? Whatever the case, not only  
did he himself come to reject anarchism, but many anarchists have rejected – or more often, ignored  
– a great deal of his work. In short, I would suggest that when we ask what constitutes a broad  
anarchist approach to ethics, Bookchin’s work does not provide the answer.
However,  following Kropotkin,  Bookchin  believed  that  mutual  aid  was central  to  an  anarchist  
ethics, and this has been taken up within the wider anarchist movement. We need, therefore, to look  
at this concept in its own right, to see whether it is capable of responding to the questions uncovered  
in the last chapter: can mutual aid explain what sort of freedom anarchism is intended to deliver?  
And does mutual aid depend on an essentialist, and benign, view of human nature? I turn now then  
to explore the question of human nature, before going on to explore the idea of mutual aid.
Human Nature and Mutual Aid
I argued in the Introduction that the anarchist common sense does not rest on any especially strong  
or clearly articulated metaphysical assumptions. It is common, however, to encounter the claim that  
anarchists rely on an overly positive conception of human nature. This is an especially prevalent  
view amongst non-anarchists (see, for example, Wolff 1996, 30; Goodwin 2007, 128) but it is also a  
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view shared by a number of contemporary anarchist theorists, such as Saul Newman (2001; 2010)  
and Todd May (1994). However, as David Morland argues in Demanding the Impossible?  (Morland 
1997) this view offers, at best, only a partial account. In fact, anarchists have often been keen to  
emphasis  the  negative  side  of  human  nature  (Hartley  1995);  indeed,  this  is  one  reason  why  
anarchists believe that authority ought never to be vested in a small group of people, because they  
are almost certain to abuse their position. 
However, whilst I agree that anarchists do not generally hold a benign view of human nature, they  
do often use a more contextualised understanding of human nature to defend their claims. Without  
claiming that there is an inherent, unchanging dimension of humanity that we may call its essential  
nature, anarchists argue that historically, humans have been social animals, and that, as such, we  
have, as a species, adopted numerous cultural tools to deal with our shared existence. The idea of  
mutual aid, then, rests primarily on this understanding of humans as predominantly social animals,  
for whom, in living socially, it often makes sense to work, not in competition, but co-operatively, to  
achieve a greater amount of food, security, happiness, love, and whatever else any individual might  
want – and that they are perfectly capable of doing this without some guiding authority. What  
mattered to Kropotkin, and what is of concern to most anarchists, is whether we can see, in human  
life, the possibility for sustained co-operation: and the answer is, we do indeed see it. We may well  
be discursively constructed subjects, but our discursive construction is one which forcibly lends  
itself,  historically  and  to  the  present  day,  through  our  shared  narratives,  practices  and  norms,  
towards living communally, and doing so in a way that reduces conflict and promotes high levels of  
sociability. This might be human culture, rather than human nature (although Morland contends that  
we can still call this nature; Morland 1997, 26-7), but it nonetheless continues to play a fundamental  
role in shaping our lives,  even if,  in certain times and places,  it  is,  or  has the potential  to be,  
removed by other, stronger cultural processes. We must be wary of reading too much into this, but it  
seems to me simply wrong to ignore or dismiss it entirely; indeed, the postanarchist Todd May  
would  appear  to  accept  this  when  he  argues  that  unless  we  make  some  assumptions  about  
humanity’s  capacity  to  organise  itself  without  the  state,  we ‘cannot  even  begin  to  critique  the  
hierarchies and dominations of a given social order’ (May 2007, 27). To this extent, mutual aid,  
understood as a shared cultural  inheritance that  is  deep-seated and often extremely resistant  to  
threats against it, is a useful way of thinking about the world, as long as all the appropriate provisos  
are well understood. 
However, I would suggest that there remains a serious problem with mutual aid, in the idea of a  
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common good which we mutually work towards. Kropotkin argued that, once people were freed  
‘from existing fetters’ (Kropotkin  1970,  102) the  tendency towards  mutual  aid  would be more  
pronounced. If we understand existing fetters as the multiple hierarchies of capitalism, the state,  
patriarchy, and so on, then I am inclined to agree. However, Kropotkin goes on to suggest that  
people ‘will behave and act always in a direction useful to society’ (ibid.).  But how do we define 
what  is  useful for  society?  This,  surely,  is  an  ethical  question,  and  one  about  which  there  is  
reasonable disagreement (Gowans 2000). Bookchin attempted to answer it by looking at nature, as  
did Kropotkin; but nature cannot answer such questions, and I would argue, once again, that most  
anarchists do not believe it can. Indeed, Kropotkin appears to recognise the point himself, when he  
states that the behaviour of what he calls ‘[...] primitive folk’ is ‘regulated by an infinite series of  
unwritten rules of propriety which are the fruit of their common experience as to what is good or  
bad – that is, beneficial or harmful for their own tribe’ (Kropotkin 2008, 74). And it is not clear to  
what extent Kropotkin believed there to be an objective and universal foundation for ‘the good’; at  
times, he appears to acknowledge that what is useful for a community is indeed subjective and  
contextualised. Yet his writing belies a faith that communities would  tend towards agreement, at 
least  to the extent that major conflicts  would be rare.  However,  whatever Kropotkin may have  
believed, this is no longer an assumption we can afford to make, and anarchists must now advance  
with  the  assumption  that  moral  disagreement is  always  possible  between  and  within  human  
communities. Doing so, we can dispense perhaps entirely with the idea of a benign or malevolent  
human nature;  indeed, we may even note that  the desire to work collectively with those other  
members of our community may make people do things which they would,  ethically speaking,  
otherwise prefer not to. The sticking point for anarchists, then, is not whether humans are good, but 
what humans believe to be good, and whether there will be sufficient agreement on this question to  
allow for a reasonable degree of community cohesion. Furthermore, if we think back to the previous  
chapter, it is also necessary to ask whether the price to be paid for this community cohesion is too 
high in terms of personal freedom; as oppressive as the state is, perhaps a community strong enough  
to do without institutionalised law enforcement would be more oppressive still. So while mutual aid  
can be understood as an important element of an anarchist ethics, there must be something beyond it  
which defines the good society for the anarchist. Mutual aid, in other words, can only ever be one  
part of an anarchist ethics. And, as we shall now see, the same is true for the equally popular idea of  
prefiguration.
Prefiguration: Which Means, to What Ends?
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Prefiguration refers to two related concepts within anarchist thought; one understanding relates to  
the idea of anarchy in action, which I discussed in Chapter One. The other refers to an ethical  
insistence on the compatibility between means and ends; in other words, it opposes the idea that the  
means may at times justify the ends.  The idea stretches back to the earliest  anarchist  thinkers:  
perhaps most famously, Bakunin argued that we cannot expect a libertarian society to come into  
being using authoritarian means. And, regardless of any other changes anarchism may have been  
through, the idea has continued to inform anarchist theory and practice ever since (Ehrlich et. al.  
1979, 3; Franks 2006). I will discuss prefiguration in Chapter Six at greater length, but I want here  
to  say  a  few words  on  the  idea  that  prefiguration  constitutes  an  anarchist  approach  to  ethics.  
Although the refusal to subordinate means to ends does indeed suggest a particular ethical stance,  
and one which directly informs the way anarchists act, it does so in a way that is, in an important  
(and potentially problematic) sense, extremely open-ended. As Nathan Jun notes:
The prefigurative principle provides a general procedure for action that does not rely upon transcendent 
moral concepts […]. Within the broad ethical boundaries established by prefiguration and the general 
anarchist commitment to freedom and equality, there is enormous room for diversity of opinion (Jun 
2010, 60).
In other words, in and of itself, prefiguration says nothing about  which means or ends are to be 
desired, beyond the ‘general anarchist commitment to freedom and equality’. But if my arguments  
in the previous chapter are correct, it is precisely this commitment to freedom and equality which is  
in need of some prior conception of ethics. As Benjamin Franks argues, prefiguration can be just as  
coherently adopted by right-wing ideologies, which would of course be opposed to many of the  
ethical  principles  espoused  by  anarchism (Franks  2006).  So  prefiguration,  whilst  a  worthwhile  
principle in other respects, will not help us address the concerns I have already raised about how  
freedom might be understood within anarchist thought. What else, then, have anarchists said about  
ethics?
Anarchist Approaches to Ethics, Continued
In his essay Sexuality/identity/politics , Jamie Heckert writes that ‘[o]ne of anarchism’s strengths is  
an emphasis on ethics’ (Heckert 2004, 133). This is not an unusual claim. For Benjamin Franks,  
whereas  orthodox  Marxism  ‘prioritises  economic  discourse  […]  anarchism  by  contrast  has  
foregrounded moral analyses’ (Franks 2008, 135) And ‘[e]thics’, according to Janet Biehl, ‘lies at  
the very heart of a truly libertarian movement’ (Biehl, n.d.).  But which ethics? And where is this  
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emphasis,  exactly?  In  fact,  if  we  look  through  anarchist  texts,  from academic  publications  to  
agitational pamphlets, explicit ethical discussions are something of a rarity. R ather than following a 
humanist  approach  to  ethics,  I  would  argue  that  anarchism  has  tended  to  have  a  somewhat  
ambivalent relationship with it. Like liberalism - a philosophy with which anarchism shares a lot  
more than many anarchists would assume (or care to admit) - anarchism is faced with an inherent  
difficulty whenever the issue of ethics is raised. With ethics come rules, certain understandings of  
what is good and bad, and all the possible consequences of normative restrictions that this implies.  
All  this creates a logical difficulty for anyone defending a libertarian philosophy, as anarchism  
undoubtedly is. And especially with the term  morality (which I understand as synonymous with  
ethics29) we also see a great deal of cultural baggage.  Morality brings to mind Victorian prudes,  
more concerned with masturbation than mass poverty; it represents unjustified interference by an  
unjustifiable authority, be it God, the State, the Patriarch, the Priest. Understood as such, it appears  
to be the very opposite of anarchism. Yet any attempt to condemn such interference, or conversely,  
to argue in favour of some form of freedom, seems to necessarily entail some type of moral claim  
(Midgeley 1991). In other words, the very reasons given for rejecting morality are ultimately moral  
reasons, and this of course holds true for the rejection of those other institutions and ideas that  
anarchists have fought against – capitalism, the state, hierarchies, and so on. None of these can be  
convincingly or  coherently  critiqued without  some recourse to  value judgements.  When Emma  
Goldman talks about the ‘monster of Morality’ then, (Goldman 1972, 127) and suggests that it is  
‘morality which condemns women to the position of a celibate, a prostitute, or a reckless, incessant  
breeder of hapless children’ (ibid., 129) she is herself expressing her own moral outrage at what she  
considers to be injustices. What Goldman is attacking is clearly not morality, as such, but a certain  
form of morality - a particular set of values - and the methods of their application. This is a common  
mistake, if we can call it that; perhaps it is fairer to call it a libertarian paradox: the (moral) demand  
for liberty rejects moral interference but is itself a deeply moral position (Franks 2008, 142). But  
what lies behind this basic ethical demand? What are its foundations, its limits, its contradictions?  
What does such a demand for absolute liberty really mean? Is it to be truly limitless? Or limited to  
the extent that the liberty of one does not interfere with the liberty of another? Or limited by some  
principle of harm? 
Once we start asking such questions (and discovering that, invariably, every answer leads to yet  
29 There is considerable disagreement about what, if anything, distinguishes ethics from morality; as there is no clear  
agreement, and as, in any case, I see the distinction as ultimately false, I use these terms interchangeably. See, for  
example, http://www.philosophyblog.com.au/ethics-vs-morality-the-distinction-between-ethics-and-morals/   and 
Bauman 1993.
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more questions), are we not in danger of finding ourselves on a slippery slope, sliding towards the  
creation of simply one more morality that tells us what we can and cannot do? Remember how, in  
the last  chapter,  we saw anarchists  prepared to defend coercion as long as it  was used against  
unethical  behaviour,  such  as  economic  exploitation.  This  remains  a  troubling  issue  for  all  
libertarians, and I would argue that it is precisely this disturbing difficulty that has so frequently and  
forcefully encouraged anarchists to push the question of ethics under the carpet, as I shall explore in  
greater detail in the following sections. 
 Escape from ethics
The anonymous author of an Anarchist Manifesto (Anonymous, anarchy.net) writes in no uncertain  
terms that ‘anarchist morality is simple: do what you will’ . Indeed, for some anarchists,  morality 
suggests  only  and  precisely  the  expressing  of  one’s  own  will;  it  serves  only  to  ensure  an  
unencumbered realisation of one’s desires. Interference is immoral, and everything else is moral  
(Carter 1993, 143). Yet the notion that anarchist morality is simply that we can do what we will is  
understood by most anarchists as being simply wrong (Carter, ibid.; see also Marshall 1993, 36-42).  
More commonly, we find the view that we must temper our actions ourselves . We must accept 
responsibility alongside freedom (McKay 2007, 26-29; Malatesta 1965, 48) . This equilibrium, it is 
true, was thought by earlier theorists to be possible at least in part because of a natural harmony to  
be found within humanity, as long as it was not corrupted by the state: as we saw earlier, Kropotkin  
and Bookchin often implied that nature would provide the moral laws by which social order would  
be achieved. Because they were grounded in nature itself, abiding by such laws would not be a  
restriction of freedom, but rather its fullest expression. However, once again, I would challenge the 
view that this concept of moral law is (necessarily) as embedded in a humanist ontology as it may  
appear; rather, I would argue that what is meant by a natural order is a more sociological idea that if  
members of a society simply leave each other alone to get on with their daily lives, communities  
will find some sort of balance, and life will be perfectly tolerable. In some ways, this could be  
understood to be an anti-essentialist position; humans are not inherently in need of an over-arching  
authority. It is interference, by the state, or the church, that causes so much harm, that is particularly  
problematic, and therefore immoral. 
Rather  than  seeing  ethics  as  explicitly  guided  by  natural  teleology,  or  as  a  project  of  rational  
investigation,  then,  I  would argue that anarchists  have simply tended to shy away from ethical  
enquiry.  Indeed,  rather  than  being  premised  on  (any  particular  sort  of)  ethics,  the  anarchist  
conception of freedom is more coherently understood as  an escape from ethics. As we shall see 
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shortly, this view is philosophically problematic, and, as I suggested earlier, it is not the whole story,  
but I would suggest, again, that this is a key element of the anarchist common sense, and one which  
we will do well to explore in greater depth. 
We are still left wondering, then, what other ethical substance there may be to the anarchist project.  
I have suggested that anarchists have often been reluctant to answer such a question 30. Anarchists 
are not alone in their reluctance to engage with ethics, however. In fact, I would argue that the fear  
of ethics has marked the political landscape of the second half of the twentieth century. The idea of  
the  moral atrocity is intended to signify its  immoral nature; yet there is also the sense that very  
often, such atrocities are seen as – and condemned as - the product of morality itself (Tester 1997).  
Like religious crusades in previous centuries,  secular morality has been accused of committing  
many great crimes in the last hundred years. After the horrors of not only Auschwitz, but, perhaps  
more importantly, the Stalinist  gulags, we have come to see how the desire to shape the world  
according to certain ethical ideals can lead to tremendous harm. This is not surprising in relation to  
fascism, but even capitalists – and anarchists - would concede that implementing the communist  
ideology was never intended to result in the murder of millions31. If fascism provokes people to ask: 
how could people have let this happen?, communism has made people – and those on the left in  
particular - ask: How can we be sure we will not make the same mistakes again? Perhaps more than  
ever before, we are aware that the road to hell is paved with good intentions 32.
Interestingly,  we  see  here  something  of  a  convergence  of  anarchist,  liberal,  and  poststructural  
thought. While anarchism appears to deny the right to ever coerce others, liberalism asks that we be  
tolerant of others’ ethical beliefs, and poststructuralism has filled us with epistemic doubt and moral  
uncertainty.33 All three promote a considerable reluctance to act on our moral beliefs, for fear that  
we may discover our own acts to be simply another form of oppression. Indeed, the more tolerant  
we become, the more we recognise the relative nature of our own understandings of the world, the  
30 Benjamin Franks and I recently edited a book, Anarchism and Moral Philosophy  (2010) which was an attempt to  
tackle what we both felt to be a problematic lack of explicitly ethical reflection within the anarchist canon.
31 Of course, it could be argued that such deaths were in fact an inevitable consequence of Stalin’s utilitarian approach,  
whereby people were consciously sacrificed for the (supposedly) greater good. What I mean by suggesting a lack of  
intent is that, communism, per se, does not have as one of its goals the destruction of a certain group of people, as  
fascism does. 
32 Indeed, this is precisely why anarchists place such a strong emphasis on prefiguration; sadly, however, this is not a  
panacea for any and all unintended problems arising from a particular ethical position.
33 In recent years, a number of theorists have challenged the idea that poststructural theory is incapable of engaging  
with  ethical  discussions,  except  to  dismiss  them  (Squires  1993;  Bauman  1995).   As  Todd  May  puts  it,  
poststructuralism has often been accused of ‘a reticence toward and an inability to justify ethical principles’ (May  
1994, 121). Interestingly, however, it is perhaps the postanarchists May and Saul Newman who have most explicitly  
placed ethics at the heart of their discussions on anarchism in recent years.  
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more we learn to see great moral ‘crimes’ as being the result of at least noble intentions. As Kate  
Soper puts it, we are invited to ‘view history as littered with the victims of such well intentioned  
visions and utopian projects’ (Soper 1993, 20).  We must,  then,  resist  the temptation to compel  
others to follow our moral code, or to use our morality to justify our actions. As Joseph Margolis  
puts it, we must  ‘Beware of men of principle’ (Margolis 2004, 16)
Again, we can see this situation as a highly paradoxical one: the desire to prevent, or to not be  
complicit  in,  moral atrocities leads us to reject  morality;  but we can only conceive of a moral  
atrocity by virtue of our own morality. This condemnation hangs awkwardly around us, and while it  
remains emotionally powerful, it can paralyse us politically; as bad as things are, we are struck by  
the fear  that  if  we interfere,  we may make things  worse.  With the collapse of  moral  certainty  
previously offered by religion (or science), the weight of moral responsibility has fallen fully onto  
the shoulders of ordinary men and women. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it: 
Choices between good and evil are still to be made, this time, however, in full daylight, and with full  
knowledge  that  a  choice  has  been  made.  […]  With  choice  comes  responsibility.  And  if  choice  is  
inevitable, responsibility is unavoidable. No secure hiding place is left (Bauman 1995, 7).
However, whilst I agree with Bauman’s basic premise, I believe he is wrong to think that there is no  
place left to hide. In fact, contemporary society has found a perfect hiding place within liberalism  
itself. And, as that hiding place can be found specifically within its libertarian ethos which promotes  
individual freedom, it is perhaps not so surprising to discover that anarchism has similarly taken  
shelter there. For reasons I will explain shortly, a closer look at liberalism and its attempt to ‘hide’  
from moral choices will be beneficial, and revealing, for anarchists. I turn now then to explore the  
relationship between anarchism and liberalism.
Liberalism and Anarchism
It is worth beginning this discussion by highlighting the fact that although liberalism is the  
dominant political ideology of our times, anarchists have given it all too little attention. For  
anarchists in the pub, to call some one a liberal is to mean little more than that they are perhaps  
well-meaning, but ultimately naive supporters of the state (see Graeber 2009, 355 for just one  
example of this). Some anarchist academics may have a more thorough knowledge of what liberals  
really believe, but if they do, they have little to say about it in their work. Engaged discussions by  
anarchists about liberalism are rare, and when liberalism is mentioned, it is usually presented as a  
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homogeneous tradition that has little more to it than a support for individual freedom that is highly  
compromised by its equally strong support for the state.
When we stop and reflect on this, it  ought to be seen as more than a little surprising, for two  
reasons. Firstly, liberalism is the dominant ideology of our times, and so it would seem of almost  
obvious importance to anyone interested in politics: after all, it surely makes sense to understand  
the workings of a philosophy that has a near hegemonic status around much of the globe and which,  
therefore, will be necessary to challenge if anarchism is to ever grow beyond its currently limited  
existence. The second reason is that liberalism is, despite some undoubtedly profound differences,  
in many important ways very similar to anarchism 34 – as we shall soon see. While what this means,  
and what what we can learn from it, is, as I have suggested already, given far too little attention, the  
resemblance  itself  is  at  least  acknowledged  by  some.  Saul  Newman,  for  example,  states  that  
‘[a]narchism might be seen as the wild underside of liberalism’ (Newman 2010, 2) and in a similar  
vein, Giorel Curran suggests ‘anarchism champions the individualism and autonomy that liberalism  
also promotes, albeit rendered differently’ (Curran 2006, 21). On rare occasions, this affinity is even  
recognised by activists; Barbara Esptein notes that one activist she talked to referred to the anarchist  
elements of the alter-globalisation movement as “liberalism on steroids’ - that is, they are in favour  
of liberal  values,  human rights,  free speech,  diversity -  and militantly so’ (Epstein 2001,  n.p.).  
This similarity is of considerable importance to anarchists. Although anarchism has been argued to  
have existed outside of theory – that is, to have been put into practice - clearly liberalism has been  
exposed to the vast array of cultural, political, moral and environmental realities of modern life in a  
way anarchism never has. Despite the obvious differences between the two ideologies, I believe we  
can learn a great deal from the experience of liberalism’s prolonged and wide-spread realisation,  
and can ask many useful and interesting questions about the problems it has faced: importantly, we  
can ask whether anarchism might not find itself addressing similar challenges, were it to be realised  
on  a  wider  scale.  Because  of  liberalism’s  dominance,  it  has  attracted  a  great  deal  of  critical  
attention, and I hope to show that what many critics of liberalism have had to say is also remarkably  
relevant for anarchists.
Like anarchism, then, liberalism strongly supports the ideal of individual freedom; while this is, for  
anarchists, entirely negated by liberals’ support for the state, liberals themselves are also well aware  
34 Alan Carter (2003) makes the point that, because of their commitment to social equality, anarchists may at times  
prefer a large socialist state, which has the capacity to redistribute wealth, to a liberal minimal state, which, however  
‘weak’, may nonetheless act to preserve such inequalities. Whilst this is a perfectly valid point, it does not detract  
from my arguments here.
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of the tension this creates, and so they too are concerned about state interference with the freedom  
of the individual (see, for instance, Bobbio 2005). Rather than simply dismiss this as disingenuous  
hypocrisy, contradiction, or naiveté, as I would argue many anarchists are prone to doing, I would  
suggest that we ought to see this position as being genuinely held and worthy of our consideration 35. 
While fully recognising this tension, liberals consider the state necessary to maintain a reasonable  
level  of  social  order,  and to  secure its  citizens  from external  threat.  Individual  freedom, while  
undeniably threatened by the state, is also enhanced by the protection the very same state offers;  
liberals would argue, therefore, that, given the reality of social life without the state, freedom of the 
individual is in fact protected better by liberalism than anarchism (Williams 2000). They do not  
embrace the state for its own sake, but rather as a problematic necessity – indeed, for some it is a  
necessary  evil.  Liberals  therefore  insist  that  the  limits  of  state  power  be  restricted  to  the  
maintenance of a basic social order, and no more. The state, then, is not intended to interfere with  
our personal lives, or our personal values. In fact, if the (theoretical) liberal state embodies one  
fundamental value itself, it is tolerance for other values.  
Underlying this position of tolerance and individual freedom is a critique of the possibility of a  
universal/objective ethics. The notion that values may clash becomes less problematic if we can  
decide  between  them in  an  objective  manner,  as  Bookchin  believed  was  possible.  Liberalism,  
however, is based on the view that we must tolerate different conceptions of the good life – that, in  
other words, we cannot rely on claims to universally accepted moral truths, although, as we shall  
see, this position is undermined by a belief in a minimal ethics that underpins all other, broader  
ethical views. While some anarchists appear to defend a view that there is an objective morality, I  
have argued that this view is not commonly held, and, furthermore, that it should not be held. But if  
there is no objective basis for deciding between ethical positions, how can we organise social life so  
that it does not descend into one huge conflict, or so that one ideology does not destroy or at least  
repress all the others? The outcome appears to be either chaos or totalitarianism. It would appear  
there really is no place to hide; communities – or states – must make ethical decisions, and those  
decisions will have wide-reaching, and possibly unintentionally illiberal, consequences.  Liberals, 
however, believe that there is somewhere to escape this dilemma: in the idea of the ethically neutral,  
liberal state, to which we now turn.  
35 This is not of course to say we must not criticise liberalism, and I will offer many reasons for doing so below, but  
rather to say we must engage with liberal arguments and challenge them accordingly, and not simply dismiss what  
liberals say as some sort of ideological mask for domination.
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Liberal Neutrality Explained & Critiqued
The liberal state, as we have seen, attempts to organise communal life without interfering with each  
individual’s private life. How? To ensure this non-interference, certain liberals have developed the  
concept of neutrality: the state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life. It  
must not favour one morality over another (Klosko, 2000; see also Kymlicka 2002; Rawls 2001).  
Neutrality does not entail an absolutely value-free position, but any values which are followed are  
supposed to be reasonable and agreeable to all by all members of a community – creating, as I noted  
above, a sort of minimal ethics. To maximise the chances of this working, the state should only  
intervene when absolutely necessary. Disagreements within the private sphere are both inevitable  
and acceptable, but, because they are kept at the level of the private/individual, and do not seep into  
institutional decisions about public life, they ought not cause any significant problems. Problems  
would only arise to the extent that the state tried to interfere with individuals’ moral lives. John  
Rawls, for example, saw that any attempt to bring about a comprehensive moral unity within a  
given  society  would  lead  to  unacceptable  levels  of  state  interference  (Rawls  2001,  425).  But,  
following the argument of neutrality, he also argued that the state was capable of acting as a sort of  
impartial security guard, which would step in to defend a set of ‘basic rights and liberties’ (ibid.,  
442) when they were threatened. For this to happen, Rawls argued, a society would need to achieve  
what he called an ‘overlapping consensus’ (ibid., 421-448 and 473-496), in order that it could then  
provide  a  ‘political  conception  of  justice  that  can  articulate  and order  in  a  principled  way the  
political ideals and values of a democratic regime’ (ibid., 421). This consensus must be ‘endorsed  
by each of the main religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to endure in that society  
from one generation to the next’ (ibid., 473). As we shall see below, and in Chapter Five, many  
contemporary anarchists have also argued that it is only by reaching consensus that a community  
can avoid resorting to some form of coercion.
In recent years, however, a growing number of critics – some liberals amongst them - have argued  
convincingly that the idea of neutrality is fundamentally flawed ( Young 1990, 96-122; Kymlicka 
1995,  108;  Mouffe  1993,  141-144,  Cooper  2004,  36).  Importantly,  this  critique  has  arisen  not  
because they consider the idea of neutrality morally questionable as such, but because they consider 
it an impossible ideal to realise. These critics argue that neutrality is simply not practicable, and  
they suggest that we need to look more closely at the inevitable problem of value conflicts (Young 
2001; Carens, 2000). 
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The liberal state is justified by its capacity to maintain a reasonable level of social order, but, in  
order to do so, it must define certain acts as social, and others as anti-social: defining which acts are  
social and which are not, however, can never be a value free decision. Critics such as Young argue  
therefore that the concept of the neutral state is ultimately impossible, because its actions are always  
guided by certain values and can never be truly neutral.  Furthermore, the state cannot help but  
regulate our private as well as our public lives. In controlling a society’s basic infrastructure – its  
cultural and educational resources, its energy and food production, its health and transport services,  
and so on - the state is placed unavoidably in a position of having to choose between different  
courses of action in relation to its administration: but because our values are not merely a private  
affair, and are in fact often linked in complex and multiple ways to the wider world, physically and  
discursively, the choices the state makes often have a direct impact, however unintentional, on our  
moral lives. What this means, ultimately, is that it is not simply narrowly defined anti-social acts,  
such as murder, that are prohibited and/or regulated by the state, but a whole range of acts and even  
beliefs that are more or less suppressed by its dominant values. 
For liberals, then, the state is justified by its capacity to maintain a reasonable level of social order;  
but, in order to do so, it must first  define certain acts as social, and others as anti-social. Rawls  
argued that the state could look to a set of basic liberties in order to decide where it had a right to  
intervene; that is, it could only properly step in to protect basic liberties, and no more.  The problem 
with this approach is that the notion of basic liberties is an extremely contentious one; is it really the  
case that a community of diverse moral values will be able to agree on what these basic liberties  
are? Rawls appears to think so. But freedoms, and all sorts of other values, often conflict with one 
another. We cannot refer to some objective notion of freedom, or some list of basic liberties, in  
order to decide between conflicting interests, because it is often precisely differing conceptions of  
freedom that are conflicting. As John Gray notes:
[Rawls] claims that giving priority to liberty does not require making choices among rival freedoms or  
making controversial judgements about the worth of these freedoms. [...Yet] claims about the greatest  
liberty cannot be value free. [...] Rawls writes as if any reasonable person can know what the greatest  
liberty is. The truth is that it is indeterminate to the last degree ( Gray 2000, 70).
Rawls’ ideal of freedom – a freedom that can contain diverse voices without significant conflict – is  
not value neutral; what Rawls considers as basic liberties may be considered trivial, or even  
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oppressive, by people of a different moral, political or cultural background. However well  
intentioned, a list of basic liberties is in fact a list of one’s own values; it cannot but reflect what we  
consider to be morally acceptable and important. This myth of the value neutrality of freedom  
allows what is in fact a strong conception of the good life to be presented as a set of basic liberties,  
as a thin, liberal, minimal ethic, a safe space that does no more than protect the diversity of values  
within it. When this problem is explored in relation to liberal thought, the emphasis is very often on  
what actions the state should or should not take. However, it is hopefully clear that this is the case  
only because the state is the mechanism by which liberals hope to resolve conflict; many, though 
not all, of the conflicts themselves exist independent of the state. So what might this tell us about  
anarchism, and its own claims to defend freedom? In the following section, I want to argue that  
anarchism suffers from the same basic problem as liberalism; in particular, I suggest the anarchist  
support for diversity echoes the liberal rhetoric about neutrality. 
Value Conflict, without the State
I have so far suggested that rather than arguing for a particular set of values, anarchists have been  
reluctant to articulate a clear ethical code; liberals, I suggested, have followed a similar process, and  
have argued that the state should organise life according to no more than a minimal, neutral  
conception of freedom. This, however, has been shown to be problematic, because the organisation  
of daily life can never in fact be value free, and when competing understandings of which freedoms  
are important, or of what constitutes the good life, come into conflict, one view will often be  
subordinated to another. What does this mean, then, for the anarchist understanding of freedom?  
Does the state create and cause such problems, or will such conflicts be a potential problem for a  
society without the state? 
In fact, although currently the state often is the cause of many such conflicts, they can and do also  
exist independently of it, and when such conflicts arise they do not need the state to come down in  
favour of one side of the dispute:36 without state interference, the conflict may simply continue  
(with whatever repercussions that entails),  be resolved in favour of one side or the other, or be  
eventually settled amicably. Very often, in contemporary societies, the result is a mixture between  
the first two options; one side becomes and remains dominant, and is generally unthreatened and  
untroubled by its opposition, whilst the other side remains in a condition of (more or less tolerable)  
36 Of course, conflicts are not necessarily always between only two groups – indeed, they can often be far more  
complex, but the point remains the same. 
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oppression.  Iris Marion Young has argued that a profound and systematic denial of freedom – what  
she calls structural oppression – can take place when such conflicts of values and freedoms occur.  
Importantly for my arguments about anarchism, she notes that ‘disadvantage and injustice’ arise in  
such  situations,  ‘not  because  a  tyrannical  power  coerces  [people]  but  because  of  the  everyday  
practices  of  a  well-intentioned liberal  society’.  The oppression that  results,  then,  is  ‘structural,  
rather  than  the  result  of  a  few  people’s  choices  and  policies.  Its  causes  are  embedded  in  
unquestioned  norms,  habits  and  symbols  [...  I]n  short,  the  normal  processes  of  everyday  life’  
(Young 1990, 41). In other words, any form of social organisation has the potential to create such a  
system of  structural  oppression,  which  equally  has  the  potential  to  limit  people’s  freedom  in  
important ways. Bhikhu Parekh makes the point well:
Every culture is also a system of regulation. It approves or disapproves of certain forms of behaviour and  
ways of life, prescribes rules and norms governing human relations and activities, and enforces these by  
means  of  reward  and  punishment.  While  it  facilitates  choices  as  Raz  and  Kymlicka  argue,  it  also  
disciplines them as Foucault argues. It both opens up and closes options, both stabilizes and circumscribes  
the moral and social  world, creates the conditions of choice but also demands conformity.  [...]  While  
valuing the indispensable place of culture in human life, we should also be mindful of its regulative and  
coercive role and the way it institutionalises, exercises and distributes power. Its system of meaning and  
norms are not and cannot be neutral between conflicting interests and aspirations (Parekh 2000, 156-157).
What ought to be of real concern to anarchists here is the argument that cultures - which is also to  
say political positions (even anti-political ones) and systems of morality, even libertarian ones – are  
argued to be  incapable of neutrality. As John Gray demonstrates, freedoms conflict and must be  
decided between, explicitly or implicitly, and, as Young and Parekh argue, certain norms become  
dominant and thus seriously limit the freedoms of people wishing to live in different ways (see  
Trujillo 2010 for a discussion of this that is particularly pertinent for many anarchists, focusing as it  
does on attempts to live sustainable lifestyles). So freedoms – and perhaps we should also say the  
beliefs and actions that are made possible by those freedoms – conflict, and when they do, one will  
very often have to  submit  to  the other.  To be  neutral  in  these  situations  is  simply  to  give  no  
assistance to either claim, which will generally mean, to let the stronger side win. By stronger I do 
not only mean physically stronger. There are countless other ways one side of a debate will be in a  
position to over-rule the others’ wishes. One of those ways, of particular importance for liberals and 
anarchists, is by virtue of being able to claim ‘neutrality’ for their position, whilst accusing the other  
side of being authoritarian; for example, it is reasonably common to hear anarchists denouncing  
vegans as fascists, because, in protecting the freedom of animals, they are restricting the freedom of  
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humans to eat those animals. However, clearly both sides are simply presenting different views of  
freedom, and there is no genuinely neutral position. When these conflicts occur, being neutral does  
not (always) give equal space for both parties to co-exist; it  can simply allow space for one to  
suppress or deny or beat or disperse the other without any third-party interference.
Liberals argue that what Rawls called the ‘fact of pluralism’ meant that only a liberal politics could  
protect us from the ‘oppressive use of state power’;  as we shall see,  anarchists also argue that  
diversity is inevitable – and should be positively embraced – but that it is anarchism which offers  
people the autonomy needed for this diversity to flourish. We have seen, however, that the liberal  
idea of neutrality does not defend this plurality as effectively as liberals had hoped; rather, it allows  
a state, and also, importantly, a culture, to present its own interpretations of liberty as being value-
free, thus creating the possibility for it to deny certain other liberties and values whilst declaring  
itself to be neutral,  or to be defending diversity,  or freedom. The question now becomes: what  
evidence  is  there  that  anarchist  conceptions  of  freedom and diversity  are immune to  a  similar  
challenge, especially when we remember the critiques of Young and Parekh, who argue that it is not  
simply state regulation, but also cultures, habits, norms, and everyday practices that are capable of  
‘deciding’ between conflicting  freedoms and values?  Young  refers  to  the  structural  oppression  
caused, not by a tyrannical regime, but by a ‘well-intentioned liberal society’; how much better will  
a well intentioned anarchist society fare?
Anarchist Freedom – the story so far
Ultimately, what all this points to is a denial of there being an unproblematic  common good. The 
idea  of  a  benign  human  nature  is  problematic,  not  only  because  it  relies  on  an  essentialist  
understanding of the world, but because it relies on the claim that there is, or can be, universal  
agreement on what it means to be benign – a claim which is, I have argued, untenable. Kropotkin’s  
view that ‘people will behave and act always in a direction useful to society’  is not, I would argue, 
problematic because of its suggestion of a positive human nature, but because of the failure to  
recognise that what is considered useful for society is open to dispute; more to the point, what is  
considered unuseful, or anti-social, is often the source of considerable conflict. This is not to say  
there can be no arguments made for one good over another;  it  is not an argument for absolute  
relativism, hence my suggestion earlier that anarchists must begin to engage more with the ethical  
reflections  of  theorists  such  as  Todd  May,  Benjamin  Franks  and  Saul  Newman  (see  also,  for  
example,  Williams  1993;  Mackie  1997;  Midgley  1991,  for  some useful  discussions  about  the  
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possibility of establishing an ethics that is neither entirely subjective, nor objective, or universal). 
But it throws into serious doubt our capacity to organise society in a way that everyone is equally  
agreeable to. Such an argument denies a human essence, in the strong sense, but it does not deny the  
capacity for mutual aid: it is not, in other words, a Hobbesian argument that pits neighbour against  
neighbour in a battle for survival. Rather, it suggests that the sort of diversity anarchism so strongly  
supports will always have the capacity to lead to conflict, not because people are anti-social, as  
such, but because people’s understandings of what constitutes the social differs in important ways.
So far, we have seen that anarchism’s conception of freedom is broad and (perhaps deliberately)  
vague.  And I  have argued that the idea that  this  anarchist  freedom could be maintained by an  
inherently benevolent human nature, or by humanity’s capacity for rational moral enquiry, is by no  
means  a  majority  view amongst  contemporary  anarchists,  and  is,  more  importantly,  ultimately  
untenable. But if we can no longer argue for some universal moral code, and if we can no longer  
conceive of an unproblematic ‘common good’, then what prospects are there for a truly libertarian  
community to exist? To begin answering this question, we do not have to wait for, or imagine, such  
a community: indeed, we need only remind ourselves of the anecdote with which I opened this  
thesis to see that such conflicts occur every day, and that anarchists are as vulnerable to them as  
anyone else. Contemporary anarchism places considerable value on the notion of diversity; although 
I support the broad view that diversity is a good thing, it also raises certain problems – problems  
which need to be honestly addressed. It is worth looking now then at the way in which diversity is  
understood by anarchists.
Freedom in Diversity?
Diversity has long been championed by anarchists ,37 but it is increasingly placed at the very heart of 
contemporary activist  discourses  (Maeckelbergh,  2009;  Gordon 2009).  But  what  does  diversity  
mean for these activists exactly? Is it limitless, or are there boundaries outside of which diversity 
becomes division? Despite its regular evocation, diversity is, I will argue below, a term that, like  
freedom, is all too often used with all too little reflection. According to Marianne Maeckelbergh:
Diversity is unavoidable, especially in a globalised world, but diversity leads to difference of opinion and  
sometimes  conflict.  Democracy  has  long  been  about  trying  to  resolve  this  basic  paradox.  The alter-
37 Bookchin also considered diversity to be a fundamental part of nature, and thus of morality; as I argued previously,  
however, I do not consider his ideas on these matters to have been especially influential, so I will not discuss them  
here.  
96
globalisation actors, rather than denying or suppressing conflict, and rather than assuming that conflict is  
necessarily  competitive  and  dangerous,  assume  that  one  can  have  constructive  conflict  without  
competition (Maeckelbergh 2009, 100).
Before looking at how diversity is understood here from an anarchist perspective, it is worth briefly  
exposing  an  underlying  assumption  about  liberal  politics,  expressed  in  the  above  quote  by  
Maeckelbergh,  but  which  I  believe  is  common  amongst  anarchists.  Maeckelbergh  implicitly  
suggests here that conventional democratic theorists see conflict as ‘competitive and dangerous’,  
and  thus  try  to  ‘deny  or  suppress’ it.  Later,  she  argues  that  the  movement’s  understanding  of  
diversity  is  intended  to  ‘challenge  the  political  project  of  homogenization  implicit  in  liberal  
democratisation’ (ibid., 109). But is the liberal project really one of homogenization? According to  
John Rawls
a diversity of doctrines – the fact of pluralism – is not a mere historical condition that will soon pass away  
[...] diversity of views will persist and may increase. A public and workable agreement on a single general  
and comprehensive conception [of the good life] could only be maintained by the oppressive use of state  
power (Rawls 2001, 425).
Perhaps Maeckelbergh is right that the  reality of the liberal state is one which attempts to limit  
diversity – if not always successfully: but why? Clearly, to the extent that this is true, there is a  
radical disconnect between theory and practice. Yet what we have seen so far suggests a strong  
parallel between liberal and anarchist theory, with both ideologies arguing that they defend diversity  
and individual liberty. But we have also seen that the reason liberalism fails to do so is not simply  
down  to  the  role  of  the  state:  it  is  a  more  fundamental  problem about  conflict.  As  we  saw,  
Maeckelbergh argues that contemporary activists ‘ assume that one can have constructive conflict  
without  competition’ (my emphasis)  – but is this  any more than an assumption? Maeckelbergh  
certainly offers no reason as to why this might be the case.
Its ability to embrace a ‘diversity of tactics’ was, according to many, one of the principle strengths  
of the alter-globalisation movement (Tormey 2005), with the slogan ‘one no, many yeses’ being  
widely used to give voice to this (Kingsnorth 2003). Yet, as Chris Hurl notes:
 
While  the  anti-globalization  movement  is  often celebrated  for  its  apparent  diversity,  it  often  remains  
unclear how this diversity manifests itself in practice. The ambiguous boundaries of the movement serve  
to obscure its specific social relationships (Hurl 2005,  1).
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One activist  who embodies  this  tension is  José  Bové,  an activist  who became something  of  a  
celebrity  within  the  movement  for  his  direct  action  against  McDonald’s  (Goaman  2004).  
McDonald’s has become a classic target for anti-capitalist campaigners, but much of the rhetoric  
against it comes from an animal rights perspective. Bové, however, is a dairy farmer. Recognising  
the conflicts that freedom raises, a writer from the anarchist collective CrimethInc states that:
We must create a world in which everything that is possible is also desirable. [...] There will be no  
reason for guilt, no possibility of hypocrisy or conflict between desires [...] a world empty of meat and 
dairy products (CrimethInc 2000, 104).  
What does this say about the anarchist commitment to diversity? And what would happen to this  
diversity – and José Bové – if this author succeeded in realising her anarchist vision? Interestingly,  
within the movement, the limits to diversity are often quite apparent, and so the topic of (at times  
heated) debates:
The Dissent! Network also jumped through hoops to remain inclusive, albeit with mixed results. At almost  
every gathering there was a discussion of who should be allowed to participate in the Dissent! Network.  
Could Christians, who might be proselytising an authoritarian religion? How about members of organised  
political parties? What exactly were the limits and nature of the PGA hallmarks, and who did they include  
and exclude? (Trocchi et. al. 2005, 66).
Yet whilst these reflections may appear to demonstrate an awareness of the problems I have been  
raising, in fact we often find that many in the movement are able to assure themselves that, having  
considered these difficult dilemmas, they have opted for the inclusive approach, and thus resolved  
any issues diversity may pose; in particular, the idea of consensus, discussed in Chapter Five, is  
believed  to  resolve  these  problems  (much  as,  for  liberals,  the  neutral  state  was  supposed  to).  
Welcoming those beyond the line up of usual suspects, which usually means allowing Christians  
and Green Party members into the network, and then coming to a consensus about any shared  
projects, has allowed a continued feeling of a movement committed to diversity. And a strong focus  
on practical issues allows deeper ideological differences to be buried, at least temporarily: 
Discussions about how the [Dissent! Network’s] ecovillage should be organised were discussions about  
philosophy of social change and shared ideals, but safely disguised behind practicalities so as to avoid  
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ideological conflicts ( Maeckelbergh 2009, 103). 
David  Graeber  declares  that  anarchism  has  often  ‘celebrated  [its]  commitment  [to  negative]  
freedom as evidence of [its] pluralism, ideological tolerance, or creativity’ (Graeber 2006, 5). But  
the obvious and necessary question - how far does this ‘ideological tolerance’ actually go - rarely  
seems to be asked. It is certainly not clear how most anarchists would answer this question, or what  
their response might be once such limits had been reached; there is, in other words, no anarchist  
common sense we can point to when considering this. Is this because the obvious response is some  
denial of freedom, in whatever form it might take? Are anarchists simply unwilling to contemplate  
what  this  might  mean  for  their  dreams  of  a  libertarian  community?  One  response  that  is  
occasionally offered when conflicts cannot be resolved is the idea that groups can divide themselves  
into smaller units (Maeckelbergh 2009, 106-7; Seeds for Change 2007a). I will discuss this response  
in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, but for now I will simply note that I fail to find it  
convincing. Diversity then, like freedom, remains a vague and problematic concept; its limitations  
are rarely discussed, and it fails to offer any real clues as to how the anarchist ideal of absolute  
freedom is to be realised.
Conclusions
Why are freedom and diversity so uncritically accepted and left so unchallenged? I believe the  
answer, in part, lies in the reason they are supported in the first place. We saw earlier how Zygmunt  
Bauman claimed that, with the moral certainty of god or science no longer tenable, people would be  
forced to accept the moral nature of their choices, and to take responsibility for the consequences of  
such choices. However, we have also seen that liberals, through the concept of neutrality, have  
attempted to take the ethics out of our – or at least the state’s – decisions; while morality still exists  
in the private realm, we are stripped of any responsibility for it precisely because it has no public  
consequence. Although explicitly motivated by the desire to protect individual freedom from the  
interference of the state and other individuals or groups, I would suggest the popularity of this idea  
must at least partly be explained by the protection it gives us from this responsibility. Importantly,  
this extends well beyond theories of state action: this, I believe, characterizes much of the modern  
condition. An ‘I live my life and you live yours’ attitude provides for the individual precisely the 
hiding place Bauman believed we no longer had, and it is one which anarchists are as likely as  
liberals to mis-use. 
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Ethics, then, does explain the anarchist discourse of freedom, but not in the sense of there being a  
clear  moral  framework  that  helps  establish  the  normative  parameters  of  liberty:  rather,  ethics  
defines liberty by its absence – freedom is the possibility of a privatised morality that is no longer  
the concern of society, and thus no longer the concern of anyone hoping to redefine or organise  
society.  Freedom is  freedom from moral  intrusion,  from the  moral  dictates  of  others;  it  is  not  
defined by a certain set of values, but by the idea of a diversity of values. However, this freedom is  
always potentially limited by the freedom of others. On one level, it is clear that anarchists have  
always acknowledged this, but the sense in which this limitation was understood was in relation to  
the  individual  and  her  relationship  with  an  otherwise  united  community  with  a  broadly  held  
agreement about what it meant to act responsibly; in other words, issues of individual crime have 
been  discussed  (although  problematically)  but  not  of  broader  disagreements  between  different  
sections of the same community. What the above discussion about values suggests, however, is that  
it is not simply anti-social acts by certain individuals that will be restricted, but particular ways of  
life that may be denied. Even without the state, people within communities have  power, whether 
they like it or not; and at times, this power may necessarily be used against others, to prevent them  
living the way they want to live. Anarchist conceptions of both freedom and ethics, therefore, need 
to be understood in relation to power. It is power then which forms the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
The Unavoidable Consequences of Power
 
IN the last two chapters, I have attempted to piece together an anarchist understanding of  
freedom: is this freedom supposed to be limitless – and, if so, how do anarchists defend such a  
proposition? Or are some limits recognised – and, if so, how are these limits to be understood? To  
understand such  limits,  I  suggested  we needed to  address  the  question  of  anarchist  ethics:  but  
anarchist ethics, I argued, are vulnerable to a number of critiques, and do not in fact provide a  
framework through which we might understand anarchist freedom. Understanding the complex and  
dispersed workings of power is, I will argue in the following chapter, crucial for understanding  
these critiques, and indeed, for understanding anarchism.
Power is already a central concept within all anarchist theory, but, like freedom and ethics, what  
anarchists mean when they use the term is often far from clear. In recent years, the charge has been  
made that, while anarchists may have followed a more sophisticated view of power than that of  
other  socialists,  they  nonetheless  missed  some  key  features  of  what,  it  is  argued,  is  a  highly  
complex phenomenon. The postanarchists Saul Newman and Todd May argue that, in particular,  
Foucault’s work on power takes its analysis further than that of the anarchists, seeing power as a  
diverse and dispersed concept that resides in all aspects of human life, and not simply within the  
state, or a particular (ruling) class. Others have challenged this view, arguing that in fact anarchists  
have always understood power as being more than simply the preserve of the state (Antliff 2007). I 
will  review these debates briefly below, but I  am not overly concerned with providing here an  
historical analysis of anarchist  thought. What concerns me is,  first,  what the dominant view of  
power is amongst anarchists today – what, in other words, the anarchist common sense says about  
power; and,  second, what the implications of such an understanding might be for the anarchist  
commitment to freedom.
I will start this chapter, then, by discussing the post-anarchist critique of what they believe to be the  
anarchist understanding of power; although I will conclude that this critique provides too simplistic  
an analysis of anarchism’s relationship with power, I will nonetheless suggest that such a critique  
should be welcomed, for one very good reason. For while I will go on to argue that anarchists tend  
to have a reasonably sophisticated view of power, I believe that the practical implications of this 
have been over-looked. I will therefore go on to suggest that the postanarchist position, as well as  
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the work of theorists such as Iris Marion Young, and the recent work of Aurora Trujillo, can help  
anarchists develop a more coherent and compelling account of power – and, indeed, through this, of  
anarchism. Whilst the postanarchist critique explicitly follows the work of poststructural thinkers  
such as Michel Foucault, I lay no claim to do the same, in part because, as noted, I believe that  
particular task has already been performed well enough by the postanarchists themselves. More  
importantly,  I  believe that whilst  the work of Foucault  and other poststructural theorists  are of  
course potentially interesting 38, I see no justification in the claim that Foucault must be given credit  
for the way power is now commonly understood, as some postanarchists insist; indeed, in my view  
thinkers such as Bakunin articulated essentially the same principles many years before. I am not, in  
my view, discussing a specifically Foucauldian form of power. Rather, and more simply, through  
the exploration of two concrete examples of the way power operates, I will demonstrate that power  
remains a problematic concept for anarchists, especially when considered alongside the critique of  
the previous chapters. Let us start then by looking at the postanarchist critique.
The Postanarchist View of Anarchism, and the Poststructural View of Power
In  the last   decade or so,39 a number  of  theorists  commonly referred to  as  postanarchists  have  
written  extensively  and  critically  on  the  subject  of  anarchism and power.  Although a  (rapidly  
increasing) number of theorists have contributed to this postanarchist discourse (such as Sureyyya  
Evren 2008 and Jason Adams 2003) it is most notably the work of Todd May and Saul Newman  
which has attracted a great deal of – critical and supportive – attention (see, for example, Franks,  
2007).  Their  critique40 rests  on  two  basic  claims:  firstly,  that  power  has  traditionally  been  
understood in too simplistic a manner, and that poststructural theorists such as Michel Foucault  
provide a better analysis. Secondly, they argue that anarchists have understood power in this first,  
simplistic way, and that they ought to incorporate the insights offered by poststructuralism.  The 
postanarchists’ claim is that the analyses of power offered by theorists such as Foucault provide us  
with a better insight into the world and all its complexity: and it is an analysis that anarchists have  
not themselves made. To begin, I want to briefly explain this poststructural view of power, before  
asking whether it does differ so greatly from conceptions offered by anarchists. 
Although the poststructural view of power has been widely discussed by numerous thinkers, it is  
38 See, for example, Foucault  1980, 1990 & 1994 for some interesting discussions on power.
39  See Kuhn, 2009, for a useful discussion on the short but already complicated history of postanarchist thought.
40  Both writers discuss much more than power, of course, but I am mostly concerned here with what they have to say  
on this matter.
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Michel Foucault who is widely regarded as the key theorist in this respect. Through his work as an  
historian,  Foucault  aimed to  uncover  hidden assumptions  about  the role  of  institutions  and the  
ideological beliefs that informed them. Foucault came to see that power was deeply ingrained in all  
social practices, constantly produced and reproduced at every level of society. Like the anarchists,  
Foucault’s analysis of power takes it beyond economics, but he takes it further still, beyond the  
state, and urges us to look at ‘other arenas of power – such as the prison, the family, psychiatric  
discourse – which have their own strategies and logic’ (Newman 2001, 76). Power, then, does not  
simply  exist  in  certain  narrowly  defined  spheres,  such  as  the  state;  rather,  ‘[i]t  is  dispersed,  
decentred [...] diffused throughout society’ (ibid., 78). Such an analysis sees power in much the  
same way as we might understand energy, a fundamental part of every element of life, lying behind  
every  human  process.  And,  like  energy,  power’s  effects  may  be  small,  large,  productive  or  
destructive, and, importantly, they are often invisible, or at least hard to pin down. As Todd May  
puts it:
Actions are inseparable from power; that is, from constraints upon other actions. And power, in its creative  
as well as its repressive aspects, channels and determines actions in ways often outside the grasp of the  
actors engaging in them. Thus, new practices with new constraints arise from the power arrangements that  
infuse social practices. Sometimes those new practices and constraints elude anyone’s knowledge (May  
1994, 88).
So the state is not the source of power, but rather made up of various networks of power which 
go beyond the state. ‘It is clear’ Newman argues, then, ‘that Foucault’s conception of power is  
fundamentally  different  from that  of  the  anarchists’,  for  whereas  ‘anarchists  see  power  as  
centralised within the state and radiating downwards to the rest of society, Foucault sees power  
as thoroughly dispersed throughout the social fabric’ (Newman 2001, 79). 
It is doubtless true that often, power, for anarchists, is presented as being morally bad, and existing  
exclusively within certain institutions such as the state: it therefore can and should be eliminated, by  
destroying the state,  or  the ruling class.  So although the classical anarchists  are  praised by the  
postanarchists for their analysis of power when it comes to the state, they have not gone far enough  
in their critique. Unlike other socialists, anarchists are rightly critical of state power, but they have  
fallen at the second hurdle, so to speak, and have failed to extend this critique beyond the state or  
other similar institutions. Such an understanding of power has allowed anarchists to see society as  
somehow separate from power – a power-free space in which the libertarian can flourish; without  
power,  there  can  be  no  domination.  Anarchism,  then,  ‘creates  an  essential,  moral  opposition  
between society and the state, between humanity and power’ (Newman 2001, 47). It is certainly not  
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hard to find evidence of anarchist understandings of power that conform to the critique laid out by  
postanarchists. According to Dave Morland, ‘power is central to anarchist theory, and anarchists,  
whether old or new, are united in their belief that it should, wherever possible, be uprooted and  
eliminated’ (Morland 2004, 23). And David Thoreau Wieck writes that ‘[a]narchists [...] propose to  
reorganise our common life without the crippling destructive principles of power’ (Thoreau Wieck  
1970, 91).
For  the  postanarchists,  this  understanding  of  power  does  not  exist  in  isolation:  we  need  to  
understand it in relation to a broader network of philosophical assumptions within which these ideas  
about power lie. As Newman claims, 
according to anarchism, human subjectivity emerges in a world of ‘natural laws’ which are essentially  
rational and ethical, while the state belongs to the ‘artificial’ world of power. Thus man and power belong  
to separate and opposed worlds. Anarchism therefore has a logical point of departure, uncontaminated by  
power, from which power can be condemned as unnatural, irrational and immoral (Newman 2001, 5).
According to this critique, anarchism’s understanding of power is deeply flawed: it sees power as  
morally bad, and as being confined to certain elements of society, in institutions, such as the state  
and the church, or in certain classes such as the capitalist or ruling class; and it embeds this view of  
power within other humanist assumptions, about human nature, rationality, progress, and so on. The  
result is that anarchists form the overarching view that ‘the state [is] essentially evil and society [is]  
essentially  good’  (Newman  2001,  28).  Despite  their  critique,  Newman,  May  and  other 
postanarchists  maintain  a  strong  affinity  with  anarchism,  and  they  argue  that  anarchism  has  
historically come closer to uncovering the complex issues of power than other political ideologies  
such  as  Marxism.  Through  their  critique  of  Marxism,  anarchists,  according  to  Newman ‘have  
allowed power to  be  studied  in  its  own right’ (Newman 2001,  37).  While  acknowledging  this  
achievement, Newman insists the anarchists have simply not gone far enough, and asks whether  
anarchists have ‘not merely replaced the economy with the state as the essential evil in society, from  
which other evils are derived?’ (ibid., 47).
As well as Foucault seeing the place of power as being fundamentally different from that of the  
anarchists,  he  makes  another  distinction,  which  I  believe  has  been  a  cause  for  considerable  
confusion: this is the idea that power is not repressive, but rather productive. What is meant by this  
is not that power cannot restrict individuals and be used against them, but rather that individuals do  
not have an unchanging, natural essence that is free from power itself but which can be repressed by  
the power of others, especially the state. There is not, in other words, a humanity free from power  
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that power comes along and represses; humanity itself is the product of existing power relations,  
and this will always be the case. I believe that the emphasis that Newman and May place on this,  
however, is at times unhelpful to their own argument. Newman, for example, suggests that ‘power  
is not repressive – rather it is productive – and that to see power entirely in terms of repression is to  
fundamentally misunderstand it’ (ibid., 81). But what precisely is being said here? Firstly, he argues  
that  ‘power  is  not  repressive’ (my emphasis)  but  then  that  ‘to  see  power  entirely  in  terms  of  
repression’ (my emphasis)  is  misplaced.  But there is  a fundamental difference between arguing  
power is not repressive, and that it is not only repressive. Which is it? The confusion, I believe, lies  
in the use of the word repression. For poststructuralists, repression is understood as working against  
an essential human nature; because they deny such a nature, they deny that power can be repressive.  
However, for most people, and, I would suggest,  at times for Newman and other poststructural  
thinkers,  repression can also simply refer to some form of coercion,  or domination.  To talk of  
humans being repressed does not necessarily entail the view that they have an essential humanity  
that lies beneath the surface. Because Newman’s argument rests on the assumption that anarchism  
believes  in  an  essential  space  free  from power,  he  therefore  sees  anarchist  understandings  of  
repression as being linked to this. But it seems to me that we can do away with an essential human  
nature  and  still  coherently  talk  of  repression,  because,  whether  the  result  of  nature  or  social  
conditioning, or anything else, people still  have needs and desires which can be limited by the  
power of others,  and it  is  this basic fact with which,  I  would suggest,  anarchists are  primarily  
concerned when they talk of the negative, or repressive, aspect of power. 
Similarly, poststructuralists – anarchist or otherwise – do see very real imbalances of power, so that  
the state can indeed be understood as a powerful institution which unjustly dominates the majority  
of humanity (May 2007, 21). However, in order to correct the traditional emphasis on the state, they  
both stress the diffused nature of power. Conversely, I would argue anarchists have tended to do the  
opposite: while I will go on to argue that anarchists do in fact understand that power infuses all life,  
they have been primarily concerned with attacking those physical and ideological spaces where  
power is so blatantly and aggressively displayed. As a result, they tend to emphasise the negative  
capacities of power. Indeed, even Newman at times talks of power in this sense: ‘Perhaps the whole  
idea of revolution should be abandoned for a form of resistance to power which is, like power itself,  
nebulous and dispersed’ (ibid.,  79).  But  how can we  -  and indeed why should we -  talk of a  
resistance  to  power  at  all?  Surely  Newman means  a  resistance  to  certain  forms  of  power?  A  
resistance which must, by his account, produce and utilise its very own forms of power. Elsewhere,  
he notes that ‘there is still […] the raw, brutal inevitability of power and authority’ (Newman 2001,  
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1), and concedes that ‘postanarchism shares with anarchism its anti-authoritarian goal of a society  
without power’ (Newman 2010, 69). Once again, I believe such confusion stems quite simply from  
the word power, and the fact that it  can be used and understood in differing ways. Commonly,  
power is precisely centralised and repressive: if power is seen by anarchists as being primarily bad,  
and as deriving primarily from the state, the obvious charge is that they have missed the possibility  
of power being at times a positive force, and of it existing in other areas of life. However, we might  
also say that for anarchists – and, it would seem, at times for Newman too -  the word ‘power’ is  
used to denote the evils of the state, but that they are perfectly aware that there is something else  
that exists, that is, or can be, positive, and that does, or can, exist outside of the state. Within the  
context of anarchist writing, propaganda, and activism, the challenge is to attack the state, and the  
destructive  and  unequal  power  relations  it  embodies.  Power,  then,  like  all  words,  is  merely  a  
symbol, and for anarchists it (often) symbolises that which is both bad and inherent in the state: the  
question is, do they recognise that there is something else, which we may or may not choose to call  
power,  which  also  exists?  Have  they,  in  other  words,  failed  to  recognise  a  certain  social  
phenomenon entirely, or have they simply preferred not to symbolise it with the term power?
This  postanarchist  critique  immediately  raises  a  number  of  questions.  Are  they  right  in  their  
assessment of what the classical theorists thought? Why have they for the most part ignored the  
work of later anarchists? Do contemporary anarchists have a different understanding of power?  
Perhaps not surprisingly, this postanarchist critique has itself come under attack. The most common  
argument is that postanarchism misrepresents anarchism: its identification of a group of classical  
theorists who are lumped into one metaphysical school is problematic, and its avoidance of later  
schools of thought which would be less easy to dismiss raises questions about the timeliness and  
merit of the critique (Franks 2009; Kinna 2007). Another critique, which, importantly, appears to be  
quite rare, is that the poststructural theory of power which postanarchists embrace is itself wrong:  
power should be seen in a more conventional way41. Interestingly, David Graeber, one of the most  
well  known  voices  of  the  new  anarchism  which  supposedly  has  such  close  affinities  with  
poststructuralism, is one of an apparently small number of anarchists who has taken umbrage with  
the Foucauldian turn.
Academics love Michel Foucault’s argument that identifies knowledge and power, and insists that brute  
41 Again, I would note that I disagree that what is commonly referred to as a poststructural, or Foucauldian  
understanding of power should in fact be understood entirely in this way; many anarchists understood the pertinent  
points made by Foucault and others long before poststructuralism appeared. I simply use this terminology at times  
to draw a recognised distinction between different understandings of power.
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force is no longer a major factor in social control. They love it because it flatters them: the perfect formula  
for people who like to think of themselves as political radicals even though all they do is write essays  
likely to be read by a few dozen other people in an institutional environment. Of course, if any of these  
academics were to walk into their university library to consult some volume of Foucault without having  
remembered to bring a valid ID, and decided to enter the stacks anyway, they would soon discover that  
brute force is really not so far away as they like to imagine—a man with a big stick, trained in exactly how  
hard to hit people with it, would rapidly appear to eject them. […] Such a theoretical emphasis opens the  
way to a theory of the relation of power not with knowledge, but with ignorance and stupidity. Because  
violence, particularly structural violence, where all the power is on one side, creates ignorance. If you  
have the power to hit people over the head whenever you want, you don’t have to trouble yourself too  
much figuring out what they think is going on, and therefore, generally speaking, you don’t (Graeber  
2004, 71-72).
I shall return to this critique below, but for the most part, it would appear that very few anarchists  
seek to challenge the view of power presented by poststructuralism.  So what do anarchists have to 
say  about  power?  In  the  following  section  I  will  suggest  that  the  anarchist  common  sense  
understanding  of  power  is  indeed more  sophisticated  than  that  sketched by  the  postanarchists:  
however,  I  will  then  go  on  to  argue  that  the  implications of  this  have  not  been  sufficiently 
considered.
A Response to the Postanarchist Critique: The Anarchist view of Power
It has been frequently argued that anarchism has changed a great deal in the hundred years since  
Kropotkin  was writing;  as  we saw in  previous  chapters,  there  is  apparently  a  new anarchism,  
reloaded and fit for the twenty-first century. If the events in Paris in 1968 can be seen as inspiring  
the poststructural theories that Newman and May hope to synthesise with anarchism, it is clear  
these events also had a very direct influence on anarchism - and the new left more broadly - at the  
time, and ever since. Indeed, many would suggest that Todd May is simply wrong when he suggests  
that ‘[o]ne does not normally think of anarchism and recent French philosophical thought as having  
a natural affinity’ (May 2009, 13). On the contrary, the relationship between poststructuralism and  
anarchism is readily acknowledged by many contemporary anarchists.  As Giorel Curran notes, there 
is a strong ‘resonance between anarchist and, for example, Foucauldian analyses’ (Curran 2006,  
30). Not surprisingly then,  it is not hard to find evidence of power being understood by anarchists in  
much the same way as it is by poststructuralists. Uri Gordon puts the point well when he notes that:
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Anarchists are hardly ‘against power’. This common misconception is easily shown untrue by anarchist  
political language, in which ‘empowerment’ is mentioned as a positive goal. Empowerment is seen as a  
process where people literally acquire power […] On the other hand, of course, anarchists want to ‘fight  
the power’, or at least ‘the powers that be’, and resist all systems of domination under which people are  
systematically subject to power […] This indicates not a ‘rejection of power’, but a more nuanced and  
differentiated  use of the concept (Gordon 2008, 49 my emphasis).
Here Gordon highlights what I earlier suggested was an important point to consider: namely, that  
anarchists may use the word power to define that which is repressive and which exists solely within  
certain institutions, but that this does not mean they do not also understand power in other ways.  
For many anarchists, power is understood as something that cannot be got rid of, and as something  
that is not always oppressive; it can be positive or negative, coercive or enabling (Gordon 2008,  
48). Marianne Maeckelbergh argues that  ‘movement actors have highly fluid and context-specific  
approaches to power’ (Maeckelbergh  2009, 101) and, as such, suggests that power is understood in  
three different ways: ‘power as centralised hierarchy, power as decentralised hierarchy and power as  
decentralised non-hierarchy’(ibid.). The Notes from Nowhere Collective state in no uncertain terms:
Put simply, power is our ability to do things, to change things. It is the creative force behind all our  
experience. It is what makes things possible. It’s easy to imagine power as something that is outside of us,  
that is safely guarded and exercised by ‘the powerful’, a tool wielded by the other, the patriarchs, the  
capitalists, the oppressors. But power does not just reside in one place. It’s not just found in the seat of  
government, on the screens of the stock exchanges, at the end of the swinging club of the police officer.  
These are simply places and moments where power has accumulated and become fixed (Notes from  
Nowhere 2003, 388).   
And in his discussion of the Spanish anarchists, Robert Alexander writes clearly that ‘their agrarian  
experiments remain one of the notable aspects of the Spanish anarchists’ experience of having – and  
sharing – power’ (Alexander 2002, 217). It is of course debatable whether the Spanish anarchists  
themselves thought of power this way, but, first published in 1999, Alexander’s account at least pre-
dates much postanarchist work. And if we look further back into anarchist history, there is evidence  
that anarchist theories of power were far from simplistic. Even Newman points to what he suggests  
are contradictions within anarchist thought: Bakunin and Kropotkin both, Newman argues, talk of  
power in ways that make what he considers to be their real view of power ‘ambiguous, incomplete,  
open to question’ (Newman 2001, 49), arguing that Bakunin ‘perhaps unconsciously exposed the  
108
hidden contradiction that lies at the heart of anarchist discourse’ (ibid.) when he acknowledged that  
‘while  individuals  are  naturally  moral  and sociable,  and while  society  is,  therefore,  essentially  
harmonious, individuals also have a dark side – an insatiable desire for power and authority – which  
jeopardises this harmony’ (ibid., 50). Rather than seeing this as a contradiction, however, we could  
more favourably suggest that  Bakunin was offering,  as Gordon suggests  many anarchists  do,  a  
differentiated view of power. The following lines from Bakunin, which are worth quoting at length,  
certainly suggest as much:
Social  tyranny is  often overwhelming and deadly,  but it  does not exhibit  the character of  imperative  
violence, or legalised, formal despotism, which distinguishes State authority. It is not applied like some  
law which forces the individual to comply […]. Its effect is gentler, more insinuating and imperceptible,  
but  correspondingly  more  powerful  than  that  of  state  authority.  It  exerts  its  authority  by  means  of  
conventions, morals and a multitude of sentiments, prejudices and habits, in the material as well as the  
mental sphere […]. Hence the immense power which society exercises over men (1973, 150).
Such a view certainly sees power as existing outside of the state; but Bakunin continues to note that  
‘this power may be just as much beneficial as harmful’, considering one such benefit to be ‘the  
development of knowledge’ (ibid.) Whatever other contrary statements Bakunin may have made, it  
is clear that he was also capable of seeing power as both positive and negative, as creative and  
destructive,  and  as  being  dispersed  throughout  society.  Writing  several  decades  after  Bakunin,  
Alexander Berkman wrote in 1929 that all life had become ‘a crazy quilt of authority, of domination  
and submission, of command and obedience, of coercion, and subjection, of rulers and ruled, of  
violence and force in a thousand and one forms’ (Berkman 1973, 8). Of course, Berkman was more  
preoccupied with putting his anarchist principles into practice than writing large tomes of theory, so  
it is impossible to know precisely what he meant here, and we must be wary of reading too much  
into his words: once again, however, such an analysis certainly hints at a view of power which sees  
it as existing throughout society, and not simply within the state.  Whatever the case is about these  
earlier theorists’ understandings of power, and certainly there will never be a definitive answer,  
what I hope is clear by now is that for the majority of contemporary anarchists, and quite possibly  
for  many  of  those  writing  throughout  the  last  hundred  years,  power  is  not  understood  as  
simplistically  as  the  postanarchists  suggest;  the  anarchist  common sense  about  power,  I  would  
argue, is not so dissimilar from that offered by poststructuralist thought.
However, we should not dismiss the postanarchist critique out of hand. For whilst I maintain that  
anarchists understand power in a more nuanced way than is sometimes suggested, I believe there is  
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still  a  significant  failure  to  truly  internalise  what  this  means  for  a  libertarian  society;  and  the  
postanarchist critique, in prompting anarchists to ask deeper questions about power (and, indeed,  
anarchism more generally) can help encourage and inform such enquiries. The task of all anarchists 
now, I would suggest, must be to move beyond the postanarchist critique of earlier theorists, and  
begin to incorporate the ideas of poststructuralism, and other approaches, to strengthen and refine  
the core principles of anarchism. In the following section, I want to explore two more concrete  
examples of how power may impact on an anarchist  society; in doing so, I will argue that the  
anarchist  understandings  of  freedom and ethics,  and  of  an  unproblematic  diversity  of  interests  
without conflict or coercion, is ultimately unrealistic. 
The Implications of Power without the State
I have so far outlined what I believe is a reasonably common understanding of power amongst  
contemporary anarchists. Although there are undeniably elements of contradiction, and at times a  
lack of clarity, I suggested that the poststructural understanding of power is more or less embraced  
by contemporary anarchism. It is, at any rate, an analysis I believe we must work with. But what are  
the implications of this understanding of power? What does this mean for the fanatical lovers of  
liberty, who hope to create a society of free individuals where no one coerces anyone else? Taking  
our enquiry to  another  level,  I  believe that  while  anarchists  follow this  more nuanced view of  
power, the ramifications for a libertarian society have not been adequately thought through. As I  
suggested earlier in relation to the classical theorists, anarchists continue to focus their attention on  
the primary abuses of power perpetuated by the state, and big business. Although this remains an  
important battle, and one which anarchists must not lose sight of, it is vital that anarchists are more  
explicit and honest in recognising that, because, as we saw in the last chapter, there are reasonable  
disagreements about what constitutes the good life,  and because power can never be overcome,  
coercion and conflict will remain (at least potential) elements of any society. In accepting this, and  
in accepting that the demand for absolute freedom must always be tempered, anarchism must come  
to terms with the inevitable limits of freedom. To be clear: what follows is a discussion of the  
problems of power; in doing so, I do not deny its positive capacities, but given the over-all focus of  
this work, my analysis necessarily focuses on the difficulties that anarchism faces, and, therefore, on  
the conflictual potential of power.
Furthermore,  there  is  no denial  –  certainly  not  from myself  –  that  power  can  be and often is  
concentrated in certain areas, in certain respects: the editor of a newspaper clearly has more power  
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to influence public opinion than I do. However, what is being claimed here is not that this is not the  
case, but that this power reverberates throughout society, and is realised, often without consent or  
knowledge, through the individuals that make up society. The power of the editor is, after all, the  
power to influence other people, to influence what they then say, and do – and it is precisely through  
what they say and do that social norms come to embody those of the newspaper editor; the editor  
sets the agenda, so to speak, which is then acted upon by countless individuals operating, on various  
levels and in different ways, throughout society. This is why Graeber is wrong when he says that it  
is simply the police officer’s stick that holds the power; it is also the social respect for the stick, the  
willingness to submit to it – otherwise, any stick would promote just as much fear, and clearly this  
is not the case. Of course, it is surely true that our fear of physical violence is very real: we are  
scared of the stick itself - but this is only half the story.
As I suggested earlier,  it  is perhaps equally true that poststructural theorists themselves tend to  
focus on the other half of the story – that which emphasises the less tangible aspects of power.  
However, I don’t believe this suggests a rejection of the relative power of the state - or the stick, for  
that matter. All it suggests is that philosophers are generally not interested in writing books telling  
people that  policemen have sticks.  What  Foucault  believed was that  the less obvious forms of  
power42 had escaped people’s attention, so it was on this he focused, with good reason.
Indeed, it is the failure to recognise power for what it is that often makes it so problematic. Power  
can be consciously and deliberately disguised, but it can also work without the knowledge of those  
who possess it. This is a crucial point for anarchists, and it is here that the arguments of the previous  
chapter,  especially those of Iris Marion Young and Bhikhu Parekh, become so clearly relevant.  
Power can operate, as Young put it, through ‘the normal processes of everyday life’ (Young 1990,  
41), processes which could lead to extremely oppressive situations for some,  despite the fact that 
they take  place  within  ‘a  well  intentioned liberal  society’ (ibid.).  Importantly,  while  the  stick –
wielding policeman is very much a fundamental part of our everyday life, Young is also interested  
in those articulations of power that are not commonly understood as such, and which do not have  
the conscious intention of repression or control. 
I turn now then to two examples of power which is dispersed, and often hidden, yet which has a  
considerable impact on those it reaches. Firstly, I explore what Jo Freeman called  the tyranny of  
42 We might also note that such a view of power relies on an equally diverse understanding of freedom; just as power is  
not simple exploitation by the state, or market, so freedom is not simply freedom from the state, or a degree of  
economic liberty. 
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structurelessness  – a concept which explores the problems of hidden hierarchies, and one which has  
been widely discussed in activist circles; I then go on to discuss transport, and in particular the car,  
to see how the power of the automobile shapes our daily lives.
Jo Freeman and ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’
In 1970, the sociologist  and feminist  activist  Jo Freeman wrote a short  but  widely read article  
entitled  The  Tyranny  of  Structurelessness.  Although  her  focus  was  the  feminist  movement  in  
America at  the time of writing, its  wider applicability has long been recognised. In the article,  
Freeman discusses the idea of the ‘structureless group’ - a group in which none of its members hold  
formal  positions  of  power.  Although  she  never  uses  the  term  hierarchy,  clearly  the  idea  of  
structurelessness mirrors the anarchist rejection of hierarchies. 43 Freeman’s basic claim is that when 
formal  structures  (or  hierarchies)  within  groups  are  abandoned,  as  they  were  in  the  feminist  
consciousness raising groups in which she participated, these structures will simply be replaced  
with informal ones. What was especially worrying was that, because these informal structures were  
not  supposed  to  exist,  they  were  effectively  beyond  critique,  and,  therefore,  invulnerable  to  
challenges. In a democratic setting where power structures are formalised, a leader can be voted out  
of their position, but an informal leader in a structureless group can potentially be impossible to  
remove. As Freeman puts it:
The idea becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over 
others. This hegemony can easily be established because the idea of ‘structurelessness’ does not prevent 
the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones (Freeman 1970).  
As such, Freeman suggests that this “structurelessness’ becomes a way of masking power’ (ibid.).  
And as she sees the power of certain individuals to be an inevitable consequence of the structureless  
group, and because such informality leads to an increased level of immunity from critique, she  
suggests that such power should be formalised. 
If the movement continues deliberately not to select who shall exercise power, it does not thereby abolish  
power. All it does is abdicate the right to demand that those who do exercise power and influence be  
responsible for it (ibid.). 
43 Freeman has been referred to as both as Leninist (Munson 2010) and as an anarchist (Franks 2003), but for my  
argument it is not relevant whether either of these claims are true.
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However, she goes on to argue that this
does  not  mean  that  we  should  go  to  the  other  extreme  and  blindly  imitate  the  traditional  forms  of  
organisation. But [... s]ome traditional techniques will prove useful, albeit not perfect; some will give us  
insights into what we should not do [...]. Mostly, we will have to experiment [...] and develop a variety of  
techniques to use for different situations’ (ibid.).
In order that the formalised power structures Freeman advocates are as democratic as possible, she  
suggests  a  set  of  principles  which,  she  argues,  can  counter  the  worst  effects  of  hierarchical  
organisation, going on to conclude that ‘we must accept the idea that there is nothing inherently bad  
about structure itself - only its excessive use’ (ibid.). Not surprisingly, Freeman’s article generated  
considerable interest amongst anarchists, who saw her arguments either as a threat to their basic  
ideological assumptions, or as a welcome note of caution that ought to be listened to carefully –  
perhaps  not  dissimilar  to  the differing ways  postanarchism has  been  received.  Regrettably,  the  
former response appears to have been more widespread, and I would argue that rather than confront  
the  issues  Freeman  raises  head  on,  many  anarchists  have  dismissed  her  critique  in  an  overly  
dogmatic fashion. Take the following example:  
The problem with this essay is that Freeman was an authoritarian leftist who wrote the essay to attack the  
anarchistic consciousness-raising groups being organised by feminist women at that time. Freeman was in  
favour of building mass parties in the Leninist mode and was alarmed at the anarchist ideas taking hold  
among radical  women.  […] The irony,  of  course,  is  that  contemporary anarchists  are using  an  anti-
anarchist essay to criticise problems in their groups and organisations! It is far better to actually talk about  
group process problems than to wave a decontextualised essay over people’s heads (Munson 2010, 4).
I neither know nor care what Freeman’s political motivation for writing this pamphlet was: what  
matters is the argument itself, and it is, in my view, undeniably powerful. Some anarchists have, of  
course, attempted to critique the article in a more helpful manner. Cathy Levine, who wrote an  
openly anarchistic reply, The Tyranny of Tyranny at least acknowledges that Freeman’s article was  
‘written and received in good faith, as an aid to the movement’ (Levine 1979, 3). Levine, however,  
goes on to challenge the basic premise of Freeman’s argument, and argues that small, unstructured  
groups
[...] multiply the strength of each member. By working collectively in small numbers, the small group  
utilises the various contributions of each person to their fullest, nurturing and developing individual input,  
instead  of  dissipating  it  in  the  competitive  survival-of-the-fittest/smartest/wittiest  spirit  of  the  large  
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organisation (ibid.).
She  goes  on  to  suggest  that  ‘[c]ontrary  to  the  belief  that  lack  of  up-front  structures  leads  to  
insidious, invisible structures based on elites, the absence of structures in small, mutual trust groups  
fights  elitism  on  the  basic  level  —  the  level  of  personal  dynamics’ (ibid.,  7).  L evine  does 
acknowledge that different individuals have different personality traits and different capacities, but  
she sees the unstructured group as offering the appropriate environment in which such differences  
can co-exist, rather than compete.
The small  personally  involved group learns,  first  to  recognise those  stylistic  differences,  and then to  
appreciate and work with them; rather than trying to either ignore or annihilate differences in personal  
style, the small group learns to appreciate and utilise them, thus strengthening the personal power of each  
individual (ibid.).
Acknowledging that the problems noted by Freeman can, however, exist, Levine believes that they  
are the result, not of the unstructured group dynamic per se, but rather of our social conditioning, 
which is, at present, deeply embedded in hierarchy.  The problem, then ‘does not find solution in the  
formation of structures’ (ibid.) but rather in a continuing effort to make unstructured groups work  
for the benefit of all. So who is right? Freeman argues that unstructured groups inevitably develop a  
hidden hierarchy, disempowering those individuals kept outside, or below, whereas Levine argues  
that such groups allow all members to flourish, and that, to the extent this is not always currently  
the case, this is due to social learning, which could, in a more libertarian context, be overcome. 
Such attempts at organising without structures or hierarchies have of course continued in the three  
decades since Levine wrote her reply to Freeman, so how have they fared?  Interestingly, Freeman’s 
article is still extremely popular amongst libertarian radicals today, and many of the argument’s key  
themes continue to resonate with those involved in structureless (or horizontal, to use the more  
contemporary term) groups. Some argue that the anarchist movement has learnt from the critique,  
and responded with positive theoretical and practical contributions (Dupuis-Déri 2010, 50; Graeber 
2009, 233-7). Others have suggested that the critique itself is no longer directly relevant, and that  
the suggestions Freeman makes to counter the problem are normatively unacceptable and, in terms  
of the anarchist  movement as it  currently exists,  practically unworkable (Gordon 2009, 62-77).  
However, I would argue that what the anarchist movement has failed to do is to honestly assess the  
merits of the argument. What we are given are moral rebuttals that maintain the ethical virtues of  
horizontal  organisation,  but  no real  arguments that convincingly suggest  that  either Freeman is  
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wrong, or that her concerns have been adequately addressed in the four decades since she wrote the  
article. Indeed, I would suggest the movement is in some ways haunted by this critique – never  
being embraced, but never quite going away. We saw in Chapter Two how Paul Chambers argued  
that it was  ‘a curious suggestion that liberty might be upheld by the denial of liberty’ (Chambers  
2006, 37), and I would suggest we can see a strong parallel here, with anarchists believing it is an  
equally  curious  –  meaning  incorrect –  suggestion  that  the  greatest  equality  of  power  may  be  
maintained by formalised structures of power. In other words, I would argue there is an ideological  
block to genuinely assessing Freeman’s argument. Clearly, some lessons have been learnt since the  
article was first written, with considerable effort being put into improving the working processes of  
horizontal groups, by, for example, improving meeting facilitation techniques – a point I return to in  
the next chapter. But how quickly such improvements will come, what happens in the meantime,  
and,  perhaps  most  importantly,  to  what  extent  we  will  ever  eradicate  the  problems  of  hidden  
hierarchies are not questions that have been appropriately grappled with.
One of the problems with analysing Freeman’s article and the responses to it is that they all focus  
on  political  movements;  but  what  about  problems  within  wider  society,  now,  and  those  of  a  
hypothetical future? What are the implications of the analyses of power we have so far seen for our  
daily lives? Freeman’s article demonstrates how individuals can assume a less tangible form of  
power; ultimately, this power rests on the capacity to influence the thinking of a group of people. I  
will have more power than you if I have a greater capacity to inspire respect and admiration from  
those we are both trying to influence, because I am older, funnier, more articulate, or whatever. I  
may also be more experienced, or have access to certain information, or equipment, that gives me  
power over  others;  something which may be considered as  legitimate in  certain  situations,  but  
which can, over time, ossify into more deep-seated and worrying forms of power (Gordon 2008, 47-
77).  These capacities to influence are not the only way power can exist  in more subtle forms,  
however. At times, power can have a more dispersed presence, whilst still being invisible to most of  
those affected by it. Of course, very often these two forms of power will emanate from the same  
place, and so each will mutually re-enforce the other.
When we think back to the discussion of the previous chapter, where I argued that a plurality of  
values can lead to conflicting priorities for different members of a community, what might this  
mean for the hopes of a libertarian society? Different ethical positions will be supported, not only  
by different communities, but also by different groups within the same communities. So while at  
times communities may agree about a common good, we must acknowledge that people will also at  
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times defend their capacity to enjoy uncommon goods. This will, at times, be unproblematic, but at  
others, conflicts will arise. What this means for a libertarian community is that some lifestyles –  
understood in  the  broadest,  cultural,  political  and  moral  sense  –  will  necessarily  coerce,  or  be  
coerced by,  other  lifestyles.  On a mundane level,  if  I  want  to play my music until  6 a.m,  my  
neighbour will struggle to get a good night’s sleep. 44 Hopefully, we could between us come to some 
mutually  convenient  arrangement:  but  when certain values are held by a  large majority  in  any  
community, the realisation of these values may have a wide reaching impact, so that it becomes  
difficult  to  avoid  the  physical  reality  created  by  them.  Furthermore,  such  conflicts  will  not  
necessarily arise because of overtly ethical or political disagreements; some conflicts may arise for  
what appear45 to be amoral or apolitical reasons, as the example of transport, to which we now turn,  
demonstrates. 
Beyond Horse Power: How the Power of the Car has Shaped Contemporary Lives
For many, transport may appear to be a somewhat mundane subject of little political relevance. Of  
course, many people now recognise the environmental impact cars have; but beyond this, transport  
can hardly be said to excite political theorists in the same way that gender, or race, or psychiatry, for  
example, have. Yet our current transport system is crucial in perpetuating a number of industries  
which anarchists  have good cause  to  denounce;  the  oil,  construction and of  course automobile  
industries, to name but three. The many problems created by these industries, which can be social as  
well as environmental, threaten not only individuals in their local area, but the future of the human  
race: the threat of climate change, which is greatly exacerbated by our current transport norms, is  
just the most obvious of these. Importantly, however, unlike, say, the arms industry, transport is  
something that we can safely assume anarchists would not want to get rid of entirely. 46 
As we shall see, however, power plays an important role in the creation and maintenance of any  
transport system, so it will continue to pose at least a potential problem for people in an anarchist  
society.  Drawing on the recent work of Aurora Trujillo (2010 and 2010a), I want to show how  
power – and in this instance, the power of the automobile - pervades our daily lives in ways which  
44 Mundane it  may be, but as I  discuss briefly in the following chapter, ‘sound pollution’ is not only a very real  
problem in our daily lives – a problem which, like power, goes largely unnoticed, despite its significant impact – it is  
also a constant problem in temporary autonomous zones.
45 I say ‘appear’ because often there will be underlying ethical or political reasons; but these may well not be explicit,  
and indeed may elude the knowledge of those favouring certain decisions. The example of transport is a case in  
point; whilst there are clearly strong economic and political dimensions to transport policy, people in their daily  
lives are often unaware of this. Either way, the key point is that not all disagreements will be of an obviously  
political nature.
46 I ignore here the critique of all technologies offered by anarcho-primitivists such as John Zerzan and Derick Jensen,  
because, whilst interesting, they are in my opinion of little practical value.
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can have far-reaching consequences. 
I want to begin though by addressing concerns that some people have about this ‘Foucauldian turn’  
– namely, the fear that such an understanding of power is essentially depoliticising, robbing us of  
the ability to critique – and indeed condemn – the power of the state, of capitalists, and so on.  
Understandable as it may be, this fear is ultimately unjustified. Throughout the western world, and  
increasingly in countries such as India and China, the car is the dominant form of transport: indeed,  
whilst the following discussion is about transport, it focuses almost exclusively on the car, because  
the  car  is  at  the  top  of  the  transport  hierarchy,  and  all  other  modes  of  travel  are  effectively  
subordinated to it. The car dominates other modes of travel in terms of its levels of use, in terms of  
economic  expenditure  (public  and  private)  and,  as  we shall  see,  it  dominates  our  cultural  and  
physical landscape – and much else besides. All of this seems perfectly normal. And many would  
claim it was inevitable. The car offers us the freedom to travel almost anywhere, at any time; it is  
safe, dry, warm (or cool), comfortable, private, reliable. 47 In short, the growth of the car is often 
believed to be the result of the qualities of the car itself, and people’s natural desire to enjoy those  
qualities. But the power of the state, and of capitalists, played no small part in what Winfried Wolf  
calls ‘the resistable rise of the car’ (Wolf 1996). Subsidised car manufacture, and a road building  
project paid for entirely by the tax payer, historically, and to this day, are key to the car’s success.  
The car has been promoted aggressively, not only by its manufacturers, but also by governments, as  
well as, in the early years, a privileged elite who had access to cars and who therefore demanded the  
state provide the necessary infrastructure to meet their desire to drive. So this initial promotion of  
the car can be understood in more traditional terms – that is,  as the result of a centralised and  
hierarchical power, operating in a top-down system of coercion and enforcement (see Wolf 1996,  
again; and also Paterson 2007). 
This state and economic power continues to play an important role, of course, but over the years, as  
our increasing use of the car grew and began to challenge other forms of transport, the top-down  
power of the state was, if not quite replaced, considerably reinforced by a more dispersed network  
of power. As the car established its hegemony, life increasingly came to be designed around the car,  
physically and discursively. As more and more cars were made, so an increasing number of roads  
needed to be built, and as they rapidly filled up, yet more quickly followed. As the country became  
criss-crossed with tarmac, daily life began to change. People were expected to travel further for  
47 At least it is perceived to be all of these, though very often it falls far short of its promises; it is certainly not safe  
compared to other forms of transport, for example.
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work, for example, and longer journeys were actively encouraged by creating out-of-town shopping  
centres. As these larger shops thrived, local shops began to close (Monbiot 2000, 162-208) at an  
alarming rate: suddenly, it became a near necessity to have a car just to do the shopping. Similar  
processes took place in relation to all manner of essential services, as well as within family and  
friendship groups. Parents looked to schools well beyond the local area, in order to secure a better  
education for their child, for example. 
Although other forms of transport, notably trams and trains (the horse and carriage was never really  
a mass means of transport) helped shape life in similar ways, at least in the bigger cities, their  
impact was greatly over-shadowed by that of the car. Before the arrival of the car, the majority of  
people rarely travelled more than a few miles beyond their  home, and their  communities were  
underpinned by the stability that this provided; with people walking to work, to the shops, to school,  
they remained near their homes, and interacted with other members of the communities as they did  
so. But as the popularity of the car increased, conditions for non-car users became increasingly  
poor, and often simply dangerous. Public transport was neglected as the car became prioritised by  
transport planners. In the space of a hundred years, the western world was shaped in no small way  
by the physical and discursive parameters laid out by the car (see Horton 2006, Illich 1979, Ward  
1991, Sloman 2006, and Trujillo 2010 for some interesting discussions about what Andre Gorz  
(1980) called The Ideology of the Motor Car).
The power that operates through and around the car, then, exists within and influences a complex  
network of physical spaces, behavioural patterns, even ethical norms: for example, what people  
expect, accept and reject in terms of their transport needs; in institutional regulations -  in road  
traffic laws, the licensing of drivers and vehicles, etc.; and in physical infrastructure – the layout of  
our roads and cities, and so on. So, when we drive to work, the speed we travel at, the route we  
take, the way we respond to other roads users – other car drivers, as well as pedestrians and cyclists  
– the facilities available to us, at our destination and en route, and much else besides: all these  
things can be analysed with reference to a complex web of power relations that exist within society.
Perhaps the most important thing to recognise, however, is the extent to which these operations of  
power are hidden. This happens, not because of any conspiracy to keep them a secret, but because  
the structures created and consequently reinforced by these networks of power are normalised, and  
are consequently seen as natural, inevitable even: ‘We take the car for granted as a social good,  
which renders it nearly invisible as the source of a range of problems’ (Lutz & Lutz Fernandez  
2010, x-xi). For example, the notion that we have lost our sense of community is an increasingly  
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common  complaint,  but  how  often  do  people  explicitly  blame  the  car  for  this,  or  at  least  
acknowledge the part it has unwittingly played? 
Every year, more than 3,000 people are killed in the UK alone as a result of road traffic accidents:  
more than 50,000 are seriously injured. Yet compare the public discourse around these deaths to  
those caused by, say, knife crime. Speed limits of 30 miles per hour or more are the norm even in  
residential  areas,  even  though travelling  at  20  miles  per  hour  has  been  shown to  increase  the  
chances of someone surviving a collision dramatically – as well as greatly reducing the chances of a  
collision occurring in the first place. However, rather than forcing cars to slow down, pedestrians  
are increasingly segregated from roads, with, for example, barriers preventing them from crossing  
them where the authorities deem it unsafe to do so (Davis 1991). 
What all this means in practical terms is that other forms of transport, and indeed, certain ways of  
life, are marginalised or entirely negated by the car’s dominance. Fear of the car prevents many  
people from cycling and the sight of children playing on the streets is increasingly rare (Hillman et  
al 1990). The street is no longer populated by pedestrians, interacting with one another, but by  
drivers of dangerous machines. As well as the many immediate effects, on personal health, for  
example, the broader implications of car culture exacerbate all manner of prevailing ills,  social  
inequality and a decreasing sense of community amongst them. 
Whilst the work of Iris Marion Young focuses on the problems of power, diversity and conflict  
faced  by  groups  which  are  commonly  understood  to  suffer  some  form of  oppression,  Aurora  
Trujillo uses Young’s framework to show how people holding alternative ethical and political views  
can be equally marginalised. Like Young, she argues that physical and social barriers exist which  
can make it extremely difficult for people to live certain ways of life, but that ‘this is not only the 
case for cultural, religious or other groups, such as women, but also for those holding alternative  
ethical and political values, such as greens’ (Trujillo 2010, 168).  This, I believe,  is  particularly  
important for anarchists,  because it suggests that even when there is no deliberate or conscious  
attempt to discriminate or oppress, the simple fact of organising daily life can have serious and  
negative  impacts  on  individuals  or  groups  whose  lives  differ  from those  of  a  majority.  When  
diversity and freedom are both supported, as we have seen they are by anarchists, questions need to  
be asked as to how this will work in practice; clearly, it is not enough to simply defend diversity  
theoretically. Uri Gordon recognises the point when he acknowledges that  
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the rise of diversity to the status of a core anarchist value […] creates a practical challenge […] since  
it  raises  the  possibility  of  stagnation  and  renewed  hierarchies  even  in  a  society  where  present  
structures of inequality have been abolished (Gordon 2009, 261).
Anarchists must therefore acknowledge ‘the possibility of forms of domination that are hidden from  
us today and that will only become apparent in the future’ (ibid.).  Trujillo’s work suggests that the 
car is one such hidden form of domination, which forms significant barriers against people living  
more localised, sustainable lives. These barriers are the result of a complex network of discourses  
and actions, many of which are unintentional and often hidden. She suggests that the  ‘potential 
disadvantages that [people trying to live sustainably] confront are not intentional. [But] intention is  
not always a necessary condition in order for injustice to exist’ (Trujillo 2010, 72-3). In fact, she  
finds evidence of 
disadvantages created by the accumulation of otherwise non-harmful actions or situations. These do not  
only lack a clear or direct intention but are also the result of a series of loosely connected actions or  
situations.  These  become  problematic  only  when  they  are  seen  in  conjunction  with  one  another,  
uncovering a systematicity that is otherwise difficult to show (ibid.)
And this invisibility has a double effect; not only does it make it difficult for people to recognise  
and understand it in the first place, but, if and when they do, it creates real barriers to challenging it.  
Highlighting nicely the paradoxical nature of freedom, these barriers often come in the form of  
claims of liberty, neutrality, diversity, and so on: in other words, those arguing against cars are  
denounced for denying the freedom of ‘normal’ people, for pursuing their own particular interests at 
the  expense  of  others  who are  simply  trying  to  get  on  with  their  own lives.  Any attempts  to  
challenge the dominance of the car is denounced as an infringement of people’s basic freedoms – a  
claim repeated incessantly by the road lobby and happily echoed by many in the media. Iris Marion  
Young  puts  the  point  well:  ‘The  standpoint  of  the  privileged,  their  particular  experience  and  
standards, is constructed as normal and neutral’,  so when others try to expose their  bias,  or to  
demand their own values are recognised 
[...]  their claims are heard as those of biased, selfish special  interests that  deviate from the impartial  
general interest. Commitment to an ideal of impartiality thus makes it difficult to expose the partiality of  
the supposedly general standpoint, and to claim a voice for the oppressed’ (Young 1990: 115-116). 
Importantly,  as Trujillo’s work makes clear, when Young talks of ‘the privileged’ this does not  
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necessarily suggest an explicit division between class, or race, for example; rather, just as power  
must be seen as emanating from all areas of life, so too privilege can exist in a complex network of  
overlapping relationships; individuals may be privileged simply by virtue of the fact that certain of  
their  understandings  of  the  common  good  correspond  with  those  of  a  majority  within  their  
community, and whilst they may be privileged in some aspects of their life, they may be oppressed  
in others. 
Individual transport use, then, is heavily influenced by the wider community; at present, an unjust  
economic and political system has essentially forced the car onto the western world, but having  
done so, many of us have come to embrace the car, and to argue strongly against any attempts to  
limit its use. But this use denies others the ability to create the sorts of community they want to see: 
there is, in other words, a conflict, and it is one which is played out on our streets daily. What does  
this mean for the anarchist commitment to absolute freedom of the individual? Of course, many  
anarchists today would be strongly in favour of severely curtailing car use, because of the car’s  
environmental and social impact. But people like their cars, and insist on their freedom to drive  
them, so how would anarchists, opposed to the coercion of the individual, respond to this? 
Whatever we, or future communities of anarchists, may think about the car, what is clear is that the  
organisation of a community will establish itself along certain norms, which will often in turn create  
certain physical, procedural and cultural parameters that shape our daily lives. It may be possible  
for individuals to exist outside of those parameters, but this will not always be the case, and, to the  
extent that it is, such existence may be accompanied by the very real effects of marginalisation.  
Living on the normative edges of society is perhaps something which anarchists now take pride in,  
but what about in a libertarian community, where the individual is supposed to be able to flourish?  
How will anarchists ensure that not only transport, but all the other elements that make up our daily  
lives, some fundamental, some trivial, will not result in denying the individual’s freedom to live as  
they choose? Of course, anarchists can provide good moral arguments for restricting car use, but not  
every one will accept them: some may argue cars can be greened with new technology, and that  
they offer a greater liberty than public transport which limits the individual’s choice in other ways.  
It might also be reasonably argued that the break-down of the close-knit community has helped  
people establish a more genuine autonomy, free from the ‘censorious eyes of neighbours’, as Colin  
Ward put it.  Ultimately, a choice has got to be made; a choice that may result in people having their  
freedoms curtailed, and which will result in a certain ordering of daily life. Importantly, decisions  
which may appear to be technical (i.e, neutral)  in nature – designing a town’s transport system –  
may result in profound cultural changes that will radically shape the way people live their lives.  
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Conclusions
So the reality of power is complex, and the infinite possibilities for its use and abuse should be of  
real concern to anarchists. While the capacity of different individuals or groups to defend their own 
freedoms varies  greatly  –  and so while  the state,  for  instance,  must  remain a  central  target  of  
anarchist  activity  –  the  somewhat  mundane  reality  is  that,  whatever  the  social  arrangement  a  
community follows, day to day life will be permeated by at least the constant potential for freedoms  
to be denied.
Crucially, power often operates without the awareness of those through whom it works, and for this  
reason, it is often ‘invisible’, in the sense that we may not realise where and in which ways it is  
having an effect. This is especially important for anarchists to realise, if their desire is to maximise  
the freedom of each individual: not only is the potential for oppression an ever-present threat, but it  
may  be  one  which  is  extremely  difficult  to  recognise,  as  Jo  Freeman  argued was  the  case  in  
structureless groups.  Anarchists must  be humble enough to acknowledge the likelihood that,  in  
many situations, they themselves may struggle to acknowledge the impact their choices have on the 
lives of others.
Saul Newman argues that ‘[t]he game of politics must now be played within the confines of power’  
but goes on to suggest that these “confines’ are not inexorable and in fact open up unimaginable  
possibilities for freedom’ (Newman 2001, 75). It is not clear, however, how the view of power  
Newman proposes opens up possibilities for freedom. Certainly, it can be argued that it is better to  
be aware of a problem than to be unaware of it, and in this sense, anarchists are better off if they  
come to terms with the complex reality of power 48; but it does seem that, this aside, the anarchist’s  
demand for absolute freedom must now be considered at best considerably more difficult, if not  
ultimately untenable. If individuals and communities can continue to exert power on those around  
them,  if  different  ways  of  life  continue  to  clash  with  no  way  to  choose  objectively  between  
competing claims, then surely freedom will continue to be limited in an anarchist society.
As I suggested earlier, contemporary anarchists are also aware of the problem of power, and they  
therefore  insist  that  genuine  freedom  can  only  be  found  in  genuine  self-governance  –  which  
effectively means that every decision a community makes must be agreed to by all; they must, in  
48 Again, the postanarchist critique maintains that we are indebted primarily to Foucault for this understanding of  
power, a claim I and many other anarchists disagree with. However, I believe the important factor for all anarchists  
is how to respond to the complexities of power, whoever we might turn to  in order to better understand it.
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other words, come to a consensus. However, being aware of a problem does not necessarily entail  
fully  understanding it,  so  in  the following chapter  I  will  explain the  contemporary support  for  
consensus decision making, before going on to argue why it ultimately fails to safeguard individual  
freedom.
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Chapter Five 
Consensus & Conflict.
Lyotard suggests that if many little narratives, rather than one grand one, were allowed to flourish, this  
would offer the possibility of many legitimations of many practices rather than the valorising of some at  
the expense of others (Todd May 1994. 116)
SO far, I have questioned whether the anarchist conception of freedom, however morally  
worthy,  offers  a  genuine possibility for organising society,  or whether it  is  not,  as  anarchism’s  
detractors claim, merely a naive fantasy. Having asked whether the anarchist conception of freedom  
rested principally on a moral foundation, I went on to in fact suggest that anarchists have a broadly  
liberal ethical sensibility which relies on, rather than defines, their understandings of freedom. This, 
I argued, is deeply problematic, and I pointed to a failure to anticipate or adequately reflect upon the  
possibility for moral conflict within an anarchist freedom. In part, I argued this was as a result of a  
misunderstanding of power. I suggested that the postanarchist critique of anarchism was not entirely  
accurate,  in  that  it  misrepresented  anarchism,  and  failed  to  take  account  of  the  many  diverse  
positions held by anarchists; and I suggested that the post structural understanding of power does in  
fact receive broad support from contemporary anarchists. However, I went on to suggest that the  
practical implications of this do not appear to have been fully realised. In particular, I discussed the  
way  in  which  the  moral  conflicts  mentioned  above  may  impact  directly  on  people’s  lives;  I  
suggested that a potentially bigger problem than anti-social behaviour, as it is usually understood,  
was the disagreements that would likely arise regarding what constituted social behaviour. Different  
ideas about how we want to live will inevitably clash, and when they do, some people will by  
necessity  have  certain  freedoms  restricted.  Whereas  with  anti-social  behaviour  I  argued  that  
anarchist responses are invariably unconvincing, in relation to the latter problem I argued that there  
are very few responses at all. 
In short,  I  have pushed anarchism to its  limits,  and thrown into doubt its  claims to be able to  
organise social life without recourse to any forms of coercion or authority. However, in recent years,  
(especially activist) anarchists have come to argue that, in order to prevent problems of conflict  
occurring, or at least to ensure that such conflicts are resolved without recourse to institutionalised  
forms of  coercion,  communities  must  come to  a  consensus on the  decisions  they make.49 Can 
49 Consensus has  been advocated  by  earlier  anarchists  (see,  for  example,  Ehrlich  et.  al.  1979,  15)  but,  given its  
centrality  and  popularity  within  contemporary  anarchist  movements,  I  have  chosen  to  focus  on  these  recent  
articulations.  However,  the  theoretical  elements  of  the  following  discussion  are  applicable  to  consensus  as  a  
philosophical concept, independent of its support and application by particular groups. 
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consensus perhaps solve these problems and rescue anarchism? If community members all agree on  
the  way  freedom is  defined,  morally,  and  in  terms  of  the  inevitable  power  relations  that  will  
continue to exist within communities, can they not then at least accept any restrictions that may be  
placed on their liberty?
Sadly, the short answer is: no. In a real community of people attempting to live their daily lives,  
consensus,  I  will  argue,  is  unlikely to be reached to a sufficient  degree to ensure no issues of  
conflict or coercion arise; although consensus could be seen as a response to the problems I have 
detailed in previous chapters, I will suggest such problems have in fact not been sufficiently well  
understood. And I will argue that consensus can also be problematic when it is reached. Ultimately, 
then,  consensus  is  not  the  libertarian  safeguard  it  is  often  presented  as  being.  Indeed,  many  
anarchists outside of the movement have strongly resisted the idea, arguing that it can amount to an  
authoritarian process whereby individuality is negated. While its value is recognised within small  
groups, within larger communities it has the potential to become deeply oppressive (Bookchin, n.d;  
McKay 2007, 42-43). However, I do not want to throw the baby out with the bath water, and I hope  
to show that the experiments with consensus which thousands of anarchists have been part of over  
the last decade or so offer some valuable tools and insights into the potential workings of more  
libertarian communities. In particular, the  process of consensus decision-making, rather than any  
resulting consensus itself, should be given real significance within anarchist thought.
Before going on to explore these issues theoretically, it should help to provide some context to these  
debates; given the importance so many contemporary anarchists place on consensus, discussions  
about its theoretical weaknesses need to be made with an appreciation of what its adherents believe  
to be its successes. I therefore start this chapter by outlining the basic principles and processes of  
consensus.  I  then go on to  discuss three fundamental  problems which seriously undermine the  
prospects of consensus resolving the problems of freedom and conflict: to begin, I highlight the  
prospect of a tyranny of one, always present when any individual has the right to block a decision; I  
then question the likelihood that diverse communities will actually come to consensus, and argue  
that in fact, disagreement about important issues must be anticipated; and finally, I suggest that  
when  we  do  encounter  rare  acknowledgments  that  consensus  will  not  always  be  reached,  the  
implications of this are not taken seriously enough. 
I go on to explore the idea that when consensus is not reached, communities can simply split, so  
that  groups with differing views need  not  impinge on other  sections  of  their  community.  This  
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response is popular within activism, but I argue that it is unrealistic to imagine it offers a reasonable  
solution for real communities.  Ultimately,  the case for consensus is fundamentally undermined.  
However, I conclude the chapter by arguing that the processes and tools developed by activists who  
use consensus decision making are a significant improvement on standard voting systems where  
dialogue and debate are easily side-lined; anarchist communities, I suggest, must incorporate some  
of the lessons learnt by activists’ use of consensus, even if the ultimate goal of absolute agreement  
is often unlikely. Let us turn now to explore in more detail the basic principles and processes of  
consensus within the movement.
The Principles & Processes of Consensus Decision Making 
Since the Battle of Seattle, people have been struggling to name a movement that staunchly resists  
easy categorisation. Although its opponents – or those who simply aren’t that interested – have been  
happy enough to lump everyone under the problematic term anti-globalisation movement (Graeber 
2002, 3), those who are involved in or otherwise support the movement have tied themselves into  
knots, desperate not to do an injustice to the plurality of voices within this diverse human story, but  
equally keen to have  some  term, to mobilise  around, and as a point of analysis  and reference;  
whether it’s for an academic article or a slogan on a t-shirt, we need to call this thing something. But 
naming it is only half the problem; defining it has proved similarly perplexing. Some call it the new  
anarchism, but the Zapitistas aren’t anarchists; some call it the anti-capitalist, or alter-globalisation 
movement, but that term might include larger NGOs and certain leftist groups that many feel are  
simply not part of these new discourses of resistance.
One term that, as far as I know, has not been proposed is the consensus movement . Yet if one thing 
unites this movement – and which, conversely, leaves certain other elements out – it is the emphasis  
on consensus decision making , and related ideas of direct democracy, horizontal organisation, and  
so on. As David Graeber, one of the most prolific and articulate movement commentators, notes:
A constant complaint about the globalisation movement in the progres sive press is that, while tactically  
brilliant, it lacks any central theme or coherent ideology [... But] it is not lacking in ideology. Those new  
forms of organisation are its ideology. It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks [...] networks  
based on principles of decentralised, non-hierarchical consensus democracy (Graeber 2002, 70).
Fellow activist and academic Uri Gordon agrees:
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One of the most notable features of liberatory struggles today is their saturation with democracy. From the  
Zapatista  consultas  in  Chiapas  to  the  tactical  spokescouncils  held  amid  the  tear-gas  in  Genoa,  and  
throughout  the  everyday  local  work  of  radical  grassroots  collectives,  non-hierarchical  and  direct-
democratic  models  of  organisation  and  decision-making  have  become default  practice  in  the  global  
resistance to capitalism and war (Gordon n.d.).
Consensus is not merely a  default decision making process however; for many activists, there is  
simply no acceptable alternative. No matter how long, difficult or tedious a meeting becomes, any  
attempt  to  move  away  from consensus  will  be  viewed  by  many  as  an  attempt  to  reintroduce  
hierarchy and authority through the back door. Consensus, in other words, is considered as being  
absolutely  fundamental  within  this  new  movement,  and  within  the  school  of  contemporary  
anarchism so closely associated with it. 
The basic theory of consensus is simple; everyone affected by a decision has a right to participate  
both in any discussions leading up to the making of that decision, and in the decision making itself  
(how to define who is affected by a decision is a problem I discuss below). When a collective, or  
community, needs to make a decision, everyone meets to discuss the matter at hand. Depending on  
the  subject,  these  conversations  may  be  straightforward  exchanges  of  information,  or  heated  
debates. At some point, some one will present a proposal. Once the proposal has been presented to 
the group to discuss, and it is clear everyone understands it, a facilitator will ask if there are any  
objections (known as blocks,  or stand-asides);  with everyone participating on an equal  footing,  
ultimately,  each  individual  has  the  right  to  block  any decision.  If  there  are  no  objections,  the  
facilitator will again ask if everyone agrees; if they do, then the group has reached consensus. 
At times, the process is as simple as it appears here; when decisions are controversial, the process  
may become more convoluted. Often, a contentious proposal will be presented to the group, then  
discussed, then amended, discussed again, reframed, discussed some more, and so on. Experienced  
facilitators,  and  the  use  of  numerous  facilitation  tools,  can  do  much  to  help  promote  a  good 
decision making process  (Seeds  for  Change 2007a).  Conversely,  bad process,  where,  to  cite  a 
common example, people feel rushed into making a decision, can be seen as devaluing the resulting  
decision. As we shall see, the process involved in making decisions is absolutely integral to the idea  
of consensus.  
The use of consensus decision making has become widespread within large elements of the social  
justice,  peace,  and  environmental  movements  –  a  fact  which  has  provided  a  great  deal  of  
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encouragement and inspiration for many contemporary anarchists, because they see it as fitting with  
anarchist critiques of hierarchy and authority, and with a prefigurative approach to politics. Long-
term autonomous spaces, such as lengthy protest camps and social centres, intentional communities,  
and on-going networks such as Indymedia, are all part of this new discourse of political activism.  
But it is overwhelmingly the use of consensus in briefer gatherings – the  temporary autonomous  
zones we have already encountered  - that is the main focus for anarchists, and which is held up as  
being exemplary of anarchy in action. In the last few years in the UK alone, a significant number of  
high profile temporary autonomous zones, such as the Hori-Zone eco-village in Scotland, and the  
Camps  for  Climate  Action,  have  been  organised  and  run  by  consensus,  providing  what  many  
consider to be evidence of the feasibility of this deeply democratic process. Networks are usually  
set  up  specifically  to  organise  these  events,  and  their  regular  (normally  bi-monthly)  planning  
meetings are open to all and follow a strongly consensual approach to decision making. Within a  
larger network – which may consist of around a hundred people - smaller working groups will often  
be set up to focus on particular aspects of organisation, and these groups may operate with varying  
degrees  of  autonomy;  but  important  decisions  – including decisions  about  which  decisions  are  
important – will be made in plenary sessions where everyone involved in the network (at least,  
everyone present at that particular meeting) has a chance not only to speak, but also potentially to  
block any decision they are unhappy with. 
When the planning is finally over and these autonomous zones materialise, again, everyone within  
that space is able to speak and partake in decision making. Systems of spokescouncils are set up to 
help facilitate the day-to-day running of  the space (Dupuis-Déri  2010,  52;  and see Fig.1).  The  
gathering will most likely be split up into neighbourhoods (or barrios as they are often called) with 
people  freely  choosing  which  neighbourhood  to  join.  Morning  meetings  are  held  in  each  
neighbourhood, and a number of spokes people – usually two, and ideally never the same people  
twice – are chosen to go to a following meeting – that of the the spokes council - made up of each 
neighbourhood’s spokespeople. 50 The spokespeople, or simply spokes, are usually not mandated to 
make  decisions,  but  are  simply  there  to  pass  information  back  and  forth  between  the  
neighbourhoods  and  the  spokescouncil.  When  decisions  are  needed,  the  spokespeople  will  
announce this at the next neighbourhood meeting, or, uncommonly, call an emergency meeting; a  
decision will then be made by consensus within the neighbourhood, and the spokespeople can then  
relay this decision back to the spokescouncil. If needed, the process goes back and forth until a  
50 It is of course no coincidence that this model resembles in some important ways that of the federalist principles of  
earlier anarchist discourses such as anarcho-syndicalism, as well as drawing on the structures of the anarchist tradition  
of ‘affinity groups’ (Dupuis-Déri 2010).
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decision is reached. Thus, everyone at the camp has the potential to influence all major and many  
minor  decisions,  either  by  positively  contributing  to  the  discussion,  or  by  actually  blocking  a  
decision. The process is made practically possible by the use of the spokespeople who are, in effect,  
true representatives, as opposed to appointed decision makers who decide for themselves how those  
who voted for them would want to be represented.  Again,  spokespeople can  only consent  to a 
decision in the wider network meeting if everyone in their own neighbourhood has also previously  
consented: a consensual decision made by the spokes, therefore, is in effect a decision consented to  
by everyone. 
Consensus is also used in other spaces such as social centres, where a smaller affinity group may  
make decisions as to how the centre is run. People may use the centre and not get involved in the  
running of it, and may not therefore be involved in the decision making process, but if people are  
actively involved, then they will automatically gain the right to be involved in decision making.  
Large  networks,  such as  Indymedia,  and smaller  collectives  such as  Trapese,  Rising Tide,  and  
Bicycology, as well as many housing and worker’s co-ops also work with consensus, and whilst  
every group or network may adapt the procedural elements to suit their particular situation, they all  
apply the same basic principles.
Inspirational, but how Viable?
Inspired, encouraged and excited by this proliferation of consensus in practice, activists have not  
hesitated in making claims about its effectiveness as a decision making process; they have also been  
quick to make claims about its applicability in much wider contexts (Dupuis-Déri 2010). Seeds for  
Change  - a small  but influential  collective which has been promoting and teaching the use of  
consensus within the movement for many years – claims that consensus is a viable form of politics  
that can be used,  not only in small  groups,  but ‘even whole nations and territories’ (Seeds for  
Change 2007a, 5351). Presenting a case study of the G8 Hori-zone eco-village/protest camp, one  
article implies that the temporary autonomous zone to which the study refers provides a good model  
of how an anarchist society might actually work:
51 Seeds for Change is a workers’ co-operative that has been involved in the movement for many years now, helping  
activists learn the necessary skills to use consensus decision making; the texts I reference in this chapter are written  
for activists, as educational tools, and are not intended to be academically rigourous. Consequently, I feel a certain  
discomfort in subjecting them to what amounts to a highly critical analysis. However, the claims made by Seeds for  
Change are exemplary of a wider discourse, and these claims are ones which, as I hope to show in this chapter, are  
in need of serious critical  engagement. My hope, then, is  that my criticisms are taken as a genuine attempt to  
encourage a constructive dialogue, and not as the arrogant and disinterested dismissals of an arm-chair theorist.
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The ecovillage offered a unique chance to experiment with consensus decision making on a large scale.  
This was particularly exciting as one of the criticisms always levelled at consensus is that it might work  
for 20 people but that it would be impossible to organise whole communities or even countries on this  
basis (59).
In  other  words,  the camp was argued to  negate claims that  consensus  can only work in  small  
groups, and, conversely, demonstrated the possibility of consensus being used in much much larger  
scenarios.  Not  surprisingly,  consensus  is  seen  as  a  fundamental  element  of  the  contemporary  
anarchist  movement;  and  it  is  not  simply  politically  inspiring,  but  also  personally  rewarding.  
Indeed, I concur wholeheartedly with David Graeber when he says that it ‘is difficult to find anyone 
who has fully participated in [consensus decision-making] whose sense of human possibilities has  
not  been  profoundly  transformed  as  a  result’ (Graeber  2002,  15).  The  feeling  of  collectively  
organising  a  gathering  of  hundreds,  maybe  thousands  of  people,  of  coming  to  often  difficult  
decisions  after  listening  to  the  deeply  felt  concerns  and  arguments  of  dozens  of  friends  and  
strangers, the sense of getting things done without a boss or a leader, all add to a profound sense of  
empowerment and possibility.  
Nonetheless, I find myself disagreeing with Graeber, and many in the movement, when he draws  
the  following  conclusion:  ‘It’s  one  thing  to  say,  ‘Another  world  is  possible’.  It’s  another  to  
experience it, however momentarily’ (ibid.). T he common sense view within the movement then is  
that  the  use  of  consensus  amongst  activists  offers  not  only  a  workable  model  for  a  genuinely  
democratic politics, but also provides evidence of its success; it is anarchy in action. But have we 
really experienced this  other world?  Have these experiments in consensus been simply smaller  
examples  of  what  a  truly  decentralised,  horizontal  society  could  look  like?  Have  we  in  fact  
witnessed anarchy in action? Many seem to think so; but whilst I share much of the excitement and  
enthusiasm,  I  would  argue  there  are  a  number  of  serious  problems  that  face  this  radically  
democratic process. 
My primary task in the rest of this chapter is to shed some light on these problems and to encourage  
some  much  needed  reflection,  especially  in  light  of  the  arguments  presented  in  the  previous  
chapters. These are not, however, simply problems about consensus: as I hope to demonstrate, the  
lessons we might take from the following discussion have very real implications for the libertarian  
dreams of anarchism more generally.
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Consensus: A Dissenting Voice
What then are the problems with consensus? In the following section, I want to focus on three of  
the more serious concerns; firstly, I discuss the right of any individual to block a decision, which  
has the potential to lead to a tyranny of a minority. Then, drawing on the discussions of previous  
chapters, I will suggest that the likelihood of agreement – of large and diverse communities actually  
reaching consensus – is limited; and, finally, that the practical ramifications of the failure to reach  
consensus are insufficiently understood. Throughout the discussions of these three more serious  
problems, I will also highlight a number of more minor concerns. Let us turn, now, to the concept of  
the block, to see what this means for the anarchist’s hope for a libertarian society.
a) A Tyranny of One
 
We saw above that any individual involved in a decision making process is able to block a decision.
Although this is understandably seen as constituting the right to veto, some activists in fact argue  
that it  should not viewed in this way, (Gordon, n.d.) and it is first  important to understand the  
reasoning behind this. If an individual, or a number of individuals, do block a decision, attempts  
will be made to accommodate their concerns; the idea is, however, that if the decision is likely to be  
blocked, more work needs to be done amending the proposal before it is presented to the group for  
agreement.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  process of  refining  and altering  proposals,  of  listening  to  
everyone’s  concerns  carefully  and  genuinely,  that  makes  consensus  work;  and,  as  I  suggested  
earlier, it is this process that many see as being the most important element of consensus. The block  
is there, at least in one sense, not as a veto, but as a tool to ensure the need for a veto never arises.
In other words, it is felt that this process can only exist – or rather, is safeguarded by – the need to  
ultimately  arrive  at  consensus.  More  conventional  democratic  debate  which  may  theoretically  
incorporate  similar  normative  ideals,  such  as  giving  everyone  a  voice,  attempting  to  address  
everyone’s  concerns,  and so on,  can easily  turn into little  more than a  façade,  when everyone  
involved knows that the final decision in any particular process will fall on a limited number of  
individuals, who may or may not take their responsibility to adhere to these ideals seriously; if we 
have the power to decide, or even if we know we’re going to win the vote, why bother trying to  
resolve  the  concerns  of  a  minority?  The knowledge that  everyone has  the capacity  to  block a  
decision, therefore, helps ensure that debates and decision-making processes are undertaken with a  
genuine – and deeply felt - commitment to values of equality, horizontality, and mutual respect. In  
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other  words,  they  are  safeguarded  from becoming  a  tokenistic  gesture,  as  many  would  argue  
standard election processes are today (Plumwood 1995, 101). 
I agree that there is much to be said in favour of the processes and tools developed by activists, and  
such  techniques  must  surely  be  considered  a  useful  element  of  any  democratic  politics  that  
anarchists might hope to build. The skills and knowledge developed through the use of consensus  
are helping transform not only the nature of decision making, but also fundamentally challenges the  
way in which politics is understood; in consensus, political decisions are not simply consented to by 
the people, but are created by the people. However, the process used by practitioners of consensus 
can be disentangled from the need to in fact reach consensus; indeed, I would argue it needs to be, 
because whilst the right to block decisions may well help this process in some respects, the price  
paid for such insurance may often be too high. Whatever the block brings to the process of decision  
making,  it  also  clearly  does  in  fact  provide  the  capacity  to  veto,  as  some  in  the  movement  
acknowledge (Graeber 2002, 71). Clearly, the ability for one individual, or a small minority, 52 to 
block a decision can lead to a situation where some members of a community are forced to accept  
the opinions of others – precisely the situation consensus is intended to ensure does not happen. As  
well as being inherently unjust, this process has the clear potential to tend towards a stagnating  
conservatism, where any new ideas about how a community might function will need the agreement  
of everyone in order to be implemented. In particular, new members of a community, and indeed  
children, as they become more active in decision making, may potentially be disenfranchised, as  
previously agreed to decisions will need a whole new consensus to over-rule them; whilst such  
consensus  is  always  possible,  it  is  equally  true  that  absolute  agreement  may  not  be  reached,  
meaning that decisions made a generation ago will remain in force, even if the majority of the  
community has changed their opinions on the matter. So, in effect, consensus has the potential to  
add political weight to cultural traditions, which may over time make for some decidedly illiberal 
communities. The possibility of blocking decisions also creates scope for unsavoury bargaining and  
the formation of alliances, with, for example, people agreeing not to block a decision in return for  
some form of reward. We might also ask at what stage consensus is deemed to be workable within  
52 Of course, in theory, a majority can also block a decision. However, the way consensus works, it  is extremely  
unlikely that a proposal will ever reach the stage where people are asked to support or oppose it, if a majority  
appears likely to block the decision. This is seen as being one of the many positive elements of consensus, but it is  
worth  considering  briefly  the  cultural  and  political  impact  that  blocking  might  have  on  minority  groups,  and,  
conversely, the fact that majorities may never appear to be blocking decisions; the potential for a majority to exploit  
their apparent libertarian credentials, by demonstrating that they have never opposed a decision, or for a minority to  
appear to be overly confrontational or divisive, should be of real concern. When we think back to the arguments of  
Iris Marion Young, who argued that the views of the privileged were often presented as normal, helping defend them  
against the supposedly selfish claims of minority groups, we can see how even consensus may lead to establishing  
imbalances of power over time. 
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the wider world; even if communities could be expected to eventually agree on all decisions, how 
long would it be before people who are perfectly happy with the status quo would stop blocking  
each  and  every  decision  that  would  otherwise  chip  away  at  their  favoured  forms  of  social  
organisation?  I have yet to see this question discussed within the movement, but presumably we  
must assume that consensus would only be implemented after the ruling classes had been ‘forcibly 
suppressed and coerced into the anarchist society’ (Schmidt & van der Walt 2009, 203). 
There are two other key reasons why the block continues to be seen as relatively unproblematic,  
which relate to the two remaining concerns I wish to discuss in relation to consensus; firstly, the  
assumption that people will in fact be able to reach consensus, that, in other words, they will be able  
to agree on what constitutes the common good; and secondly, the failure to fully understand the  
ramifications when such agreement is not reached. I discuss these issues in turn.
b) Consensus and the Common Good
Anarchists claim that these recent experiments in consensus offer insights into how more libertarian  
forms of decision making may work, not only in small groups, but amongst ‘potentially tens or  
hundreds of thousands of people’ (Seeds for Change 2007b, 5, my emphasis). As such, they point to 
‘what functioning direct democracy could actually look like’ (Graeber 2002, 70). In other words,  
consensus really is a viable model for organising large, modern societies. However, activists also  
acknowledge that ‘a necessary condition of consensus’ is that ‘we’re all on the same side’ and have  
‘overall shared aims’ (Seeds for Change, n.d, 7). Consensus, in other words, will  only work in  
groups that share ‘fundamental principles’ (Graeber 2002, 71). Indeed, activists have developed the  
idea of  principled blocks, which relate to the founding principles of a group. For example: If a  
group is set up to stop a pipe-line being built, then some one in the group could make a principled  
block against the group’s plans to support another pipe-line ten miles down the road, arguing that  
the group’s core principles are opposed to pipe-lines per se. But a vegan could not raise a principled  
block against the group supporting a local dairy farm, because veganism is not part of the group’s  
core  principles.  Groups  using  consensus,  then,  must  have  a  shared  understanding  about  their  
principles and values; this not only helps the group reach consensus, but can in effect justify the  
group rejecting a block because it is unprincipled. 
Conversely,  groups with plural  values,  or  unclear  aims,  will  be less  likely to  reach consensus.  
Indeed, when ‘people are not united by a common aim they will  struggle to come to the deep  
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understanding and respect necessary for consensus’ (Seeds for Change 2007b, 4). But what, exactly,  
is meant by ‘deep understanding’? If deep understanding and respect are necessary for consensus,  
what happens when they are absent, and consensus cannot be reached? How does this fit with those  
earlier claims, made by the same collective, that consensus is possible within entire nations? Surely  
there are many groups that will not be able to respect or understand one another? Isn’t this precisely  
why many people regard the state and other institutions of authority, not with a rosy optimism, but  
as necessary evils? And how does this relate to the anarchist support for diversity? Doesn’t the need  
for people to be ‘united by a common aim’ suggest very real limits to this diversity?  
Does  this  support  for  consensus  therefore  suggest  a  failure  to  acknowledge –  or  realise  –  the  
potential for serious moral disagreements, as I suggested is often the case in Chapter Three? Are  
these new anarchists still committed to an Enlightenment inspired philosophy which sees morality  
as  somehow naturally  grounded,  or  which  believes  in  the  capacity  for  moral  reasoning  to  be  
conducted on entirely rational grounds? Postanarchists such as Saul Newman and Todd May would  
certainly argue  that  this  was  the case  for  classical  theorists,  but  what  of  their  contemporaries?  
Anarchism has undergone many changes in the last hundred years, but the failure of contemporary  
anarchists to fully comprehend the potential for moral disagreements raises questions about how  
profound such changes have been. Unfortunately, as I argued in Chapter One, and in the previous  
section, the emphasis on practice all too often sidelines overt discussions about such matters, and it  
is far from clear exactly what reasoning is taking place in such contexts; perhaps, as I suggested,  
there  is  no  underlying  philosophical  assumptions  at  all,  and  such  problems  are  simply  being  
overlooked. Whatever the case, it seems clear that some reasonable agreement on what constitutes a  
common good, or some shared sense of values, is seen to be necessary for consensus to work; as  
such,  the  arguments  I  presented  in  Chapter  Three  must  considerably  weaken  the  view  that  
consensus  is  in  fact  a  viable  form of  decision  making  in  large,  permanent,  and  unintentional  
communities. 
In other words,  rather than offering a considered response to the critiques I  have so far made,  
consensus appears to be supported despite them. And just as the anarchist approach to ethics failed  
to understand the extent to which power would continue to operate in an anarchist society, so too  
with consensus we see a similar failure to understand the consequences of a community unable to  
come to consensus, or how power will play out in communities that have internal disagreements  
about what constitutes the good life. I turn now to discuss this further problem.
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c) Standing Aside; The Unavoidable Consequences of Decisions.
We saw at  the  end  of  Chapter  Two that  within  anarchist  theory,  freedom,  even when  viewed  
positively, is usually understood as an absence of institutional authority; that of the state, the church,  
the police force. When disagreements arise within a community, it is the state which imposes order;  
anarchism, however, denies both the moral legitimacy and the practical need for such an imposition;  
consensus decision making is in many ways the logical outcome of this.  But I have argued that 
communities are unlikely to be able to reach consensus on every matter. One response to this is the  
use of the block, but I have also argued this too is unsatisfactory from an anarchist perspective,  
because it has the potential to simply shift authority from the majority to a minority. However,  
another option offered by practitioners of consensus is that of the stand-aside. The stand-aside is a 
commonly  used  and  necessary  element  of  the  consensus  process .  According  to  the  Seeds  for 
Change  collective,  ‘standing  aside  =  not  being  involved  in  implementing  a  decision  or  its  
consequences’ (Seeds for Change 2007a, 9, my emphasis). 
These anarchists recognise that if a decision is not agreed by everyone, then there may well be some  
degree of coercion needed to enforce it -  unless people block it,  or stand aside. Although I have 
suggested that the block has not received the critical attention it deserves, on rare occasions it is  
nonetheless  recognised  that  blocking  a  decision  is  problematic.  The  stand-aside,  however,  is  
intended to resolve this problem, because it allows a decision to go ahead whilst allowing those  
unhappy with it to be free from the decision’s consequences; rather than resulting in a tyranny of a  
minority, then, the minority can simply stand-aside from majority decisions it disagrees with. This  
of course is the hope of the wider anarchist movement, whichever form of decision making is used.  
As Harold Barclay puts it:
 
The fundamental difference between anarchist and democratic doctrine [...] is that the minority in the  
anarchist situation is not compelled by threat of police action to accept the majority decision. In anarchist  
theory, even if a decision were reached by a majority vote, it cannot be forced on the minority (Barclay  
1997, 155).  
Robert Graham argues in the same vein that within anarchist theory, ‘[w]hat the majority cannot do  
is force the minority to obey its decisions’ (Graham 2004, 22). Yet as we saw in the last chapter,  
even  if  we  live  without  government,  without  the  police,  without  institutionalised  hierarchical  
authority, we still have to make decisions that will limit or deny entirely the freedom of others to  
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pursue  particular  goals  or  values;  these  may  be  small,  trivial  issues,  but  they  may  well  be  
fundamental to someone’s idea of the good life. Graham, and other anarchists, might believe the  
majority should not force a minority to obey its decision, but would anarchism ensure that it could 
not – even if it didn’t want to? In other words, can people really stand-aside, in the sense that they  
can avoid the consequences of certain decisions?
Anarchists  defending  consensus  appear  to  at  one  and the  same time understand and miss  this  
problem. David Graeber suggests that ‘any society not based on violence ultimately needs to be  
based  on  consensus’ (Graeber  2004,  34).  If  communities  cannot  reach  consensus,  forms  of  
coercion53 will somehow be imposed, even without a state; in other words, coercion, of one sort or  
another, is the inevitable consequence of unresolved disagreements . Surely then we are back to the 
absolute need for all members of a community to agree with every decision that affects them –  
something I have suggested in Chapter Three is extremely unlikely in large, plural societies. 
Once again, it is useful to briefly consider the liberal response to these questions; doing so, we see  
further parallels between liberal and anarchist thought. As w e saw in Chapter Three, the liberal 
philosopher John Rawls argued that  a ‘public and workable agreement on a single general and  
comprehensive conception [of the good life] could only be maintained by the oppressive use of state  
power’ (Rawls 2001, 425). In recognising the fact of pluralism, and the unhappy consequences of  
any attempt to unify divergent interests, Rawls therefore sought to limit the actions of the state:
Since  there  is  no  reasonable  religious,  philosophical  or  moral  doctrine  affirmed  by  all  citizens,  the  
conception of justice affirmed in a well-ordered democratic society must be a conception limited to what I  
shall call ‘the domain of the political’ and its values (Rawls 2000, 220).
In other words, because agreement cannot always be reached, we must limit the extent to which  
political decisions extend into people’s daily lives. For Rawls, the state deals only with the political  
sphere, maintaining a broadly neutral social order in which individuals can pursue their own ‘good  
life’,  without  any,  or  any  undue,  interference  from the  state.  However,  Rawls’ domain  of  the  
political suffers in much the same way as the concept of neutrality; how, precisely, are we to define  
a ‘domain of the political’ which is somehow separated from people’s personal lives? For a number  
53 Graeber does not indicate precisely what he means by violence, but it must be assumed that he is referring to what  
might also be termed  coercion;  if people cannot come to consensus, then  some people will be forced to do, or  
prevented from doing, certain things . Because Graeber sees coercion as potentially avoidable, he therefore sees any  
incidents of it as being illegitimate, and therefore equates them with violence. However, I see some coercion as  
inevitable,  so  I  prefer  to  avoid  using  the  term  violence,  which  suggests  a  degree  of  illegitimacy  that,  given  
coercion’s inevitability, seems ill-placed. 
136
of fairly obvious reasons, anarchists have not employed the same imagery and language as Rawls,  
but I want to argue that in fact, a very similar logic is being used to define and defend consensus,  
and, in particular, the concept of standing aside.  Activists tend to talk about  action,  rather than 
politics: as Graeber puts it, ‘[d]ebate always focuses on particular courses of action; it’s taken for  
granted that no one will ever convert anyone entirely to their point of view. The motto might be, ‘If  
you’re  willing  to  act  like  an  anarchist  now,  your  long-term  vision  is  pretty  much  your  own  
business’’ (Graeber  2002,  72),  and  elsewhere  he  writes  that  the  ‘assumption  behind  all  good  
consensus process is that one should not even try to convert others to one’s overall point of view;  
the point of consensus process is to allow a group to decide on a common course of action’ (Graeber  
2004, 84-85). Like Rawls, then, anarchists appear to be suggesting that we can somehow separate  
the effects of certain decisions, into the ‘realm of the political’, or to specific actions; those opposed  
to such decisions need simply to avoid those actions, to stand-aside. Again, these ideas are echoed  
within wider anarchist thought. As Nicholas Walter argues
anarchists disagree little about private life, and there is not much of a problem here […] All 
that is needed for the liberation of the individual is the emancipation from old prejudices and 
the achievement of a certain standard of living. The real problem is the liberation of society 
(Walter 1979, 55).
What we have here seems to be more or less the Rawlsian view of an overlapping consensus simply  
articulated in different terms; instead of the political domain, activists talk about action, but the idea  
is essentially the same: find points of agreement, and work with those, and leave the rest to some  
private realm: people’s long-term visions are pretty much their own business, as Graeber put it. 
But while we see here some acknowledgment of the  potential power of a majority to force its 
decisions on a minority, even without the state, there is clearly a failure to properly consider the fact  
that this potential is very often realised regardless of the will of the majority: the stand aside, or the  
division between the public and private, fail to fully understand the distributed effects of this power. 
In other words, the stand-aside ignores the reality that, unless the minority leaves the community  
entirely,  that  minority  will,  with  regards  to  many  decisions,  be  seriously  impacted  by  those  
decisions. A society that allows hard drug use does not force me to consume those drugs, but if I  
remain in that society, I have to live with the consequences of that policy. Put another way: how  
would I  stand-aside  from such a policy? Simply not taking drugs is surely no use, as it  would 
clearly not help me address my concerns about serious drug use in my community. 
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As with the block, the possibility of standing aside is hugely problematic, but there is no real sense  
within the movement that this is the case, and it continues to be promoted as a workable response to  
the majority of conflicts. However, at times anarchists recognise that conflicts will be so great that  
other  options  must  be  considered;  namely,  the  splitting  of  a  group,  or  the  leaving  of  certain  
individuals within it. Whilst this may appear to negate my previous claims, I would suggest that  
even though this does suggest some acknowledgement of the potential for unresolvable conflict, the  
emphasis is overwhelmingly placed on the appropriateness of the stand aside in most instances. My  
claim,  then,  is  not  that  anarchists  have  entirely  failed to  see  that  standing  aside  is  not  always  
feasible,  but  that  they  have  failed  to  understand just  how vulnerable  the  stand  aside  is  to  the  
problems just discussed. Furthermore, the proposed solution, which I now turn to, is perhaps more  
problematic still.
 
Agreeing to Disagree...at a Reasonable Distance
Although I have argued that there is a general silence with regards to the difficulties of consensus,  
occasionally anarchists are forced to recognise that there will be times when consensus cannot be  
reached; unfortunately, however, the standard response to this possibility is hugely problematic. In  
fact, I would suggest that it simply fails outright to address these concerns.
When such dilemmas arise, many anarchists argue, the response is not to resolve them with, for  
example, another decision making process,54 or an appeal to other values, but rather that one or 
more,  or  possibly all,  parties involved simply go their  separate  ways (Seeds  for Change 2007;  
Gordon 2008,  69;  Maeckelbergh 2009, 226; Graeber  2009,  316).  In  a  typical  statement,  David  
Graeber suggests that even when a decision is being made which has a ‘bearing on the structure of  
the  group,  there’s  no  one  forcing  [anyone]  to  stay’ (ibid.).  Or,  as  Ed  Stamm  notes,  ‘[e]ach  
community can debate the issue of ‘actual harm’ for itself, and people can relocate according to their  
preference’ (Stamn 1995, n.p, my emphasis). Marianne Maeckelbergh expands on such arguments,  
and argues that the possibility of individuals leaving communities, and even entire communities  
separating, must be considered a necessary element of an anarchist politics: 
Above all, a decentralised democratic system needs to have a constituency that is not fixed but fluid.  
Individuals and groups [...] must have the option to sever links, to leave a group and to ‘stand aside’, so that  
one does not get held to a decision when one does not agree with it; otherwise consensus becomes much more  
54 Some people do suggest moving to some form of voting, but with a much higher standard than a simple majority. A  
figure of eighty or ninety percent agreement has at times been mentioned, which simply leads to the questions: what  
if that can't be reached? And how are these decisions to be enforced?
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difficult to reach, and outcomes become potentially ‘oppressive’.  For this fluidity of constituency to be  
possible, what constitutes ‘the people’ cannot be determined by geography. It would have to be determined by  
topic or issue and continuously reconstituted decision-by-decision. As challenging as this may sound, it is not  
impossible ( Maeckelbergh 2009, 226)
These are common responses to difficulties arising within activist groups, and although this often 
results  in  situations  that  are  less  than ideal,  it  does  indeed provide a  practical  response to  the  
breakdown of the consensus process in these limited situations; the problem comes when such  
groups, and the problems they encounter and the tactics and theories they develop to resolve those  
problems, are held up as examples of how an anarchist society may function. The Seeds for Change 
collective again:
One example is the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, where in those situations where consensus could not be  
achieved, people were free to move and set up their own community with the support – not the enmity –  
of the town they were leaving (Seeds for Change 2007b, 4)
The notion that, when a dispute arises between two or more factions, resolution can be found by  
such groupings reducing their proximity to each other may seem to some to be a remarkably naïve  
response.  It  is.  Cultures,  and  the  sociability  we  witness  wherever  we  witness  human  life,  are  
malleable and capable of ruptures, but only to a point. Cultures cannot simply pack up and leave.  
Neither can a shared history. Neither can knowledge grounded in a direct relationship with the land,  
its  topography  and  weather,  its  flora  and  fauna.  In  other  words,  and  contrary  to  Marianne  
Maeckelbergh’s hopes, what constitutes a community very often will be determined by geography.  
Whilst nomadic movement might have been a feature of early humankind, it has not been so for the  
majority of humanity for a very long time. Contemporary mobility, much lauded within western  
ideologies – capitalism in particular -  is still the preserve of a minority; at least, the enjoyable and  
rewarding form of it. Forced relocation, as a response to extreme conditions such as war or draught,  
are themselves the cause of considerable suffering. Less dramatically, but perhaps no less painfully,  
forced movement for reasons of seeking employment, to cite just one example, creates all sorts of  
personal and social problems. As Michael Walzer notes in a discussion concerning the negative  
effects of increased social mobility, ‘[m]oving may be a personal adventure in our standard cultural  
mythologies, but it is as often a family trauma in real life’ (Walzer 1995, 60).  Even if a group was  
willing to leave, it is far from clear that they would have somewhere else to go. At one time, it may  
have been easy enough for some members of a community to drift a few miles away, clear some  
trees, and build a new village or town. But nowadays land is scarce, and there would appear to be  
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little scope for communities to literally start afresh. The other option is for people to move to other  
existing communities; but what is to say they will be welcomed, that they will be able to cope with  
a sudden influx of new people, or that those leaving would want to begin a new life in an entirely  
new community? Even if we assume a group would be willing to move on and leave their houses  
and history behind, it is far from clear that there would always be somewhere suitable for them to  
go.
Which brings us to another problem; which group should leave? One writer notes: ‘If no resolution  
is  possible,  the  dissenting  individuals  can  form  another  grouping  or  leave  without  fear  of  
persecution by the rest of the group’ (Stamm, 1995). But given the problems outlined above, it  
seems reasonable to assume that there would be resistance to moving, and therefore that no parties  
involved in the dispute would be happy to volunteer to be the ones to move on. We can also go on  
to consider that there are already clearly tensions within the community, such that separation is  
considered the only solution; it seems unlikely that such a fragmented community would be able to  
agree on which party ought to be the one to leave. Stamm’s suggestion, that it is the ‘dissenters’  
who leave, not only relies on there being a clear understanding within the whole community of who 
the dissenters are, which seems morally and practically unreasonable, but also appears to punish  
them for their dissent; hardly an appropriate anarchist response. Yet apparently a rather common  
one. Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt note unproblematically that
[g]iven  that  the  anarchist  society  would  be  a  voluntary  association,  membership  assumed  a  basic  
commitment and values of that society. Those who disagreed with those values were under no obligation  
to remain within a society with which they were at odds (Schmidt and van der Walt 2009, 70).
More worrying, they go on to note that ‘equally, that society was under no obligation to maintain  
such persons’ (ibid.).  Such rhetoric sounds like that  of  the contemporary British state,  with its  
border controls and citizen tests, and hints at worse still. It does at least acknowledge the problem of  
maintaining a libertarian society when members of it hold differing values; but if the response is  
one that would not look out of place in the right wing press, this raises very serious concerns for the  
anarchist project.  
All  things being equal  then,  the idea that,  when disagreements or  conflicts  arise,  the proposed  
solution that one group simply moves away seems to be a far from satisfactory response. Indeed, as  
Sam Clark  notes,  it  was  circumscription,  when ‘people who would prefer  not  to  submit  to  an  
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incipient state are either unable to leave, or think the costs of doing so too high’ that played a  
necessary, though not sufficient, part in the evolution of early states (Clark 2007, 80; see also Taylor  
1982, 58). Not only does this provide some historical evidence, therefore, that people will in fact be  
unable to move on even when they would like to, it also suggests that an inability to do so can lead  
to the creation of a powerful, dominant group or ideology – and possibly from this some form of  
state  -  that  can  force its  norms  on  to  weaker  members  of  the  community,  who are  forced for  
whatever reason to remain. True, it may well be the case that moving on does occasionally offer a 
realistic solution in a number of situations, especially for small numbers of individuals, but that this  
will always, or even often, be the case seems extremely implausible.
The following responses,  it  might  be  argued,  are  question  begging,  in  that  they assume social  
conditions that may not exist in an anarchist society. Anarchism, so this argument may continue,  
will,  because of the problems I outline, necessitate radically new forms of living, including, but  
perhaps not limited to, a renewal of nomadic lifestyles by all communities. To this I would simply 
respond that if anarchism  is only viable by returning to nomadic lifestyles, we might reasonably  
question to what extent it can in all honesty be considered viable  - and indeed desirable - at all.
Duty, Responsibility, and Care
There is another problem with the response that conflicts can be resolved by groups separating  
themselves from one another. The concept of duty is, I accept, a problematic one; can people be said  
to have moral duties towards others, except when they are the result of certain actions, for example  
promises? I do not have space to pursue any in-depth discussions here; nonetheless, I think we can  
legitimately raise the basic concept of duty as a likely and valid source of objection to the idea of  
relocation; perhaps most effectively, we can utilise its negation, that is, the idea of abandonment.
One anonymous anarchist writer notes that ‘[s]ome communities will be dedicated to crime and  
drug use, and other communities will be intolerant of such choices and will defend against them’  
(anarchy.net). It is of course hard to imagine an entire community dedicated to crime; in fact, it is  
not  clear  how  we  would  conceptualise  crime within a  community  if  all  its  members  where 
committed to it. But we can leave these objections aside; the point that the author here is trying to  
make is that some communities will follow certain moral norms, and others will follow others, and  
that, aside from one community defending itself from another, interaction between the two need not  
occur. The obvious objection to this is that many disagreements that are likely to arise will involve a  
third party. If this dispute is of the sort: John doesn’t think Sarah should do x to herself, then we can 
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agree that Sarah will have a convincing case in saying simply that John ought to mind his own  
business.55 But if John doesn’t agree with Sarah doing x to someone else, then we immediately enter 
a very different situation and quickly encounter a number of complications: Does the third party  
consent?  Can he/she/they consent? Is their consent considered genuine, informed, even relevant?  
How  would  a  concerned  community  know  that  they  could  protect  the  third  party  any  more  
appropriately? How do we separate and  understand paternalism and guardianship, authority and  
care?
Many moral disagreements will involve the treatment of a third party, by which we can understand  
individuals,  groups,  non-human  animals  and  the  natural  environment,  and  even  man-made  
environments  and  objects.  A simple  example:  a  community  becomes divided  about  the  use  of  
children  for  hard  labour;  some parents  are  using  their  own children  to  perform hard,  possibly  
dangerous tasks.  The community is split  as to whether this is acceptable. A solution is offered  
whereby the town is divided into two new, autonomous communities; one for those opposed to such  
treatment, one for those in favour or without strong opinions. Leaving aside all the problems of  
physical relocation raised above, there remains a significant objection to this proposed solution; if  
the  disagreement  comes  in  the  first  place  on  behalf  of  a  third  party,  i.e.  the  children,  simply  
separating the community is not going to be a satisfactory response,  because the third party in  
question will continue to suffer from the wrong that is the source of the conflict to begin with (or at  
least those in the care of the parents who remain); so this is no resolution at all. At best, a situation  
would arise where two adjacent communities existed in a state of mutual antagonism, which is far  
from ideal.  More likely, there would be an attempt by those opposed to the children’s working  
conditions to force such behaviour to end, in order to defend the children in question; as we saw in  
Chapter Two, anarchists appear to be in favour of using coercion to stop exploitation, so why would  
this not be the case in this example? I think it is fair to assume that most anarchists would be of the  
opinion that to simply abandon an oppressed group in order to prevent conflict within a community  
is not a satisfactory response, and it seems that the issue of duty remains as a serious obstacle to the  
idea of resolution through relocation.
It is worth posing the question here, though I can do no more than that, as to whether anarchism can  
or should be seen as  embodying an ethics  of  extreme toleration,  in  which even those  acts  we  
strongly disagree with are allowed, because to attempt to stop them will inevitably lead to a greater  
55 This raises another question which should be of interest to anarchists, about paternalistic care, and the extent to  
which communities may want or need to coerce certain individuals in certain ways, due to mental health issues for  
example.
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harm. I am not convinced by this, and it raises a number of paradoxical questions, such as why  
anarchism would exist at all, at least as it defines itself against the state , hierarchy, and so on. Still, 
it does appear occasionally that in a partial – and thus highly problematic and often disingenuous  
way – the idea of ‘live and let live’ motivates some elements of anarchism.
For practical and dutiful reasons then, the response that, when consensus fails, groups can simply  
divide  themselves  up  into  new,  smaller  communities  is  simply  not  an  adequate  response.  The  
chances of diverse and permanent communities always reaching consensus must be doubted, and  
the proposed response to resolving problems when consensus is not reached must be considered  
either untenable, undesirable, and often both. But what about when consensus is reached – surely  
that ought to be something which we at least aim to reach? In fact, there are reasons for concern  
even when consensus decision making runs according to plan.
The Successes of Consensus?
 
Whatever criticisms I might lay at the door of consensus, it continues to be applauded by most of  
those involved in the contemporary anarchist movement, and anyone who has been involved in a  
group or space organised using consensus will understand why. In the setting in which consensus is  
used, it is at times an effective tool which, although sometimes difficult (and remarkably tedious),  
really does get results. As we saw earlier,  many inspiring examples can be found of consensus in  
action, and if and when it is experienced, it creates an undeniably strong feeling that this is how  
politics ought to work –  this is what democracy looks like . At times I believe these feeling are 
justified,  but  only at  times.  Anarchists  also need to ask whether there is simply the belief  that  
consensus has been achieved when in fact it has not, or whether, when it has been reached, it is  
done so in such a way that raises concerns about its ultimate value.  There are obvious ways that  
both these scenarios might occur, and, in fact, practitioners of consensus are usually keenly aware  
of them; the manipulation of individuals, the withholding of certain information, emotional cajoling  
or even blackmail, and so on. But there are other, less obvious ways in which the process can be  
corrupted.
For John Rawls, the consensus process was backed up by a set of basic liberties which could not be  
questioned; consensus, in other words, needed to be premised on a predefined set of values. This  
was  a  pragmatic  response,  intended  to  make  the  overarching  aim  of  consensus  viable.  Whilst  
anarchists might reject this idea when presented in such an explicit manner, preferring to believe  
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that no freedoms will be denied, and no coercion permitted, we have already seen how certain  
beliefs and actions are in fact readily denied,  and how anarchists accept that shared values are  
crucial for consensus to work. It seems reasonable to assume that many of the values held now by  
anarchists, such as a commitment to anti-fascism, would be carried into an anarchist community,  
thus becoming the guidelines for an anarchist set of basic liberties. Consensus would have to rest on  
an underlying moral framework which would not be open to challenge, at least not easily. This may  
be as much as any libertarian can hope for – communities would certainly seem to need  some 
degree of shared values, but the idea of consensus must therefore be understood to be to some  
degree  predetermined  and  limited,  and  the  consequences  of  this  ought  to  be  more  honestly  
acknowledged. As I suggested earlier, there appears to be an under-acknowledged tension between  
the  desire  to  have a  genuinely  open,  libertarian process,  and the  recognition  that  consensus  is  
limited by the need for agreement about certain values. This tension can theoretically be resolved  
without recourse to coercion, if it is assumed that all members of a community will freely choose  
sufficiently  compatible  moral  values,  and  it  would  seem  that  this  is  the  unspoken  hope  of  
practitioners of consensus. 
Furthermore, there is the important question (which I have space only to comment briefly on here,  
though  it  is  one  worth  pursuing  in  more  detail  elsewhere)  as  to  the  limits  of  the  discursive  
methodology employed by practitioners of consensus. The implicit assumption with the consensus  
model is that we are rational agents who can articulate our needs and desires in ways which will be  
understandable by other, similarly rational agents. This approach clearly echoes the work of J ürgen 
Habermas (1993) though not surprisingly his work appears to be little known within the activist  
community. Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy suggests that, in what he called an ‘ideal  
speech situation’ people would be able to reach agreement through rational debate; we might well  
say that the facilitation tools used by activists are an attempt to reach such an ideal speech situation.  
This position, however, has been critiqued by feminists and others (see, Mehhan, 1995; Devaux  
2000) for assuming, as John Rawls does, that there can be a neutral and public form reason which  
everyone is equally able and willing to employ when engaging in ethical and political discourse. As  
Monique Deveaux states:
The view that participants in dialogue are likely to be persuaded by the same public reason 
relies in part on a distorted view […] about the main source of political […] disagreement in  
plural societies (Devaux 2000, 152).
Rather, we must acknowledge that many disagreements stem from ‘group based differences in our  
ethical and cultural frameworks’ (ibid). Reason, in other words, is not a universal tool which anyone  
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can use, and even when it is used, it is used differently by people. Just as Rawls failed to see that his  
view of basic liberties was inherently skewed to relect his own values, so too with the notion of  
reason itself. Whilst the use of reason, and the potential to engage in rational debate, should not be  
dismissed  entirely,  we must  acknowledge that  there  are  clear  limitations  to  this  approach.  The  
power of  values (which may or may not  be articulated rationally),  of  tradition,  of emotion,  of  
personal and group psychologies, all these things come into play when people are discussing how  
their  lives  are  to  be  organised,  and  these  place  certain  limits  on  the  likelihood  of  achieving  
consensus through reasoned debate. 
Taking all these concerns into account, perhaps it is better to be more open from the out-set about  
the need to impose certain limits to consensus; and, indeed, for limits to freedom. 
Conclusions
For contemporary anarchists, consensus is increasingly seen as a fundamental part of anarchism; in  
fact, we might go further, and suggest that it is seen as the very expression of anarchism; consensus  
and anarchism are not simply linked, they are the same thing. As David Graeber notes:
A constant complaint about the globalisation movement in the progressive press is that, while tactically 
brilliant, it lacks any central theme or coherent ideology. […] It is not lacking in ideology. Those new  
forms of organisation are its ideology (Graeber 2002, 9).
Contemporary anarchists need to recognise the intrinsic limits of consensus,  and understand that 
anarchism is about more than a decision making process. However, I want to end this chapter with 
some more positive thoughts. Consensus can be an effective tool in certain situations; the workplace  
for example,  or perhaps in neighbourhood associations and other similar,  small-scale scenarios.  
Furthermore, the tools used by practitioners of consensus could play an important role in making  
other decision making processes as democratic as possible. Of course, the question as to how much  
consensus as result makes consensus as process so effective must remain an open one; if people  
know that at the end of a discussion, a vote will be taken, can that discussion ever be as genuinely  
focused on resolution as it would be if consensus was required? Whatever the answer – and indeed,  
there is likely to be no one answer for all situations – I believe that the tools of consensus can be  
disentangled from the view that absolute consensus is always possible. 
Proponents of consensus – and indeed all anarchists – must also begin to ask broader questions  
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about the organisation of social life – questions which, I have argued, do not arise in temporary  
autonomous  zones,  and  which  are  all  too  rarely  asked.  How  long  do  decisions  made  by  a  
community last? Are they open to constant review, to be re-negotiated whenever some one changes  
their  mind?  What  happens  if  some  one  arrives  from a  new community;  can  she  demand  old  
decisions  be opened up for debate? And what  about  children? At what age does their  consent  
become valued? They, after all, will have to live with some decisions longer than those who are  
making them. And we might also ask, given the increasingly connected world we live in, how we  
decide which decisions affect which people; burning coal in Glasgow could be argued to affect  
indigenous  communities  in  northern  Canada,  and  there  are  of  course  many  such  less  extreme  
examples that a community might be expected to ponder - so how exactly is such connectivity to be  
understood?  Perhaps some global spokescouncil  might be considered – the movement certainly  
prides itself on making consensus decisions about large protests that concern and involve tens of  
thousands  of  people  all  over  the  world;  but  again,  we  need  to  ask  more  practically  oriented  
questions about  day-to-day life  in  anarchist  communities.  At  the moment,  such discussions  are  
simply not being had.
If  consensus  is  not  always  possible,  then  the  anarchist  commitment  to  freedom  remains  as  
problematic as it appeared to be in previous chapters. Anarchists are left facing the problems of  
conflict, of values, of power, and they must, as Bookchin, Newman and May so clearly argue, begin  
to accept this, and to work towards a libertarian politics that can offer, not absolute freedom, but a  
much greater freedom, and a much deeper level of social, political and economic equality, than  
liberalism, or communism, have been able to provide. Although such a project is undoubtedly vast,  
and my central aim of this work has been to argue for the need to discuss such a politics, rather than  
define my own view of what it may look like, in the final chapter I want to offer my own tentative  
thoughts; reflecting on the problems I have so far outlined and accepting the limits of freedom, I  
believe a less perfect, but far more viable anarchist politics can be imagined.  
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Chapter Six 
Melting the Snow: 
How Anarchism Prefigures Anarchy
A goal which is infinitely remote is not a goal at all, it is a deception (Alexander Herzen, quoted in Ward  
2008, 164). 
IN the preceding chapters, I have presented a series of critiques of anarchism, and argued  
that anarchist conceptions of freedom, ethics, and power suffer from contradictions and a lack of  
clarity. The analysis has been highly critical, yet none of this is intended to encourage the reader to  
either continue in their dismissal of, or abandon, anarchism. In fact, my rather grandiose hope is  
that,  in challenging anarchism so thoroughly, I will not have killed it,  but made it stronger. Of  
course, what it is – that is, what sort of anarchism I hope to salvage – remains to be seen, and may  
not be to everyone’s taste. Addressing the concerns I have raised will certainly require tampering  
with a number of anarchist taboos, and may ultimately be seen as making too many compromises.  
The reader must judge for herself if my solutions are acceptable. However my tentative responses to  
these problems are received, what I hope is now less contentious is my claim that anarchism is  
currently ill-equipped as a political philosophy, suffering as it does from a number of significant  
problems. Such problems will need to be over-come, or at least considered with greater honesty, if  
anarchism is to receive significantly wider support than it currently does; and if it is to succeed (as  
and when it gets the chance) in its efforts to create a fairer world. I hope, in other words, to have at  
the very least demonstrated that something needs to be done.
Before beginning this final chapter, it is worth recapping the main arguments so far. In the first  
chapter,  I  suggested that  claims that  anarchism can and indeed does  exist  in  practice  must  be  
critically  scrutinised;  the  much  lauded  examples  of  anarchy  in  action,  I  suggested,  did  not  
correspond to the absolute ideals of anarchism. In Chapter Two, I argued that freedom will always  
need to be moderated in some way, partly because, as I showed in Chapter Three, people holding  
different ethical values will at times disagree about which freedoms should be promoted or denied.  
In Chapter Four, I suggested that even without the state, communities will continue to embody  
networks of power, which will endorse (and, indeed, enforce) certain values over others; anarchists  
cannot  walk  away  from  this  reality.  The  anarchist  support  for  absolute  freedom,  and  the  
concomitant rejection of all forms of domination, appears to be indefensible. In the previous chapter  
I  turned  to  the  idea  of  consensus-decision  making,  to  see  if  this  could  provide  a  satisfactory  
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response to the problems identified in the earlier sections of the thesis. In fact, I argued it could not.  
Anarchists must come to terms with the limitations that this critique suggests; power can and will  
be used to defend certain liberties over others, certain values over others, certain ways of life over  
others. In fact, anarchism should be understood, not as a negation of this reality, but as an attempt to  
respond to it in a certain way. 
Furthermore,  in  Chapter  One  I  suggested  that  at  the  heart  of  anarchist  thought  we  find  two  
independent understandings of what anarchism is: anarchism as a fully fledged societal system, and  
anarchism as a trend that can exist within other political arrangements. Although in many ways  
these understandings over-lap, they also offer a radically different perspective from one another –  
something which I believe has created problems for the furthering of anarchist ideas over the years.  
Because this distinction is rarely articulated or discussed explicitly, it is difficult to ascertain how  
anarchists  themselves  relate  to  this  tension,  but  my  belief  is  that  rather  than  offering  certain  
arguments that explain or resolve the issue, it is generally over-looked. Indeed, as my argument  
progressed, it often remained unclear as to what was meant, in any one case, by anarchism. Even 
when, in the previous chapter, our discussion turned to an exploration of contemporary anarchist  
activism, a form of politics that explicitly declares itself to be practising anarchism, the tensions that  
this created were never adequately acknowledged or discussed. Why should this be the case? Why  
does anarchism continue to be talked about in two different ways with so little awareness that this is  
happening, and what this might mean? 
In this final chapter, I want to outline a number of responses to the various challenges anarchism  
faces. With little space left, I can do no more than offer sketches, but this is perhaps the way it  
should be. I do not intend to trample on anarchist principles to such an extent that I believe a perfect  
blueprint can and should be constructed; but I do believe that anarchism would benefit from more  
detailed discussions about how life without the state might look. I believe that the time has come for  
anarchism to recognise that it needs to engage with the difficult questions of how it would organise  
society in the 21st century, and, more importantly, what it hopes to offer people, today. 
I start this chapter by arguing that anarchism should be understood first and foremost as a certain  
approach  to  all  areas  of  life  that  can  be  realised,  even  within  wider,  non-anarchist,  forms  of  
organisation. To begin such a process, I go on to suggest that anarchists need to reduce the emphasis  
on direct action, understood as blockades, occupations, temporary autonomous zones, and so on  
(which does  not  mean to  abandon such things entirely),  and to  increase efforts  to  create more  
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positive and permanent prefigurative experiments – alternative health and education projects, and  
housing  and  workers’ co-ops,  for  example.  In  addition  to  such  projects,  which  I  call  social  
prefiguration,  I  will  suggest  that  the  question  of  lifestyle  anarchism –  which  I  call  personal  
prefiguration – is also key, and has too often been over-looked, misunderstood, or rejected. Finally,  
I  suggest  that  these  acts  of  prefiguration  can  help  break  the  resistance  to  exploring  more  
hypothetical  questions  about  the  functioning of  libertarian communities.  The rejection of  blue-
prints, in other words, must be challenged, and anarchists must begin to explore tentative proposals  
for libertarian life.
These arguments represent my own responses to the challenges anarchism faces, as discussed in the  
previous chapters. However, I have argued that anarchism faces numerous problems, and although 
some may be  considered  as  being  interdependent,  it  would  be  far  too  simplistic  to  claim that  
everything I have argued so far is reducible to one core problem; even if this were the case, I would  
argue against attempts to pin down the one, true, logical response to it. It is not my contention then  
that what follows in this chapter is logically dictated by the problems I have presented, and, clearly,  
not every position I defend here purports to solve every issue previously raised. Rather, this chapter  
offers a more holistic response to a complex set of problems, and makes no claims to be either  
entirely sufficient, or absolute. My hope is that it is, simply, helpful. I begin by returning to the  
question of how anarchism is to be understood; as a certain approach to life, or as an ideology  
capable of organising society in its entirety.
The Ontology of Anarchism – Here, Now, and Beyond
To start with, I believe one of the most fundamental issues in need of greater clarification is the  
question of what anarchism is,  or  can hope to  be,  not  in  relation to which values or tactics  it  
promotes, but with respect to the problem I posed in Chapter One, where I suggested that there are  
two  different  ways  of  understanding  the  basic  ontology  of  anarchism;  anarchism  as  a  certain  
approach – to life, politics, and so on; and anarchism as a way of organising an entire society. The  
problem with this is not that there are two differing ways of thinking about anarchism, per se; in  
fact, I would suggest this is a positive thing, opening up as it does scope for contextualised and  
plural  responses  to  the  same set  of  questions.  The  problem,  rather,  is  the  apparent  failure  of  
anarchists to fully accept the difference between the two approaches, and to therefore acknowledge  
the  ramifications.  In  particular,  there  is  a  very  real  problem in  continuing  to  see  examples  of  
anarchy in action as being simply small-scale and temporary articulations of what we might expect  
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from a genuinely anarchistic society, with little or no acknowledgement of the wider context within  
which these anarchic bubbles occur. I discussed this in Chapter One, and the arguments presented in  
the chapters that followed make this point more valid still. To think of this another way, we can  
begin to see that there is in fact no truly  autonomous zone, temporary or otherwise; anarchy in  
action exists  in a complex and multi-faceted relationship with liberalism and capitalism (not to  
mention religious and other discourses). 
Anarchism must come to terms with its interdependence with a world that is often at odds with its  
own strict ethical principles – at least for the time being. Now, there are at least two possible ways  
of interpreting this. Either anarchy in action is robbed of its apparent successes, coming to be seen  
as  little  more  than  a  politically  unimportant  game  played  by  a  few  thousand  anarchists  who  
convince themselves that they are changing the world when in fact they are, at best, hiding from it –  
a position put forward, in his later works at least, by Murray Bookchin (1997). Or, it can be seen as  
blurring  the  boundaries  between  anarchism  and  liberal  democracy 56,  creating  space  both  for 
anarchist theory to grow, and for liberal democratic theory to be pulled in an increasingly libertarian  
direction. In other words, we can either see anarchism as being unavoidably contaminated by liberal  
democracy, or liberal democracy as increasingly contaminated by anarchism (Plumwood 1995, 102-
3). I believe anarchists ought to embrace the latter option 57; crucially, anarchists must stop seeing  
this interaction as a compromise that sullies the good name of anarchism, and begin to see it as an  
opportunity . As Colin Ward put it, the ‘choice between libertarian and authoritarian solutions is not  
a once-and-for-all cataclysmic struggle, it is a series of running engagements’ (Ward 2008, 164).  
However, in the idea of the temporary autonomous zone, anarchy in action has too often resulted,  
not in running  engagements, but in running  away  from situations which are deemed contrary to  
anarchism’s basic principles; the fear of corruption, of working with ‘unpure means’,  has resulted in 
56 By this I do not mean that the distinction discussed above, between anarchism as a certain approach to life and  
anarchism as a way of organising an entire society is broken down, at least not in a significant way. In  
experimenting with prefiguration, anarchists claim to be experiencing another world, a claim I have already  
dismissed in Chapter One. Rather, I believe that they are slowly creating another world, but one which continues to  
exist within the old world. I believe the philosophical and practical consequences of this must be more openly and  
clearly acknowledged, and to do so we must accept the distinction, although not always perfectly black and white,  
between prefigurative experiments performed within state-capitalism, and a society entirely organised along  
anarchist principles. 
57 As I explain in this chapter, there are numerous ways in which we might consider anarchist ideas are able to  
contaminate liberal democracy, by expanding libertarian practices (and thus reducing the need for statist institutions)  
and by a discursive exchange, whereby, for example, some of the more realistic ideas behind consensus are  
encouraged within more hierarchical institutions (local councils, for example). This vision clearly runs the risk of  
being, or being percieved to be, an unhelpful compromise, and there is no hard and fast rule as to how, when and  
where this notion of contamination might succeed: the context is crucial. What matters here is that anarchists begin  
to emerge from their purist tendencies and experiment with the basic idea that, through exposure to dialogue and  
example, individuals, institutions and discourses that are currently inclined towards hierarchical, statist forms of  
politics might slowly become more open to other, more anarchistic ways of organising.
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a  tendency  towards  disengagement.  However,  anarchism,  in  its  rejection  of  hierarchical  and  
centralised authority, can be understood as offering a continuing critique to the way in which liberal  
politics currently manifest 58, alongside very real strategies for reducing such authoritarian forms of  
social organisation, but it can do so most effectively by practising forms of prefigurative politics  
which engage with the wider world, in anarchistic ways.
Prefiguration: What, When and How?
What, then, is this opportunity? And how can it be seized? I believe one important answer lies in  
the  anarchist  principle  of  prefiguration;  but,  like anarchism,  prefiguration is  understood in  two  
different ways;  I want now to explore this tension briefly, before turning to a wider discussion  
about how a more effective prefigurative politics may be realised; to do so, I separate prefiguration  
into what I call social and personal prefigurative politics. Such a division is primarily a theoretical  
tool, to help analyse more clearly what are in fact two over-lapping and mutually dependent ideas.
a) Prefiguration: Definitions and Problems
Firstly,  prefiguration suggests  a  consistency between means and ends – a  consistency which is  
viewed as being central to the anarchist tradition (Ehrlich et. al. 1979, 3). But if anarchists hold  
unrealistic expectations about possible  ends,  as I have argued they do in relation to their  basic 
libertarian ideals, then the means they use to reach them are likely to be too stringent. Crucially, this  
is  not an argument for compromise or pragmatism. I am not suggesting that anarchists ought to  
sever the link between means and ends, which would be to ultimately reject prefiguration, but rather  
accept  that  the ends they seek must  be understood as necessarily partial;  anarchism will  never  
provide a perfectly libertarian end, so anarchist means to achieve liberation need not be perfectly  
libertarian  either.  To  cite  an  example  already  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter;  the  idea  of  
consensus is given so much weight within contemporary anarchism because it is understood as the  
only  decision-making  procedure  that  will  not  result  in  coercion.  Voting,  on  the  other  hand,  is  
condemned as inherently authoritarian. However, if my analysis so far is correct, such a critique of  
voting, in otherwise egalitarian environments, loses some of this strength, because we come to see  
that there will always be times when some degree of conflict, and coercion, is possible. Simply put:  
58  As I am discussing principally western anarchist discourses, my arguments are similarly focused on the liberal  
world in which they operate; I am unqualified to discuss how my ideas might translate into non-liberal contexts.  
Presumably, in other social and political environments, there would be important differences but also important  
points of convergence. 
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consensus will not always be possible, and if anarchists continue to argue that it is, then they are  
destined to be chasing an illusionary dream, and, what is worse, liable therefore to ignore or reject  
more viable alternatives.
Secondly, prefiguration is understood as the realisation of one’s politics in the here and now – as  
opposed to waiting for the revolution; it is the famous building of the new society in the shell of the  
old. However, there is a tension between these two understanding of prefiguration. On the one hand,  
there is a  demand for consistency between means and ends,  and on the other,  for an anarchist  
politics to be lived, here and now. But how can means and ends remain consistent within a wider  
context deeply antagonistic to anarchist principles? The traditional answer has of course been to  
withdraw from situations where such conflicts might arise: party politics, hierarchical organisations,  
and so on, and conversely, to create spaces of autonomy where no such compromises are necessary.  
Whilst there is much to be said for the notion of setting up autonomous spaces, it raises the question  
as to how viable such an approach really is: by deliberately keeping anarchist politics clean from  
associations with non-anarchic politics, I believe anarchists are also ensuring their own continuing  
marginalisation.  Furthermore,  as  I  argued  in  Chapter  One,  the  assumption  that  anarchists  can  
operate autonomous of the state, or of capitalism, is ultimately flawed: an anarchist social centre  
may  be  run  along  libertarian  principles,  but  will  always  remain  a  part  of  a  more  complex  
relationship. In other words, they do not, and cannot, create or return to a pure, libertarian space – 
what Saul Newman refers to as an ‘uncontaminated point of departure’ (Newman 2001, 38). This  
does not automatically negate the worth of such experiments, but it raises a further question as to  
how this relationship is understood: why are some compromised means – using money, for example  
– acceptable, and others – becoming a councillor – not?  
Although there are certainly some notable exceptions to the picture I have painted – the work of the  
Haringey Solidarity Group being just one 59 - I believe we can draw some extremely important – if  
somewhat broad – conclusions about prefiguration; crucially, I hope that doing so will help open up  
more spaces in which anarchist politics can have a direct impact. At this stage, I want to explore  
how prefigurative politics can function, taking into account not only the concerns presented in this  
chapter, but also the earlier discussions about freedom, power, and ethics. Firstly, I will argue for an  
increase in anarchist forms of organisation, such as workers’ co-operatives – something I refer here  
59  The Haringey Solidarity Group (HSG) is involved in numerous activities, including residents’ associations which  
include many non-anarchist members of the community; rather than creating temporary autonomous zones, HSG  
‘aims to practice, encourage and support self-organised struggles by ordinary people within Haringey’. See  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haringey_Solidarity_Group  for more info (last accessed 23/01/2011).   
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to as social prefiguration. Importantly, I stress that such endeavours must accept that they are not  
autonomous,  but  must,  rather,  recognise,  and  utilise,  their  inter-connectedness  with  the  wider  
communities of which they are part. I also argue that such projects will have a greater capacity to  
intersect with more traditional forms of anarchist – and other radical, leftist – organising than is the  
case with much of contemporary activism. Secondly, I will suggest that a more day-to-day approach  
to  anarchist  principles  is  fundamental  to  the  anarchist  project.  Such an approach is  sometimes  
referred to as lifestyle anarchism, a confusing term that means very different things to different  
anarchists. I do however, believe that such a term is worth saving, and so I use it here, but I also  
employ the term personal prefiguration.
b) Social Prefiguration: Building the New Society
The creation of libertarian alternatives to those things usually provided by the state, or the capitalist  
market – housing, places of work, healthcare, education, and so on – is a long established tool  
within anarchist  politics; as such, I do not want to spend too much time discussing the precise  
details of such projects. However, within the contemporary anarchist movement, such projects are,  
whilst valued, nonetheless given considerably less priority than those forms of action with which  
the term direct action is usually associated – summit mobilisations, blockades, office occupations,  
and so on – in  other  words,  protests. 60 It  seems worthwhile,  therefore,  to  highlight  why social  
prefiguration is such a useful tool - indeed, more useful, I would suggest, than many of the above 
mentioned strategies.
Social prefiguration, as I understand it, is the creation of spaces and processes which fulfil the needs  
and desires of members of any community, and which do so along anarchist principles of horizontal  
control  and  mutual  aid,  as  well  as  incorporating  other  values  which  anarchists  might  well  be  
expected  to  endorse,  such  as  sustainability.  The  results  of  such  prefiguration  are  what  Chris  
Carlsson calls ‘nowtopia’ (Carlsson 2008) and what Saul  Newman, following Michel Foucault,  
refers to as ‘heterotopias’ (Newman 2009). The concept of ‘DIY’ is also commonly used within  
activist circles (Holtzman et. al. 2007; Trapese Collective 2007). Such initiatives may exist outside  
of the established order, and may even be illegal, or open to legal dispute; squats and land-based  
projects  where  semi-permanent  communities  are  created  without  planning  permission  being  
60  An Earth First! Pamphlet entitled Direct Action, for example, focuses solely on such actions, and makes no mention  
of other forms of direct action, such as the creation of workers’ co-ops.
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examples  of  this.  Other  projects  may  have  more  direct,  and  even,  to  some  extent,  agreeable,  
relationships  with  the  wider  world;  for  example,  housing  and  workers’ co-ops,  which  rely  on  
mortgages  and market  exchange respectively,  and  which  are  more  open and amenable  to  pro-
actively engaging with members of  the wider  community.  Home or  community education – of  
children and adults,  alternative health  care projects,  community allotments,  cultural  spaces  and  
events,  environmental  schemes  (composting,  tree-planting  and  so  on),  bike  workshops,  local  
economic trading schemes, and countless other projects exist with more or less participation with  
the wider community and its established institutions, norms and practices. As such, few, if any of  
these, can be said to be fully prefigurative, in the sense that, to some extent, they are all reliant on,  
or restricted by, non-anarchistic methods of social organisation. Furthermore, although they create  
alternatives to profit-making companies and state run services, they do not directly challenge them;  
although there will clearly be points of tension and possibly conflict, it is possible for both to co-
exist.  In  particular,  workers’ co-operatives  still  operate  within  the  market  paradigm,  which  is  
consistent with Proudhonian mutualism (see Prichard 2010), but which is opposed by the majority  
of anarchists. As such, it is common within the anarchist movement to see such activities as little  
more than reformism. Although they are generally accepted, and indeed appreciated on a personal  
level, they are often dismissed in strategic terms; all well and good, but hardly revolutionary (see  
McKay 2010). However, whilst social prefiguration is not  sufficient in and of itself for bringing 
about radical social change, I believe it is necessary, and that it should be given greater emphasis  
within the anarchist movement. 
Such  spaces  provide  opportunities  for  experimentation  and  education  that  cannot  be  found  
elsewhere. Any shift towards a more libertarian world is likely to meet a great many obstacles, but  
whilst  some,  such  as  explicit  military  intervention,  are  acknowledged,  the  psychological  and  
discursive barriers people – anarchists included – are liable to encounter are too often over-looked.  
This becomes especially  true when the postanarchist  critique is  recalled;  if  and when the state  
disappears, humanity will not simply revert to a peaceful and harmonious community. Nor can we  
simply make a rational choice one day to act as good anarchists, rather than as efficient, individual  
consumers. Learning how to work, live, and play in horizontal communities is not something that  
can be taken from theory to practice at the individual’s choosing. Our habits and norms, which  
currently reflect a competitive and hierarchical world, need to be undone, and consciously replaced  
with new values. Such projects become, in the words of Chris Carlsson, ‘a breeding ground for  
strategic and tactical  thinking and practices that  confront  the everyday objectification to which  
capitalism reduces us all’ (Carlsson 2008, 4) and therefore ‘constitute the beginnings of new kinds  
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of communities’ (ibid., 6). Errico Malatesta made a similar argument, and whilst stressing that co-
operatives were not revolutionary in and of themselves, he
 
recognise[d] the extreme usefulness that co-operatives, by accustoming managers to run their own affairs,  
the  organisation  of  their  work  and  other  activities,  can  have  at  the  beginning  of  a  revolution  as  
experienced organisations capable of dealing with the distribution of goods and serving as nerve centres  
for the mass of the population (Malatesta 1965, 115-6).
Proudhon also defended such a position, arguing that the more people began to live their politics on 
a daily basis, especially in the workplace, the closer they would be to creating a better society. As  
Alex Prichard explains, Proudhon ‘advocated a gradualist (r)evolution’ which ‘could be achieved  
through  the  socialisation  of  title  through  workers’  co-operatives  and  trade  and  communal  
federations’ (Prichard 2010, 108). Such processes take time, and as painfully slow as it may seem, if  
anarchists take their politics seriously, such work must begin here, and now. 
However,  there is  a  further criticism of  such initiatives,  and especially workers’ co-ops,  which  
suggests that, based on market principles and embedded within a wider capitalist context, they are  
forced to make too many compromises. As Iain McKay argues, ‘Eco-friendly technology […] is  
often more expensive than its rivals’ (Mckay 2010, 15) so market forces would either force co-
operatives to ignore eco-friendly alternatives, or have their survival threatened. He continues:
In terms of environmental impact, a self-managed firm must still ensure sales exceed costs in order to  
survive and so the economy must grow and expand into the environment. As well as placing pressure on  
the planet’s ecology, this need to grow impacts on human activity as it also means that market forces  
ensure that work continually has to expand (ibid., 16). 
Furthermore, such projects ‘could even degenerate back into capitalism as any inequalities that exist  
between co-operatives would be increased by competition, forcing weaker co-operatives to fail’  
(ibid.). Although anarchists must take these concerns with the seriousness they deserve, as out-right  
objections they are empirically contestable, and over-look two very important points that go to the  
very heart of the prefigurative project. On a concrete level, McKay’s claim that co-operatives will  
be forced to abandon their principles to compete on the open market is simply untrue (assuming, as  
it appears McKay is willing to do, that we accept that the very act of setting up a co-op is not in  
itself such a compromise).  In fact,  many co-ops exist  that stick firmly to their  principles,  even  
though they may well suffer economically as a result (a point I return to below), and McKay does  
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their often thankless work a great disservice by ignoring their efforts. Clearly, some give into the  
pressures – or promises – of the market, and slowly but surely their principles fade; and others,  
unwilling to compromise, do sadly fail. But what political strategy does not suffer from elements of  
failure? As Chris Carlsson argues 
all the foibles, contradictions, vices and confusions that beset anyone living in this mad world affect [such  
projects...]. Nevertheless, the experience that accumulates in them over time can be a fertile ground for  
new initiatives that might break out of this pernicious circle (Carlsson 2008, 236-8). 
Holtzman et al. make a similar point, when they note that although such projects ‘still take place in  
a monetary economy […] commodities produced in a DIY fashion have expanded their use-values  
in relation to their exchange-value’ (Haltzman et. al. 2007, 45). As such, these projects become ‘part  
of  the  process  of  undermining  capitalism by forming relationships  not  intended by  capitalism’  
(ibid.).
Whilst the problems of performing prefiguration within a capitalist economy must be constantly  
borne in mind, they do not ultimately diminish the importance of such projects. And, as noted,  
McKay’s arguments also miss two core features of social prefiguration. McKay argued that market  
pressures would force co-ops to run in environmentally unfriendly ways, because the market would  
force them to pursue economic, rather than ecological, goals. However, once again, this is countered  
by real examples,  and by a wider theoretical argument;  many co-operatives exist  with a strong  
emphasis on creating – or relearning - viable alternatives to unjust or unsustainable practices (see  
Carlsson 2008 for a lengthy analysis of this point).  Growing with Grace, the local workers’ co-op 
where I get my vegetables from, is dedicated to growing food in as sustainable way as possible. As  
such, its members are playing a vital role in the much needed process of recreating a viable food  
production system in this country – something which we have all but lost in the last fifty years or  
so. They also offer much needed pockets of bio-diversity, as well as helping maintain traditional  
seed lines, without which we would quite literally lose many varieties of fruit and vegetables which,  
unlike most of the food we currently eat, is suited to the local environment and therefore essential to  
any sustainable, localised community. Although referring to intentional communities rather than  
workers’ co-ops,  Geoph Kozeny (quoted in  Coates  2007)  highlights  succinctly  the  value to  be  
gained from prefigurative projects:
In the twenty-first century, the experimentation extends to technological innovations and environmental  
practices,  with members of intentional communities at the forefront of implementing and testing such  
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technologies  as  straw  bale  construction;  solar,  hydro,  biodiesel,  and  wind-powered  energy  systems;  
composting  toilets  and  managed  wetland  water  treatment;  and  organic  agriculture  and  permaculture  
(Coates 2007, 13).
Without such projects, any potentially sustainable world that may come once McKay’s preferred  
revolutionary tactics became effective would suffer from a very real lack of essential knowledge,  
skills, and environmental potential. Here and now, then, anarchists must begin the process by which  
they might eventually achieve, not only metaphorically, but also quite literally, ‘the conquest of  
bread’ (Kropotkin 1985, 66-88).]
The second point, which I discuss in greater detail below, is that a critique of ‘ market pressures’ can 
often obscure the fact that all manner of  pressures exist, and will continue to exist, whatever the 
economic or  political  system we adopt.  The critique of the previous chapters  suggests  that  the  
freedoms  demanded  by  individuals  may  conflict  with  one  another,  and  that  there  will  be  
unavoidable  power  relations  between them,  and between the  producers  or  providers  of  certain  
services and goods. Communities will at times have to make difficult decisions about how they  
want  their  lives  to  be  organised;  such  decisions  will  often  involve  workers,  for  example,  and  
tensions  may grow between  producers  and  other  members  of  the  community,  or  between  two  
groups of producers. Such conflicts and tensions are not, in other words, simply the result of a  
market economy, but are an inevitable consequence of a plurality of values existing on a finite  
planet (see Fairlie 2010 for an interesting discussion about the many ethical and cultural choices  
about food production that communities will need to make in a post-oil world). Growing with Grace  
is in fact suffering from considerable economic difficulties (though refusing to alter its principles as  
a result) but it is all too easy to blame ‘the market’ for this. Quite simply, Growing with Grace  
would survive quite easily if every anarchist in my home-town of Lancaster bought their vegetables  
from them, instead of from supermarkets. Doing so may mean making some sacrifices – spending a  
little more money, getting a little less variety -  but if anarchists are not prepared to do so now, we  
might well ask to what extent they really do want a different world. Such decisions are not simply a  
result  of  the  way  the  world  is  currently  organised;  market pressures  also  relate  to  very  real  
limitations in resources – of time, of people, of the environment – and such limitations will always  
exist.  If  the market  now bullies companies  into cutting corners to save money, will  libertarian  
communities not also be persuaded to make environmentally unsound decisions when doing so will  
result in greater luxuries or easier working conditions? To believe that it is only the market which  
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creates such conflicts is to believe in a possible world where there are no constraints on resources –  
a  post-scarcity anarchism,  as  Bookchin  called  it  (1974).  Bookchin’s  astute  environmental  
observations, however, were clouded by a naïve optimism in the potential of technology to solve  
problems of production and consumption – a position which is no longer deemed tenable by many  
anarchists, and rightly so (see Gordon 2008, Ch. 5, for a useful overview of this). Playing with a  
rather apt metaphor, we might say that if projects such as Growing with Grace fail because of  
market pressures, it is also because people – anarchists amongst them – choose to enjoy the fruits of  
an unjust world over the winter vegetables of a just one. 
If and when such projects suffer because of market pressures, then, anarchists must accept the role  
they play in this; the market, impersonal and abstract on one level, is concrete and personal on  
another.  Developing procedures  for  resolving such disputes  is  as  much a  process  of  individual  
learning as it is the creation of rigid protocol. Once again, the benefits of beginning such a process  
now cannot be overstated. 
Furthermore, such projects should not only be viewed in isolation. Radical Routes, 61 a network of 
radical co-ops based in the UK, is active in supporting housing and workers’ co-ops. As I write,  
some of its members are busy trying to get the best possible results out of the government’s decision  
to disband the Financial Services Authority. This engagement with government – which created  
considerable discussion about reformist politics within the network – could be seen as akin to the  
sort of politics that unions often undertake. Indeed, there is increasingly excited discussion within  
the network about the potential for a radical co-operative movement to expand in a more organised,  
and explicitly political, direction; one which could potentially engage with politics, as unions do,  
but which was also prefigurative. Not only is each co-op based on anarchist principles, but so is the  
network as a whole. Such an approach could help unite many of those involved in such projects –  
who  tend  to  also  be  engaged  with  the  movement  I  have  been  discussing  –  with  other,  more  
traditional anarchist trajectories, such as Solfed, or the IWW, for example. 62 Malatesta, again, saw 
the  role  of  co-operatives  as  similar  to  that  of  trade  unions,  as  both  offered  the  possibility  of  
experimenting with new forms of relationship, and so preparing people for an anarchist future  (if  
and when unions were run alongside more libertarian grounds) whilst both offered more immediate  
reforms which could help bring working-class people, unwilling to wait for a revolution, on-board  
(Malatesta 1965, 115-6; see also Sparrow 1997). 
61  See www.radicalroutes.org.uk
62   See www.solfed.org.uk and www.iww.org.uk
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So, social prefiguration offers a multitude of direct and indirect avenues for anarchists to pursue  
their political goals; it provides a concrete way to engage with anarchist politics, is often personally  
rewarding and inspiring, and it creates much needed space to experiment with and reflect upon the  
process of reducing hierarchies and living with fewer and fewer levels of authority and control. One  
slightly critical note I would add is this: as I have argued so often in this thesis, anarchists display a  
strong tendency to be too uncritical about their own politics. Not surprisingly, discussions about  
these  prefigurative  projects  tend  to  over-emphasise  the  positives,  and  under-emphasise  the  
negatives.  Radical  Routes  is  one  more  example  used  by  activists  to  point  to  the  viability  of  
anarchism,  and  in  particular,  of  the  consensus  process;  yet  there  are already signs  that,  as  the  
network grows, Radical Routes is struggling to achieve consensus on certain issues, occasionally  
reverting  to  voting  (Nicholson  2007).  Although  this  uncritical  support  is  understandable,  it  is  
ultimately damaging. If the process of social prefiguration continues to grow, critical voices will no  
doubt appear, but the sooner they do, and the more they come from within the movement itself, as 
supportive, rather than dismissive, criticism, the better. 
Social prefiguration is also made much stronger, and is often entirely dependent on, a more personal  
approach to  political  change.  I  turn  now to  the  question  of  personal  prefiguration,  or  lifestyle  
politics.
c) Personal Prefiguration: No Gods, No Masters ... No Excuses.
Although the subject generates frequent and heated debates on anarchist email lists, at gatherings,  
and so on, the issue of lifestyle politics has rarely been written about in depth. Not only academic,  
but also activist literature, tends to ignore the issue. One very well known text which people may  
refer to with reference to the lifestyle debate is Murray Bookchin’s essay,  Social Anarchism or  
Lifestyle Anarchism (1995). It is worth explaining briefly then why Bookchin’s essay, and his use of  
the term itself, has no real relevance to my own discussion. For Bookchin, ‘what passes for [such  
lifestyle] anarchism […] is little more than an introspective personalism that denigrates responsible  
social  commitment’,  that  ‘arrogantly  derides  structure’ and  therefore  presents  no  more  than  ‘a  
playground for juvenile antics’ (Bookchin 1995, 10). He continues: ‘Lifestyle, like individualist,  
anarchism bears a disdain for theory, with mystical, and primitivistic filiations that are generally too  
vague, intuitional, and even antirational to analyse directly’ (ibid., 11). However, it is, apparently,  
not quite so vague as to escape Bookchin’s wrath, and he goes on to deride the fact that 
lifestyle anarchism today is finding its principle expression in spray-can graffiti, postmodernist nihilism,  
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antirationalism, neoprimitivism, anti-technologism, neo-Situationist “cultural terrorism”, mysticism, and a  
“practice” of staging Foucauldian “personal insurrections” (ibid., 19).  
However, this text has rightly been critiqued for its own lack of consistency and clarity (Black  
1997). Bookchin’s claim that lifestyle is too vague to analyse, for example, arises principally from  
that fact that he ‘cobbled together all his self-selected enemies’ (ibid., 51) under the term lifestyle  
anarchists;  certainly,  Bookchin’s  caricature  of  lifestyle  anarchism  does  not  relate  to  any  self-
identifying group of theorists or activists, or indeed to any recognisable trend within anarchism. As  
Bob Black correctly suggests, lifestyle anarchism for Bookchin simply denotes those elements of  
anarchist theory of which he disapproves, regardless of whether such elements have in fact any  
relationship with one another – which, more often than not, they do not. Most regrettably, rather  
than inventing a new term to disabuse those he disagreed with, Bookchin (for no obvious reason)  
chose to label  them as  lifestyle  anarchists  –  a term which had a very real,  and very different,  
meaning for those who did identify with the label.                                                                               
The lifestyle anarchism (henceforth, simply lifestyle, or personal prefiguration) which I wish to  
discuss is more commonly understood as referring to the prefigurative notion where one must put  
into practice here and now those principles one would hope to see in an anarchist society. However,  
rather than simply seeing this as a question of what I have called social prefiguration, lifestyle  
understands prefiguration on the personal level as well. Not only is the anarchist to create collective 
spaces to work, to live, to grow food and be educated, she is also to live, day to day, according to  
her principles, acting, where possible, in ways consistent with her own values. Although this may  
seem perfectly reasonable, and a logical extension of the sort of prefigurative politics I discussed  
above  –  and,  indeed,  I  would  suggest  it  is  both  those  things  –  lifestyle  is  often  greeted  with  
considerable criticism. There are,  I  believe,  two reasons for this;  one,  to do with its perceived  
reformist nature, and the other, to do with a more complex ethical problem relating to issues of  
responsibility and blame; I discuss these in turn, and, in tackling them, present the case for an  
increased support of lifestyle politics.
 
d) Lifestyle Politics; Revolutionary, or Reformist?
Lifestyle, then, is often dismissed as, at best, ineffective reformism; individual actions make little  
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difference to the larger picture, and, in suggesting that the individual has real power to do good  
without radically changing the world, it supports a liberal view of the individual,  freely choosing  
one  act  over  another.  In  a  discussion of  ethical  consumerism –  one,  but  only  one,  element  of  
lifestyle - the Anarchist FAQ presents a fairly standard position, not condemning lifestyle per se, but  
questioning its ultimate worth:
This is not to suggest that we become unconcerned about how we spend our money. Far from it. Buying  
greener products rather  than the standard one does have an impact.  It  just means being aware of the  
limitations of green consumerism, particularly as a means of changing the world. Rather, we must look to  
changing how goods are produced. […] Because green consumerism is based wholly on market solutions 
to the ecological crisis, it is incapable of even recognising a key root cause of that crisis, namely the  
atomising nature of capitalism and the social relationships it creates (2007, 470, my emphasis)
This statement makes explicit an assumption that underpins most critiques against lifestyle, and  
which is entirely misguided. The argument here is that shopping ethically is all well and good, but it  
will not help address the way goods are produced. I would suggest that lifestyle does in fact do that,  
that it has the potential to do it with considerable effect, and that it does much else besides. On what  
basis is the claim that ‘green consumerism is based  wholly  on market solutions’ made? Clearly, 
some green consumerism is little more than the support of green-wash by companies that have no  
real interest in working towards a just or sustainable world; but I would argue that rather than being  
a critique  of ethical consumerism, this ought not be seen as ethical consumption at all. In other  
words, for consumption to be ethical, it must, for an anarchist, go beyond this superficial greening,  
and incorporate genuinely radical values. Lifestyle is by its very nature not a simplistic approach to 
shopping  where  some  companies  are  boycotted  and  organic  vegetables  are  bought  from  
supermarkets; it  must integrate a far more holistic approach. One obvious factor in this, almost  
always over-looked by critics, is that ethical consumerism is, first and foremost, about consuming  
less, and a broader lifestyle approach is about finding ways to satisfy needs without shopping, by  
growing one’s own food, by learning to live with less, and so on. Another way to reflect upon this is  
to consider the distinction to be made between ethical consumerism and ethical consumption, with 
the former understood as a surface greening of an essentially unsustainable economic structure that  
demands perpetual growth, and the latter designating an attempt to make sustainable – and just – the  
production and provision of things that are seen as being of genuine worth 63 (Seyfang 2005).
63  Of course, the question of which things we need to live becomes a very complicated one, the moment we step  
beyond the realm of those things, such as food and shelter, that are absolutely necessary; and even here, there are  
questions about which food, and what sort of shelter, we might demand. What is clear to anarchists, however, is that,  
at present, we live in a world that has gone too far in its obsession with material wealth, and that, consequently, a  
reduction in consumption is necessary (in the west, at least). Conversely, an anarchist society would, in theory, make  
discussions about necessity more equitable and just; as C. Douglas Lummis puts it: ‘The sorting out of our true  
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It  is interesting to note that whilst  lifestyle is often criticised for being too embedded within a  
capitalist economy,64 temporary autonomous zones escape such critical reflection. David Graeber  
recognises the difficulties created by engaging with a society at  odds with anarchist  principles,  
although he, like so many in the movement, still maintains the illusion that it can be done. But he  
accepts  that  this  is  only  because  such  endeavours  remain  marginalised  and  temporary;  his  
assessment of the basic problem, and the necessary steps to address it, mirror my own:   
A revolutionary strategy based on direct action can only succeed if the principles of direct action become  
institutionalised. Temporary bubbles of autonomy must gradually turn into permanent, free communities.  
However [...] these communities cannot exist in isolation; neither can they have a purely confrontational  
relation with everyone around them. They have to have some way to engage with larger economic, social,  
or political systems that surround them. This is the trickiest question because it  has proved extremely  
difficult for those organised on radically democratic lines to so integrate themselves in any meaningful  
way  in  larger  structures  without  having  to  make  endless  compromises  in  their  founding  principles  
(Graeber 2009, 210-11).
I would suggest that personal prefiguration offers an excellent site of struggle, where responses to  
the problems raised by Graeber can be constructively considered, by creating much needed spaces  
in which emotional, cultural, tactical and practical issues can be addressed, experimented with, and  
improved. 
Although it must rank amongst the most frequently quoted anarchist texts, it is worth here making  
mention of Gustav Landauer’s view that ‘the state is a social relationship; a certain way of people  
relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relationships; i.e., by people  
relating to one another differently’ (Landauer 2010, 3). Applying this analysis to our everyday lives,  
we can see that our every act is played out within certain discursive, and practical, parameters.  
Shopping at a local workers’ co-op, rather than a supermarket –  even when doing so relies on  
standard economic transactions – helps create and define new social relationships: it helps people  
operate such ventures (because, as I suggested above, without people actively choosing to support  
them, they would not exist); it helps people learn to think and act in more localised, community  
needs from those that are the maimed consequences of the fear and envy of class society would happen slowly and  
naturally  in  a  society that  was genuinely just,  equalitarian and safe’ (Douglas  Lummis 1996,  78).  Rather  than  
suggesting this is not a difficult question, personal prefiguration turns such theoretical questions – what do we need  
to be happy? - into a matter of concrete, daily life. 
64  Bookchin’s critique of lifestyle anarchism suggests that this issue effectively negates the value of such experiments;  
clearly, I think this out-right rejection fails to recognise that such problems can themselves be useful. What I would  
argue is not that this is problematic per se, but that such tensions need to be recognised.   
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oriented  ways,  with  people replacing  workers and  customers;  it  helps  create  broader  social  
relationships – the local shop buying food from the local farm, and so on; and, once again, it helps  
make clear the issues raised in the previous chapter, as people’s needs and desires are not simply  
theoretical,  ideological  hopes,  but  day-to-day,  practical  realities,  with tangible  consequences.  In  
short,  it  helps  people  experiment  with  and  move  towards  the  sort  of  social  and  economic  
arrangements anarchists might hope to some day see realised. Again, Geoph Kozeny puts the point  
well:
Many topics about which people in the mainstream culture may be reluctant to talk (relationship dynamics,  
for  example,  or  differences in  values  and priorities) tend to get  discussed more openly in  intentional  
communities because their members are attempting to design their lives intentionally.  They are trying  
deliberately to address and change culturally ingrained habits; generally they are trying to move from  
individualistic  behaviour  towards  actions  based  on  co-operation,  sharing  and  collaborative  decision-
making (Kozeny, quoted in Coates 2007, 13).
Trust, values, friendship and a shared sense of responsibility and interdependence replaces the soul-
less transaction of a supermarket check-out. Abstract principles become the matter of concrete and  
daily  decisions,  and  this  includes  responding  to  the  difficult  dilemmas  that  any  such  activity  
necessarily creates – and would, if my analyses in previous chapters are correct, continue to exist in  
some form in an anarchist society.  
And this is just one example of many. As noted, lifestyle is much more than ethical consumption,  
and, furthermore, ethical consumption is much more than ethical  shopping. Learning to live with 
less, learning to grow at least some of our own food, to brew our own beer, to repair instead of  
discard, to share and hold in common, to structure our lives in ways that help, rather than hinder,  
our attempts to reduce our impact on the planet and all that lives on it. And, as I shall explain in the  
next section, it is about reclaiming responsibility for our own actions. 
e) Responsibility in an Unjust World
The claim that anarchists – or indeed most individuals – should take responsibility for their actions  
is obvious to some, but extremely contentious to others; as I suggested earlier, the argument that  
people  have  responsibility  would  appear  to  rest  on  the  prior  claim  that  people  are  genuinely  
empowered  to  act  in  whichever  way  they  chose  –  something  which  any  radical  analysis  of  
capitalism and the state would appear to deny. Whilst  I  would accept  that  people’s actions are  
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seriously limited by their context – and this is true of some individuals much more so than others – I  
would also argue that there is in fact considerable space in which we  can move towards more 
consistent lives. Once again, Landauer makes the point powerfully, in a letter to Max Nettlau, in  
which he states that he
refuse[s] to divide people into those who are the masters of the state and those who are the state’s servants.  
Human relationships depend on human behaviour. The possibility of anarchy depends on the belief that  
people can always change their behaviour. In order to change ourselves and our social conditions, we must  
use the limited freedom that we have. It is up to no one but ourselves to do so and to create as much  
freedom and unity as possible. Who can deny that we have made very little use of the possibilities we  
have? (Landauer 2010, 309).
In other words, the argument that people are disempowered and disenfranchised by the state, and  
capitalism,  need  not  result  in  the  conclusion that  people are  therefore  completely  incapable  of  
making small  but  important changes in their  everyday lives.  Ironically,  doing so results in still  
further disempowerment, and anarchists must be cautious of the disabling potential of their own  
radical critique. The issue of responsibility also touches upon the wider points made by this thesis;  
the  more  the  notions  of  freedom,  power  and  ethics  are  problematised,  the  more  we  see  how  
important – and difficult - the making of daily decisions is. Such an argument, however, forces  
anarchists to accept an uncomfortable problem; namely, that they would, in an anarchist society, be 
put in a position where such decisions needed to be made. At present, lifestyle is often dismissed as  
being  divisive,  because  it  assumes  moral  judgements  are  being  made  within the  anarchist 
community.  Here I  believe  we see  tangible  evidence  of  Newman’s  claim that  anarchists  see  a  
fundamental division between society, which is good, and the state, which is bad (Newman 2001),  
and evidence that the basic issues raised by this thesis have yet to be properly addressed. Somehow,  
the differences between anarchists – between meat-eaters and vegans, to cite one common example  
– is seen as being an unnecessary distraction; the real battle is between anarchists and the state. We  
are back to a simplistic analysis of the world – a world of ‘one no, many yeses’. Whereas Newman  
argues that such a position rests on underlying metaphysical assumptions, I believe that there are  
also more personal reasons, relating to questions of guilt and personal responsibility; such issues are  
much easier to deal with when the moral universe is neatly divided into the good guys and the bad  
guys. Certainly, the question of lifestyle, whilst remaining an apparent irrelevance for academics –  
as noted by the  lack of discussion on the matter  –  is  one which never  fails  to  illicit  a  strong  
emotional response from the wider anarchist  community.  A quick glance through any anarchist  
email list will quickly reveal similarly passionate, defensive and often aggressive discussions
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 whenever the subject of personal prefiguration is raised. Such moral concerns, it would appear, are  
supposed to remain personal, once again echoing the liberal division between individual morality  
and public politics.65 
But  the  arguments  I  have  presented  in  the  preceding  chapters  suggest  that  this  division  is  an  
illusion; anarchists need to accept that questions of ethics will  remain pertinent – and at  times  
conflictual – within libertarian societies; at present, the way questions of personal moral choices –  
lifestyles – are dealt with points to a movement that has failed to acknowledge the potential for  
moral divisions,  without the state.  Personal prefiguration, then, is important not only because it  
helps sustain  social prefiguration, but because it  helps foster both a sense of responsibility and  
forces anarchists to begin working through ways of responding to ethical conflicts. Rather than a  
distraction,  disagreements  about  lifestyle  should  be  seen  as  an  integral  part  of  the  challenge  
anarchists face in the long battle to create new cultural and political tools to replace those of the  
authoritarian state with which we have all  been raised.  Indeed,  one of the strongest  arguments  
against  the  state  is  that  it  infantilises  those  it  controls,  by  taking  away  the  individual’s  moral  
responsibility. Kropotkin, for example, in his essay Law and Authority argued that people
 
are so perverted by an education which from infancy seeks to kill in us the spirit of revolt, and to develop  
that of submission to authority; we are so perverted by this existence under the ferrule of a law, which  
regulates every event in life […] that, if this state of things continues, we shall lose all initiative, all habit  
of thinking for ourselves (Kropotkin  1970, 197).
Following Kropotkin, Randall Amster makes much the same argument. Any ‘reference to external,  
written laws represents an abdication of the subject’s capacity for moral self-direction – an essential  
element of a social order without institutionalised coercion’ (n.d). Such a critique, however, implies  
that people must relearn – or, more accurately, create afresh - these things; they will not, in other  
words, simply awaken once the state is destroyed. Making ethical choices in one’s daily life now  
plays a crucial role in this respect. 
Now, anarchists opposed to, or indifferent towards, personal prefiguration may take umbrage with  
65 Of course, there are also reasonable disagreements about which values ought to be pursued – a fact which may  
muddy discussion of lifestyle somewhat, because there are no clear acts which a lifestyle anarchist would necessarily  
perform, or abstain from. This diversity of values makes it  hard to assess the extent to which anarchists embrace  
lifestyle, and adds an additional dimension to debates about prefiguration which often makes such debates not only  
confusing but also even more emotionally charged. Although this fact makes it  more difficult to analyse with any  
certainty how lifestyle is viewed by anarchists exactly, I believe this makes my argument for a more explicit approach to  
lifestyle stronger, rather than weaker. 
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my apparent suggestion that they are, by rejecting lifestyle,  not making ethical decisions; clearly, 
they  are.  Their  anarchism  is  the  result  of  a  moral  choice,  the  result  of  which  is  an  ethical  
condemnation of capitalism and the state, and there will no doubt be countless other examples –  
their  outrage  about  a  war,  a  particularly  offensive  policy,  a  corporation’s  especially  ruthless  
approach to business,  and so on.  But  whereas such ethical choices will  lead to people holding  
certain  (often  long-term)  political  views  about  how  the  world  could  or  should  be  organised,  
personal prefiguration encourages the individual to act, as much as is possible, according to those  
ethical decisions. As such, the practical and philosophical complexity that arises in making certain  
decisions that affect one’s daily life, decisions which are often much more personal, and much less  
black and white, than questions of, for example, foreign policy, means that such decisions provide  
much more profound and informative, and often challenging experiences for the individual (see  
Trujillo 2010 for an informative discussion on the difficulties, and political relevance, of trying to  
live according to environmental values).
Social and personal prefiguration work on many levels, then. Although neither will bring about  
radical change on their own, I believe they are both necessary elements of any attempts to create a  
more libertarian society.  They offer small  but important forms of daily resistance (which could  
become much bigger,  the  more  they are  adopted)  as  well  as  offering spaces  for  much needed  
experimentation and learning. These acts of prefiguration also suggest ways in which anarchists  
might more comfortably deal with the question of defining how an anarchist society might function.  
The rejection of blue-prints is based on a number of legitimate concerns; the fear of a vanguardist  
approach to politics, the recreation of hierarchies, and the illegitimate universalising of political  
responses to complex and contextualised problems. However, attempts to prefigure an anarchist  
politics will necessarily provide clues as to how many of life’s problems may be solved if and when  
the state and capitalism disappear. Such experiments must be understood with reference to their  
necessary limitations, performed as they are within the confines of the state, but as long as this is  
acknowledged, and claims are not made that they provide a genuine example of anarchistic forms of  
organisation, then what they  can offer is of considerable value to anarchists, because rather than  
abstract principles, acts of prefiguration provide daily examples that anarchists can begin to learn  
from, and which can, with necessary caution, begin to shed light on how such processes may grow  
and flourish as the state withers and dies. 
Once again, there remains an undeniably large step between such projects and life in a fully fledged  
libertarian society. So although prefiguration can respond to some of the fears about blue-prints, it  
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by no means does away with them entirely. However, I believe that such fears, however valid, must  
be balanced with the need to ask questions about how anarchist societies might work, and the need  
to respond to people’s legitimate concerns about challenging what most people see as essential  
features of modern life. Now, then, I want to explore this matter, and suggest that the unequivocal  
rejection of blue-prints is one more anarchist principle in need of moderation.
Rethinking Blue-prints: Positive Visions or Authoritarian Models?
In this  final  section,  I  want to argue that anarchists  must  rethink their  rejection of blue-prints,  
though this does not automatically entail an unthinking embrace of them either. We saw in Chapter  
One how Michael Albert argued that ‘citizens of developed countries are not going to risk what they  
have […] to pursue a goal about which they have no clarity’  (Albert 2001, 326-7).  Like Bookchin, 
Albert  stresses the need to respond to the questions which anarchists  have so often refused to  
answer (see also Shukatis, 2009; Purchase 1994). He also argues that as well as providing a more  
long-term vision, such discussions can help inform anarchist responses to contemporary political  
questions.  Unfortunately,  also  like  Bookchin,  Albert  appears  unable  to  resist  taking  an  overly  
personal tone against those with whom he disagrees. In the article from which the above quote is  
taken, he refers to those trends which reject the creation of blue-prints as ‘distasteful anarchism’  
(ibid.,  322).  Not only is this counter-productive, in terms of winning support for his argument,  
which  is legitimate,  it  is  also  misguided.  The  anarchist  rejection  of  blue-prints  is  not  some  
whimsical position, dreamt up by ‘distasteful’ people; it is a thoughtful response to the problems of,  
amongst other things, knowledge, hierarchy, authority and control. What I would urge  is a meeting 
of these two concerns, where one does not cancel out or dismiss the other, but where each informs 
the other. There is a crucial distinction to be made between arguing that an anarchist community  
would, or should organise according to blue-print A, and arguing that an anarchist community could 
organise in such a way. Put simply, offering people a vision of how anarchists might deal with anti-
social behaviour is not the same as arguing that such a society must, or necessarily would, follow 
such a vision. Of course, it is true that there is always the danger that ideas presented initially as  
possibilities, over time became ossified dogmas – which is precisely why the critique of blue-prints  
must  not  be  entirely  forgotten.  But  an  out-right  rejection  of  blue-prints  is  equally  dangerous,  
because whilst it offers a less risky strategy in theory, it is, as Albert rightly suggests, unlikely to  
ever win widespread support; in other words, it runs the risk of giving far more openly authoritarian  
ideologies a free hand at convincing people that anarchism is a hopelessly utopian dream, and a  
liberal state, at best, the only viable alternative.
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It is also crucial here to disentangle two different but over-lapping reasons for rejecting blue-prints;  
the more common argument given, as we saw in Chapter One, is that to predefine how a society  
might organise at some point in the future would in itself be an authoritarian act, limiting as it  
would the capacity for those who would actually live in such a community to decide for themselves  
how their lives should be organised.  However, there is, especially in recent years, an increasing  
resistance to the idea that the sort of institutions Albert and Bookchin discuss should exist  at all, 
and therefore, a rejection of blue-prints as not only dangerous but ultimately unnecessary. As Albert  
suggests,  many contemporary anarchists  dismiss ‘political forms, per se,  or  institutions,  per se’  
(Albert  2001,  322).  What I  hope to  have shown in this  thesis  is  that  the dream of a perfectly  
libertarian world is just that - a dream. However they might be imagined or realised, societies will  
create systems by which some form of social  cohesion is created, and order maintained. Some  
communities  may  adopt  formalised  methods  that  approach  what  we  currently  understand  as  
institutions – and certain institutions, such as the police force, at that. In doing so, they will run the  
risk of slipping back into more authoritarian forms of politics. Others may rely more heavily on  
cultural  tools,  such  as  the  creation  of  moral  taboos,  for  example,  to  create  some  degree  of  
conformity and order. In doing so, they will run the risk of slipping back into more authoritarian  
forms of politics. In other words, anarchists cannot simply deny the legitimacy of institutions and  
therefore hope to have solved the problems of authority per se, because other social tools have  
proved just as effective in creating authoritarian spaces. It seems, then, that the refusal to at least  
contemplate  questions  about  how an anarchist  society might  run is  considerably weakened.  Its  
premises should not be dismissed, however, but incorporated as legitimate concerns that may rightly  
limit, guide, and inform such endeavours. So how might anarchists respond to these arguments, and  
incorporate them with lessons learnt from prefigurative experiments, to begin to sketch out the  
necessary outlines of a future world without the state? 
I argued above that conflicts between different producers of goods and services, and between such  
producers and those they provide for, ought not be seen as simply the result of a market economy;  
such conflicts  are,  ultimately,  inevitable,  though we might hope they would be greatly reduced  
without the additional aggravating factors of a profit-centred economic system. As such, workers’  
co-ops and their customers must, to some extent, already begin to experiment with ways to respond  
to such conflicts.66 For example, by breaking down the division between workers and customers,  
66  And, indeed, much wider networks may slowly be established; a local farm, for example, may also engage in  
discussions with producers of farming equipment operating in other parts of the country, or even the world. As such,  
we can already see the development of a federated system of decision-making, where the needs of two communities,  
separated by geography, are united by shared, though possibly conflicting, interests.  
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collective  processes  of  decision-making can  be  established,  and  refined.  Operating  outside  the  
relative simplicity of a temporary autonomous zone, such processes offer a far greater wealth of  
experience  and insight  into how difficult  decisions  might  be  made,  and  how conflicts  may be  
resolved when full agreement is not possible. The needs of the workers, the consumers, and the  
local environment, therefore, will be taken into account, not as a theoretical experiment, but as a  
concrete procedure, with very real consequences affecting everyone concerned.
I also mentioned earlier that Radical Routes is, at the time of writing, engaged in a complicated  
process of responding to the government’s plans to abolish the Financial Services Authority (FSA),  
the body which until now had over-seen the running of co-operatives.  A particular concern for  
members  of  Radical  Routes  in  an  issue  known as  carpet-bagging,  where  members  of  a  co-op  
effectively de-mutualise it, and turn it into a standard business, or house. Although strictly illegal,  
incidents of carpet-bagging have long been ignored by the FSA, which has created problems for the  
co-operative movement. Some members of Radical Routes are therefore hoping to convince the  
government that the co-operative movement itself should have control over individual co-ops. The  
process is extremely interesting for anarchists, 67 because it presents the possibility of a movement  
which  operates  according  to  many radical  principles  being  given quasi-governmental  authority.  
How this organisation might perform would therefore be of considerable theoretical and practical  
interest; if (deemed) successful, it could provide concrete ideas as to how institutions holding some  
degree of authority, and the power to act on it,  may operate in a more libertarian context. The  
processes and structures employed could well provide an outline for other, similar ‘institutions’,  
becoming more localised and independent over time. Of course, if it fails, it may suggest either that  
radicals made one compromise too many, or that the possibilities of anarchistic organisation ought  
to be considered as even less realistic. 
The creation of tentative blue-prints, then, can inform, and be informed by, anarchist experiments  
with prefiguration. How much detail such outlines might provide is not itself a question that can be  
answered in any great detail; some anarchists may, for example, consider general proposals for a  
rotating system of individuals, empowered by their community, who would act as ‘police officers’,  
67   It is also interesting to note how readily people approved the proposal that the network should engage in this  
process, seemingly unconcerned by the extent to which this simply replaced a governmental authority with a co-
operative one. On a personal level I was heartened to see so many anarchists willing to make what I believe to be a  
worthwhile and certainly educational compromise, but also deeply concerned that this was happening because of an  
ideological blindness which was focusing people’s attention on the problems of the state, and not on the broader  
question of authority per se. Indeed, as I hope my thesis has shown, the concern that anarchists could well, given the  
chance, and with the best of intentions,  simply replace state authority with an equally problematic ‘libertarian’  
authority remains very real – but woefully under-acknowledged.
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and no more; others may feel that such an open-ended suggestion is more problematic than one with  
greater clarity, preferring to address particular concerns directly. Either way, I believe anarchists  
must come to terms with the tensions involved in considering such matters, and begin to consider  
more detailed ideas about the functioning of libertarian communities. And, in doing so, they may  
come to see that, rather than closing off possibilities, discussions surrounding these ideas are likely  
to lead to engaged and useful debates, prompting still more ideas; indeed, this must very much be  
about presenting a plurality of visions, rather than one, as authoritarian politics tend to do, or none,  
as anarchists have all too frequently done.
Conclusions
In this final chapter, I have outlined some broad and tentative proposals for making anarchism a  
more  viable political  force.  As well  as  responding directly  to  critiques  I  made in  the opening  
chapter,  I  have  also  argued  that  a  stronger  emphasis  on  prefigurative  strategies,  as  well  as  a  
rethinking of the absolute rejection of blue-prints, are appropriate responses to the core arguments  
of the thesis, which suggest that anarchism must accept that social order without the state can only  
be considered possible by accepting some limits to basic libertarian demands. This does not mean  
that anarchism needs to accept the state as a necessary political tool, but that it must come to terms  
with the need for some forms of organised politics, and with the need to begin to outline what such  
organisations must look like. Doing so can help anarchism escape the criticism that it offers no real  
alternative to the liberal  state,  as  well  as providing stepping-stones by which genuinely radical  
change might occur. 
All of the strategies I have proposed are already part of the anarchist tool-kit, but they are too often  
over-looked, or even considered as little more than a well-meaning distraction to the real goal of  
revolutionary struggle. By providing them with a strong theoretical underpinning, I hope to have  
shown that such strategies can play a crucial role in the sort of social change anarchists wish to see.  
My support of such tactics does not deny their inherent problems, but rather suggests that at times,  
these problems are themselves of value to people hoping to create forms of politics that deal with 
conflict,  rather  than  stamp it  out.  If  my  proposals  appear  to  step  out  onto  the  slippery  slope,  
precariously waiting to slide into an authoritarian, vanguardist revolutionary movement, or into a  
liberal reformism, my response would be that this is precisely the challenge which anarchism must  
face; ironically, the absolutist positions of so many anarchists are themselves simply attempts to  
control the political terrain, to prohibit certain actions because of their supposed potential to become  
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authoritarian. Anarchism must resist becoming what it has so relentlessly critiqued, but it must be  
mindful of the potential that, in doing so, it runs the risk of simply recreating its own forms of  
authoritarian politics. Anarchism is, then, the art of politics, not in the safety of the state, or the  
party, or the autonomous zone, but rather, it is the politics of the slippery slope. 
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Conclusions
 Rules without Rulers?
We do not wish to be ruled. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule  
nobody? (Kropotkin 1970, 98) 
ANARCHISTS have always argued that another world is possible . Indeed, perhaps one of 
anarchism’s most persistent and admirable features is its consistent refusal to accept the inevitability  
of  the  state,  the  market,  of  inequality,  of  hierarchy;  its  refusal,  in  other  words,  to  accept  the  
inevitability of  this world. When Margaret Thatcher stated that ‘there is no alternative’ it is clear  
that this is not precisely what she meant; what she meant to say was that there is no  desirable 
alternative.  Indeed,  the Iron Lady was well  aware that  alternatives  existed,  and she thoroughly  
despised them. Although it might seem mere pedantry to point this out, I think it is informative to  
consider the likelihood that no one really thinks there is no alternative, or that, conversely another  
world is not possible. What people question are the declarations by individuals, or political groups,  
that they can offer not only another world, but a better one. 
The other world which anarchists insist is possible is, however, supposed to be a better one. Indeed,  
whilst  anarchists  deny they  are  utopians,  if  by  utopia we understand a  world of  uninterrupted  
happiness and perfection, they do nonetheless suggest that theirs is a world where everyone is free  
to pursue their own dreams, where no one will coerce anyone else, where any inequality is the result  
of natural difference and not social division. It is, politically speaking, perfect. 
Stated so categorically, anarchists may deny that this is what they believe, but if it is not, they are  
seemingly unwilling to admit which flaws we might expect to encounter: if there is to be coercion,  
we are left none the wiser as to how this might arise; if there are to be social inequalities, we are left  
none the wiser as to why they may come about; if there are to be limits to freedom, we are left none  
the wiser as to which liberties may be denied. Anarchism appears to offer everything, and explain  
almost nothing.
In the following work, I hope to have shown, though with regret, that anarchism is all too often 
presented  as  a  simplistic  and  utopian  fantasy,  with  little  awareness  or  acceptance  of  its  own  
limitations, and the limitations inherent within the complexity of human life. Absolute freedom  
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cannot be guaranteed, and, consequently, no society can promise that no one within it will ever be  
coerced. Disagreements about what it means to be good, about what is useful for society, about  
what  constitutes  harm,  are not  solely the product  of  an unnatural  power held within the state,  
however much social divisions may have been exacerbated by hierarchical and deliberately unequal  
ideological systems. There is no natural harmony to be found within human nature, and theoretical  
and  practical  conflict  is,  to  some  degree,  inevitable;  consensus  will  not  always  be  reached.  
When anarchism is presented as a once-and-for-all resolution to the inequities of capitalism and the  
state, is it any wonder that people refuse to accept such a promise, however appealing it might be?  
Yet when pushed, and at times of their own volition, anarchists do recognise that such problems  
exist; why, then, is anarchism so consistently presented as little more than a collection of absolute  
moral demands? Even when theories of social organisation are being experimented with by groups  
and  networks,  the  rhetoric  is  not  only  one  of  success,  but  of  a  success  which  proves  that  an  
anarchist society of liberty, equality and consensus is possible. 
But anarchism cannot, I have argued, offer such a world; a world without conflict is not possible, no  
matter  what  ideological  path  we  pursue.  An  anti-authoritarian  politics  must  be  one  which  
recognises, and learns to live with, the limits of freedom, and, in doing so, recognises that therefore  
anarchy is precisely an ever-changing interplay between its own libertarian values and the countless  
other values that exist within and shape our world. Anarchism should not be seen as a refusal to  
engage with this world, but a certain approach to it; a way of learning to live with the inevitable  
consequences of power. Anarchism is life on the slippery slope, and a refusal to shepherd everyone  
to the ‘safety’ of the top -  or the bottom. As Saul Newman argues
anti-politics  makes  sense  only  if  it  takes  seriously  the  task  of  politics:  building,  constructing,  
organising,  fighting,  making  collective  decisions  and  so  on.  Such  practices  are  in  no  sense  
irreconcilable with libertarianism, on the contrary, they are its very condition. Put simply, a politics  
of anti-politics points to the possibility of a libertarian politics outside, and ultimately transcendent  
of, the state and all  hierarchical structures of power and authority. To counteract such structures  
requires, however, the development of alternative libertarian and egalitarian structures and practices,  
coupled with a constant awareness of the authoritarian potential that lies in any structure (2010, 139)
Such a view chimes, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, with the work of Murray Bookchin – a point  
which Newman himself  recognises,  suggesting that in ‘Bookchin’s idea of municipalism as the  
basis for a new politics of citizenship and democratic decision making, we find many interesting  
and appealing ideas for libertarian institutions and practices, including forms of council democracy  
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and  decentralisation’  (151).  With  another  slightly  ironic  twist,  I  would  suggest  it  is  the  
contemporary anarchist movement, supposedly inspired by much post-structural thought, which has  
failed to  recognise the  possibilities  of  power and the  limits  of  freedom; hence the  claims that  
consensus is a viable tool for organising society. 
If my arguments have been convincing, such criticisms might lead the reader to wonder if there is  
anything or anarchism worth saving. In fact, I believe that there is, but only if anarchists themselves  
are prepared to recognise the limits of their ideology. If they do so, then they may begin to ask more  
honestly and critically what anarchism has to offer, and they will come to see that there is much to  
be said in its favour. The basic idea of democracy, so powerful in the western world, is more and  
more being placed under scrutiny, not only by academics (Hirst 1994; Douglas Lummis 1996), but  
also by the population at large, increasingly fed up with the political system. This political system, 
however,  is  more  than  happy to  offer  a  few politicians  themselves  as  sacrificial  lambs.  These  
proverbial bad apples are offered as scape-goats in order that the system itself is never placed under  
scrutiny.  Anarchists  have  seen  through  this,  and  recognised  that  a  change  of  the  guard  still  
ultimately leaves us guarded. But in refusing to discuss how life might work without the state, and  
in refusing to accept and explore the ways in which life might reasonably be expected to continue  
without disintegrating into violent chaos, anarchists have helped ensure their ideas are easily and  
thoroughly dismissed. 
Anarchists  must begin to accept that whilst  they themselves may be fanatical lovers of liberty,  
liberty itself is not so easily loved; freedom for the pike is death for the minnow, as R.H. Tawney  
once wisely said. A society without the state must therefore be a society with some form of order, if  
it is to become not only another world, but also a better one. The promise of absolute freedom is as  
simplistic as it is false. Getting rid of the guard, as anarchism rightly demands, does not, and indeed  
must not, entail getting rid of order, but rather suggests making that order more equal and more free.  
Anarchism is neither chaos nor utopia, it is a world of rules without rulers. The sooner anarchists  
accept this, the sooner we might come to know this entirely possible world.
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